ity over vice; as it imparts to its possessor a self approba tion and tranquility, which vice cannot impart;—as it procures, in a greater or less degree, esteem and respect from men, which vice, as such, cannot procure; and as in consequence of this esteem, the virtuous man, other things being equal, is more readily assisted, and in general better treated, than the vicious:—a probability hence arises, that such will be the state of things, through whatever stages of existence we may pass hereafter.-Nay, further, as those circumstances, which, at present, prevent virtue from obtaining a complete triumph, and vice from being put to confusion, are not necessary, but wholly adventitious, and as the tendencies of virtue and vice are opposite, and eternally must be, there is reason to hope, that in a future state the superiority of the one to the other, will be more decided and ob vious. In proceeding thus far, the divine moral attributes have not been taken into view. When these are satisfactorily proved, the argument in favor of a future state becomes more powerful. As God is morally pure, whenever he sees virtue, he must approve it; and vice, for the same reason, must excite his displeasure and disgust. It cannot be conceived, that any good being, whether human or divine, should view with indifference, opposite moral qualities. Now, if God looks on virtue with approbation, and on vice with hatred and disgust, can it be doubted, that this hatred or approbation will, in some way, be rendered manifest? Were a parent to make no discrimination between his obedient and disobedient children; bestowing the same favors, praise, and caresses, on the one, as on the other, his own moral character could not be maintained. No person, I am persuaded, can entertain honorable views of God, without believing, that in some period of human existence, a difference will be made between the precious and the vile. As there is, in the present state, no perfect discrimination of this kind; and as, notwithstanding the opposite tendencies of virtue and vice, there are ten thousand instances, in which the latter triumphs over the former, reason seems to impel us to believe in a future state, in which present disorders will be rectified, and when that retribution, which is now incipient and extremely imperfect, will be consummated. But though this reasoning appears conclusive in proof of a future state, in which there shall be a perfect discrimination of characters, it does not so clearly prove, that happiness will be the lot of any. To any person who makes use of his reason, and entertains correct views of the divine character, it must be apparent, that the world is in a state of moral pollution. If the divine law is just, every violation of it deserves punishment. The most reflecting persons would therefore have very uncomfortable apprehensions as to their future desti(Butler's Analogy, Part ii. ch. v. §3.) ny. I do not deny, that in the creation and government of God, there are proofs of mercy as well as of goodness, and that therefore the friends of virtue, if such should be found, would have reason to hope, that their sins would be pardoned on condition of repentance, and their upright services accepted and rewarded. Yet nothing like certainty could be obtained. These friends of virtue would know that their virtues were imperfect, and their offences innumerable. These offences, while not pardoned, must prevent reward, and render the person obnoxious to punishment. But should he be satisfied of this general truth, that Deity is not inexorable, but that pardon is, on certain conditions, attainable, it would still be perfectly beyond his power precisely to ascertain those conditions. Were he sure, that the terms were repentance, he would still have reason to inquire, whether this would be effectual in regard to all sins, even those which had been of a peculiarly deep stain, or had been long continued; and further, whether those sins, which were subsequent to repentance, would come within the limits of mercy. Neither could it be ascertained, whether future happiness would be temporary or eternal. If pagan philosophers had reasoned, on the subject of moral retribution, as forcibly, as the ablest among the moderns, such as Clark and Butler, their conclusions would still have been too indefinite to give satisfaction even to themselves; and how far removed their arguments would be from the understanding of common people, who have neither capacities nor leisure for such speculations, but who are, however, as much interested in a future state as any on earth, is too evident to require proof. It appears then, that had the powers of the human mind been well employed on the subject, there would still have been great need, that the doctrine of life and immortality should be divinely illuminated. II. But there is a vast difference between the possible and the actual discoveries of human reason: which leads us to inquire, in the second place, as to those sentiments, which prevailed on the subject of a future state of moral retribution. That existence is not terminated by death, but that the soul survives the body, appears to have been a sentiment, extensively diffused and generally admitted among pagan nations. This remark is applicable not less to heathen of modern, than of ancient times. Why then, it may be asked, was it necessary that the doctrine of immortality should receive additional light by Jesus Christ in the Gospel? I an swer, For three reasons; 1. Though the doctrine of a future state was general among the ancient heathen, it was by no means universal. Socrates is represented in the Phedon of Plato, as saying, "Almost every body fancies, that when the soul parts from the body, it is no more; it dies along with it. In the very minute of parting, it vanishes like a vapour of smoke, which flies off, and disperses, and has no existence." (Plato's Phedon. p 100.) This testimony is more important, as it is contained in a work designed expressly to prove the opposite doctrine. Polybius complains of the general profligacy and want of integrity, which, in his day, prevailed among the Greeks, and attributes it to the national rulers, who had encouraged the multitude to despise the terrors of a future state. It will not, I hope, be thought improper to introduce the following passage from Roman history, although it may have been repeatedly brought forward for a similar purpose. In the speech, which Cæsar delivered to a full Senate on occasion of Cataline's conspiracy, he endeavours to dissuade them from passing a sentence of death on the conspirators, by this argument, that death would be no punishment, as they, who were in favor of that sentence, intended it should be; assigning for a reason, that after death, there is neither enjoyment nor suffering; but that death is to all mortals, the end of evils.* We cannot doubt, that he well understood the character of those to whom he was speaking. But if we had any doubts of this, they would be removed, by observing, that this open avowal of infidelity, did not occasion the least surprise; those who replied, made no remarks, as that it were a novelty. Cicero answered cooly, that their ancestors had supposed it necessary to the public good, that the vicious should be deterred from crimes, by the fear of something after death.f The same illustrious author informs us in another place, how generally the ancient belief as to infernal regions of reward and punishment, was, in his time, discarded.‡ The contempt, in which this doctrine was held even by the vulgar in the days of Juvenal, is strongly represented in his second satire. "Esse aliquos manes, et subterranea regna, Atque una transire vadum tot millia cymba, Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum ære levantur." : Eam cucta mortalium mala dissolvere ultra neque curæ, neque gaudio locum esse. Sallust Cat. § 1. † Apud inferos ejusmodi quædam illi antiqui supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt. 4 Orat. in Catalinam. See Timæus, in life of Homer, 220. ‡ Quæ unus tam excors inveniri potest, quæ illa, quæ quondam credebantur, apud inferos portenta extimeseat? Cic. denat. deor. L. ii. c. 2. Tusc. L. i.16. "That angry justice formed a dreadful hell, By children question'd, and by men despised." Gifford. It may be thought, that the sentiment, here conveyed, is contradicted by the same author, in his 13th satire, which portrays, in very lively colours, the terrors of a guilty conscience, and represents the wicked as fearing punishment from an avenging hand. To this I reply, that those fears relate to this life, and are in no degree founded on an expectation of punishment beyond the grave. The guilty person turns pale, when it thunders, and trembles at the tempest, not because he expects a future life, but fears, that offendend Jove will terminate the present. The truth of these remarks will be more apparent by examining the story of the dishonest Spartan, mentioned in this 13th satire; so likewise in the fable by Prodicus, concerning Virtue and Pleasure, transmitted by Xenophon, the rewards of virtue are fame on earth, but nothing in heaven. (p. 316.) That there was prevailing at Athens, at the time of the great plague, little or no belief in a future moral retribution, appears from facts, stated by Thucydides in his account of that calamity. As the danger of death increased, crimes were augmented. "Every one was now more easily induced to do that, which for decency's sake they did only covertly before. They saw the strange mutability of outward condition, so that they thought it prudent to catch hold of speedy enjoyments and quick gusts of pleasure, persuaded, that their bodies and their wealth might be their own merely for a day. Reverence for the gods, or for the laws of society, laid no restraints upon them, either judging, that piety, or impiety, were things indifferent, since they saw, that all men perished alike; or throwing away every apprehension of being called to an account for their enor |