taxes whatsoever, under authority of the State, if the State could immediately impose another and more burdensome tax?

We admit the force of the doctrine that, when it is asserted that a State has bargained away her right of taxation in a given case, the contract must be clear and can not be made out by dubious implications.

But of the existence of the present contract there is no doubt. Its meaning and its terms are clear enough, and, taken alone, no one denies but that it is a contract which would be protected by the Constitution of the United States. The implication is of a right to revoke it and comes from the other quarter, and is one which we do not think exists by fair construction, and which we do not feel at liberty to import into the contract to defeat its manifest purpose.

The judgment of the Court of Errors and Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY took no part in the consideration of the case.

Recent Bankruptcy Decisions.

DISCHARGE.

1. Not impeachable collaterally for fraud.—A discharge can not be impeached collaterally for fraud in preventing notice to creditors of the pendency of the proceedings, nor on the ground that the bankrupt, before the proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced, fraudulently removed his property out of the jurisdiction of the court in which an action against him was pending, with intent to defraud his creditors. Sup. Ct. Commission, Ohio. Howland vs. Carson, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 372.

2. Judgment a provable debt, whether for tort or contract. A judgment against the bankrupt, existing at the time his petition is filed, whether founded upon contract or tort, is a provable debt.

Ib.

3. When court will look back of judgment: discharge will not bar judgment founded on fraud.—Where it is claimed that the collection of a judgment is not barred by a discharge in bankruptcy on the ground that such judgment is a debt created by fraud, the court will look back of the judgment, and if it had its root and origin in fraud, the discharge will not bar it. Ib.

4. Judgment for seduction not a debt created by fraud.-A judgment recovered by a father for the seduction of his daughter, where there was no promise of marriage, and no arts or devices were practiced to accomplish such seduction, is not a debt created by fraud within the meaning of the bankrupt act. Ib.

EXEMPTION.

Bachelor supporting family: change of residence.-A bachelor may be considered as the head of a family, so as to be entitled to a homestead exemption, when his widowed sister has resided with him, taking charge of his household

and domestic arrangements, and paying no board, but regarding it as her home. The right to such exemption is not abandoned by residence of the bankrupt for a time at another place, occasioned by ill health. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Missouri. Bailey, assignee, vs. Comings, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 382.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. Conveyance of real estate to.-In Indiana a conveyance of real estate to husband and wife creates an estate in joint tenancy. While such an estate exists neither husband nor wife has any interest which can be sold on execution, or will pass to the assignee of either. U. S. Dist. Ct., Indiana. Benson, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 377.

In re

2. Effect of divorce as to real estate owned in common. -If the effect of divorce, procured subsequent to an adjudication in bankruptcy, is to destroy the unity of possession and turn the estate into a tenancy in common, it is simply the creation, by operation of law, of a new interest in the bankrupt, and is, to all intents and purposes, a new acquisition which the assignee can not claim. Ib.

MORTGAGE.

Deed of trust to secure debt: trust: personal one will not pass to trustee's assignee in bankruptcy.—Where a deed of trust, given to secure a debt, contains a provision that, on the failure of the trustee to act, the cestuis que trust may appoint a new one in his stead, the power thereby conveyed is a personal trust or confidence in the cestuis que trust, and will not pass to their assignee in bankruptcy. Sup. Ct. Mississippi. Clark vs. Wilson, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 356.

PARTNERSHIP.

Two firms composed of same partners: insolvency of one firm: drafts by one firm on the other.—Where all the members of one firm are partners in another firm, they can not prove its debt against the latter. Where a bank has discounted drafts drawn by the former firm upon one who is a partner with the members of such firm in the latter firm, it can not prove its claim thereon against the joint estate, but must look to the separate estate of the drawee. U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. New York. In re Savage, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 368.

PREFERENCE.

1. What constitutes: procuring property to be seized on execution.—An insolvent debtor, who was a trader, gave to a creditor new notes, payable on demand, signed by himself alone, to take up others of the same amount, secured by the signature and indorsement of other responsible parties, and purchased goods of persons who were ignorant of his insolvency, in order that such goods might be taken on execution on judgments recovered on such notes. Held, that he thereby procured, or at least suffered his property to be seized on execution within the meaning of section 5128 of the Revised Statutes, if seizure there was. U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. New York. Sage, Jr., vs. Wynkoop, assignee, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 363.

2. Knowledge of agent that of principal.-Where the agent of the creditor had reasonable cause at the time to believe the debtor was insolvent, and knew

that the transaction was in fraud of the bankrupt law, it is the same as if the creditor had himself taken part therein, with the same cause to believe and the same knowledge. Ib.

Abstract of Decisions.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

[Reprint from the Albany Law Journal.]

FIRE INSURANCE.

Insurable interest: government tax: transfer of ownership.-The firm of T. & Co. owned certain whisky, and were also liable as sureties for the tax due upon the whisky, which was payable by D. The G. Insurance Co. insured T. & Co. against loss upon whisky owned by them, etc., "including government tax thereon for which they may be liable." There was a provision in the policy making it void "if the property be sold or transferred, or any change take place in title or possession, whether by voluntary transfer or otherwise." The firm of T. & Co. were, without notice to the insurance company, changed, one partner withdrawing and a new one coming in, after which the whisky was destroyed. Held, that the liability of the original firm of T. & Co. for the tax was an insurable interest, and that it was not affected by the change in partners, and the company could not avoid liability for the loss under the provision making the policy void in case of a change of ownership. Freeman's Ins. Co. vs. Powell, 13 B. Monr. 321; Gordon vs. Mass. Ins. Co., 2 Pick. 249; Roderback vs. Germania Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 53. Judgment of United States Circuit Court, Kentucky, affirmed. Germania Fire Ins. Co., plaintiff in error, vs. Thompson. Opinion by Miller, J.

Book Notice.

RULES TO REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND CITY AND COUNTY COURTS OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO. Compiled and arranged by A. P. Needles, of the San Francisco Bar.

This is a work of 219 pages, giving all the rules of practice adopted by the various courts sitting within the city of San Francisco, arranged in the order of their adoption and number. The book is compiled with great care and will prove an indispensable aid to the practitioner; especially is this true, inasmuch as these rules are strictly enforced by the courts, and are of equal dignity with express statutes.

San Francisco Law Journal.

VOL. I.

JANUARY 19, 1878. .

No. 21

Current Topics.

THE bill introduced in the State Senate, by Mr. Murphy of Santa Clara, permitting women to practice law, has passed the Senate. In all probability it will pass the Assembly for no other reason than that the members do not feel like putting themselves in opposition to a measure so harmless in its effect, and against a right that perhaps in theory the opposite sex may justly claim. Few if any women of refined and modest nature will dare brave the reproaches and scandal that are sure to follow an attempt to become a general pleader at the bar, however unjustly they may be made. It takes no argument to show that they are by nature unsuited to those duties, and when we know that none but the daring and reckless will make the venture into the bivouac of legal warfare, to be beaten' and bruised with sneers and jests, it seems but little more than idle legislation to insist upon rights that are meaningless and not demanded by any considerable number of that sex.

SOME time ago a San Jose merchant visited a business house in this city and purchased an invoice of goods amounting to nearly $3000, which was made payable in time installments for the accommodation of the customer. When the first payment became due the San Jose dealer came here and paid it, purchasing at the same time a second invoice of goods on similar terms to that on which the first lot was obtained. But when a second payment became due it was not forthcoming, and the San Francisco house pressed the San Jose customer for the money. After some trouble the matter was carried into the District Court at San Jose. The San Francisco house sued for the amount of the debt, with interest, etc. The debtor demurred, on the ground that the plaintiffs were not a legally constituted firm, not having complied with the law relating to the fil. ing of articles with the County Clerk and the publication of the true names of the firm in a daily newspaper, as the statute requires; that a failure to comply with the law has deprived them of any standing in court. It is reported that the demurrer has been sustained. The constitutionality of the law will probably be tested, as it is understood that the case will be carried up to the Supreme Court on appeal. If it is true, as stated, that very few newly-established firms comply with the law in this respect, this may open up a long series of law-suits.

IN Thorn vs. Sweeney, recently decided by the Supreme Court of Nevada, the plaintiff applied for an injunction to prevent the defendant from running a ditch across his land, and the latter answered, alleging that the part of the plaintiff's land over which the ditch had been run was rocky, barren, and of no value; that the plaintiff had suffered no damage from its construction, and that the defendant was solvent and able to respond in damages, if any had been caused by his act. The injunction was refused. The foundation of the jurisdiction in a court of equity to issue an injunction in aid of the action of trespass is the probable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, or the prevention of a multiplicity of suits where the rights are controverted by numerous persons. The plaintiff is not entitled to the injunction as a matter of right, because another threatens to continue his illegal acts. It must be shown that the property has some peculiar value that could not be compensated in damages. This fact is clearly pointed out in the opinion of the Chancellor in Jerome vs. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 334, a leading case upon this subject. "I do not know a case," says the Chancellor, "in which an injunction has been granted to restrain a trespasser, merely because he was a trespasser, without showing that the property itself was of peculiar value and could not well admit of due recompense, and would be destroyed by repeated acts of trespass. In ordinary cases the damages to be assessed by a jury will be adequate for a check and for a recompense. Every man is undoubtedly entitled to be protected in the possession and enjoyment of his property, though it may be of no intrinsic value. He may have on his land a large mound of useless stone or sand, which he may not deem worth the expense of inclosing, and yet it would be a trespass for any person to remove any portion of the stone or sand without his consent, and he would be entitled to his action, even though the damages were nominal. But would it be proper for this court to assume cognizance of such a trespass and lay the interdict of an injunction upon it? I apprehend not." The doctrine announced in this case is fully supported by the following authorities: Wood vs. Sutcliffe, 42 Eng. Ch. 165; Bassett vs. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 47 N. H. 437; Bigelow vs. The Hartford Br. Co., 14 Conn. 565; Wason vs. Sanborn, 45 N. H. 180; Blake vs. City of Brooklyn, 26 Barb. 301; Murray vs. Knapp, 42 How. Pr. 462; Ib., 62 Barb. 566; Nicodemus vs. Nicodemus, 41 Md. 537; Weigel vs. Walsh, 45 Mo. 560; Herbert vs. Carslake, 11 N. J. Eq. 241; Catching vs. Terrell, 10 Ga. 578; Wooding vs. Malone, 30 Ga. 980; High on Inj. §§ 459, 483; Eden on Inj. 231; 3 Story Eq. 925, 928.

JUDGE WHEELER, of the Nineteenth District Court, rendered the following opinion in the case of the compromise arrangement between the Board of Trustees of the Lick Trust Deed and John H. Lick :

"It having been already determined, for reasons heretofore given, that this court would ratify and confirm the compromise agreed upon between the plaintiffs, as trustees of the estate of the late James Lick, and the defendant, John H. Lick, administrator of said estate, the only remaining question is as to whether the court will, as a part of such ratification and confirmation, also designate the fund out of which the compromise money shall be paid. In other words, will the court direct that the various beneficiaries named in the trust deed, including the residuary donees, shall contribute pro rata a sum sufficient to carry out the compromise?