well read in that great master of nature, "3. Under the protection of this courageous indifference (a better protection than sevenfold shield'), such a man will securely praise in 1795 a motion concerning volunteer carps, because it went farther than the former measures of 1778 and 1782, and made the force applicable to the defence of the whole of the country. And in 1803 he will as securely condemn the measure which establishes and extends the principle itself of 1795, and will prove that the volunteer force is no better than an armed rabble,' fit only to consume provisions,' to choak up the roads, and to stand in the way of the regulars *.* 4. Such a man will say in 1803, that the country cannot meet France singlehanded, for it is out of condition to go to war.-March 9. Nor will he care if an opponent reminds him, that in Dec. 1794 he maintained, it was not the character of the English to despond. Perseverance and invincibility were their characteristics: they had met France single-handed in her proudest day. Or that in Jan. 1795 he warned the house not to be led away by the motives that induced gentlemen on the other side to paint the situation of the country as they had done! Let other men be sore when contradictions are proved upon them; nothing of this sort can move the man who has no objection to suppose inconsistencies in his language.' 5. Such a man will say in 1903, that regular troops alone are fit to meet an enemy, and that the militia and other corps are no better than a mob' in comparison of them; nor is it any thing to him, if in Nov. 3795 he undertook to answer Gen. M'Leod's objections to his fencible troops, (viz. that they could only defend the kingdom from invasion, or preserve its internal tranquillity), and to maintain, that it might as well be asked, Of what use are any troops at all? They were of double use, because they might be employed against the attacks of a foreign enemy; and they might be raised with greater facility than other troops, beCause they were not to go out of the country. And it is equally immaterial to him, that in Dec. 1797 he proved the fencibles to have also this advantage, that they partook more of the nature of a militia, than of regular troops!' "But other men may contradict themselves, and forget it after a few years. The future minister of this country will, in the same year, and very nearly in the same de- 6. Such a man will go to war for any thing. Any spot upon the earth or sea, though fit only for the contention of seals and sea-gulls, may assume a much more important aspect, and become a legitimate subject of diplomatic interference, if honour is connected with it.'-Mr. Windham, Nor, 1801. "And hence we may see how unreasonable Burnet was, in saying that it seemed at odd thing for France to go to war formeriv about some old furniture of the duchess of Orleans. But, on the other hand, the fnture minister of this country shall say, whenever he pleases, that honour is nothing, and interest every thing; ner shall he care for the contradiction. "I will put the point of honour out of the question. I will not push it to a wild, extravagant, and chivalrous excess; for na tional honour, when rightly understood, is, generally speaking, nothing more than na tional interest. In general, there is nothing dishonourable in giving up this or that, when it is not disadvantageous to the national interest.-Mr. Windham, Nov. 1802. "It is the privilege of greatness to be careless about itself, while it draws the attention of all towards it. Thus the destined minister "I despise the rabble of volunteers.'-Pol. Reg. Sept. 17. of this country talks as humour suggests; and all parties look to him as their patron. To the high-flying spirits he carries himself, as he well expresses it, in a wild, extravagant, and chivalrous excess.' And while he is in this humour, he will deplore neither the destruction of commerce, nor the decay of manufactures, nor the loss of resources, nor the total annihilation of wealth.' --Mr. Windham, 1797. Nor will he have any objection (if he is pushed upon the question) to hold out to his brave countrymen, the inviting prospect of a never-ending war, if the country should be so fortunate as to have him for first minister! "It is asked, Are we, on the principles I have laid down, to wage an erernal war? -I answer, that, on the principles I have stated, it is clear that there is an eternal resolution on the part of France, to destroy this country: and I am unable to see any other alternative!'-Mr. Windham, Nov. 7. 1801. But, in a moment, this high strain shall stop, and to the money getters it shall be proclaimed, that the beginning and the end of all wars, is interest alone; for honour, when rightly understood, is nothing more than interest:' and the nation may give up any thing, when it is not disadvantageous to the national interest' fo part with its Who does not see, from all this, that Mr. Pitt has great reason to be jealous of the ascendancy of Mr. Windham,' and that the one gentleman, who alone is proper for the station of first minister,' is far exceeded by the other gentleman; who lends the weight of his talents,' and to whom all the sound part of the nation look, at this crisis, for their opinions' concerning honour, and interest, and everlasting hostilities." ART. XLVIII. Four Letters to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, &c. By WILLIAM 8vo. pp. 72, COBBETT, IF we were members of parliament, and as hearty in our opposition to ministers as the noted author of these Four Letters, we should not pursue the same line of criticism. Far from attempting to invalidate any flourishing statements of the revenue, we should not only admit, but corroborate, them. We should endeavour to indicate those items, which had produced more to the public than was accounted for by office. We should endeavour to detect those private subtractions from the receipt, which supply a criminal expenditure. We should hold up the increasing abundance of revenue as a reason for alleviating the harsher clauses of money-bills, and for selecting very critically the less grievous projects of taxation from among the superfluous claims of ministerial precaution. We should object to levying more within the year than the yearly de and requires. We should found on the boast of repletion, the expediency of abstinence. But discontent has always its routine; and ministers so well understand it, that the line of opposition expected is, in fact, a convenient hostility. By representing their resources as unproductive, they are assisted in heavier extortion: by announcing that their estimates of expenditure are deficient, they are propped in extravagant provision for them: by mapping the progressive scale of our outgoings, the public mind is prepared for the continuation of the "Besides the three sums of arrears stated in the recapitulation of the preceding account, there are three other sums, stated under the detailed heads of income arising from the sources of 1798, 1799, and 1800. These. make together 869.3191. which, added to the total of three sums specified in the recapitulation, produce a total of 2,305,2671. as is here stated. for 6,500,0001., as the surplus of the Cosolidated fund during the present year; and, unless your accounts now laid before parlia ment are false, or, unless you augment the income of the fund by new taxes imposed this year, I have proved, that the said surplus will amount to no more than 4,974,654]. a sum which falls 1,525,3461. short, not only of your estimate of the surplus, but of the credit which you took on account thereof, in your ways and means of the 10th De cember last. To this point, sir, I wish to hold you." The postscript contains an amusing detection of those tricks of office, by which accounts, made up for the public eye, are swelled in conspicuous places. The sum of 20,1701. was taken from 1801, and included in 1802, in order to turn the corner of the million, as Mr. Cobbett phrases it, and to increase the round number from 26 to 27 millions. ART. XLIX. The Day of Alarm: being a progressive View of the Spirit and Designs of the leading Men in France, &c. 8vo. pp. 178. IN order to give a specimen of the argumentative character of this writer, we will extract a page or two. "Full of that arrogant confidence which prompts them to assert the most palpable falsehoods, these shameless apologists have thought proper to record in lamentable strains what they denominate the massacre of Copenhagen. Who that knew not the real truth and nature of the event, to which they have affixed so shocking an idea, would not be led to imagine, that, in violation of treaties, and that against the common faith which ought to subsist between nations, and on which a peaceable and friendly neighbour depended for his security, Great Britain rush ed upon him unaware, and shed his blood without mercy? Who that knew it not, would think that France, having succeeded by its intrigues in forming a combination of the three northern powers against GreatBritain, a British fleet sailed to the Baltic, and destroyed the Danish navy at Copenhagen, and would probably have done the same to the navies of Sweden and of Russia, had they not had recourse to a treaty, which put an end to the hopes of France from that quarter? "When individuals take up the pen in defence of public measures, it is requisite to warn them, that without a strict adherence to truth, they will certainly injure the cause in which they are engaged. So infamous a perversion of facts as that above cited, is a notorious sample of French duplicity, and want of the commonest honesty; and ought to put upon his guard every man who seeks for information. The audacity of the French knows no bounds in these matters. It costs them nothing to invent the most atrocious, as well as the grossest forgeries. Thus they have lately ascribed to British malice an rancour, the assasination of their two depu ties at the negociations of Radstadt, and have had the impudence to extend the like execrable insinuations to some of the vilest and most horrid events during the war. "Happily for the British character, it is of itself a sufficient refutation of such abominable calumnies: they are believed no where, and the French have been universally branded as liars. But they are not to be daunted in the career of falsities upon which they have lately entered: they seem to think it in their power to distort the most authentic facts, for the purpose of deceiving nations, and preventing them from forming just con ceptions of the politics and transactions of France. They represent the wisest statesmen in the various courts of Europe, as uniformly of opinion, that the many alliances that have been formed with Great-Britain, have constantly proved pernicious to them, and serviceable only to Great-Britain.” Here is much declamation, but not the slightest attempt to apologise for the attack on Copenhagen. The author would do well to read Seidelin's account of the engagement. The Dane's broken English will amuse him; and he may perhaps begin to suspect that both the projection and the conduct of the enterprise are to incur the eventual censure of history. ART. L. Reply to some Financial Mistatements in and out of Parliament. 8vo. pp. 68. THE impudence of peculation which had introduced itself among the establishments dependent on the admiralty, during Lord Spencer's superintendance, must have convinced ministers, as well as the public, that enormous abuses frequently prevail in subordinate offices, and that vigilance in a financier is as productive as a budget. We have little doubt that ministers are grossly deceived in the supposed produce of the several taxes; and that the revenue exceeds by many millions annually the timid and mutilated statements which are shown about to excite our patriotic pity, when they come a begging to parliament. O fortunatos nimium sua si bona norint. It cannot be doubted that the public is in the habit of undervaluing its prosperity, and of thinking too meanly of its resources; because a portion of them never meets the general eye at all, but passes from hand to mouth, without first being dished out on the government table. This writer endeavours to infuse a rational confidence; to cast up stock for the nation on as favourable a footing as if the creditors were to be called together; to estimate our well-being by the weight of our burdens, and place, like caryatids, our perfection in our supportance. For instance, "The first point to be examined in this part of the subject, is the account of ships built and registered in Great-Britain, which Mr. Cobbett professes to have given in a complete state in his Supplement. But, witheut troubling our readers to refer to that work, we shall completely dispel all the apprehensions they may have been disposed to entertain, by quoting the following very short official abstract, signed by the register "That the average number of ships built and registered in the different ports of Great Britain in three years, ending 5th Jauuary 1793, was 618, and the amount of "their tonnage 60,949. That in three years, ending 5th January, 1802, the number of "vessels was 817, and their tonnage 103,071. "And that in the year 1802, the number of vessels was 967, and their tonnage general, viz. 04 ** 104,789." "We could here, if it were necessary, pare the comparison further, by examining the accounts of the different ports; but we think it will be more satisfactory to observe, that the number of vessels belonging to the British empire, which, on the 30th of September, 1801, amounted to 19,772, their tonage being 2,037,000, and the number of men employed 143,987, had, in the year 1802, increased to 20,060 vessels, 2,078,561 tons, and 152,269 men, although the returns are stated to be incomplete. But Mr. Cobbett observes, that an account of the number of men and tons of shipping in the merchant service, sailing inwards and outwards during the aforementioned years, would have been more satisfactory, particularly if made up with a due regard to the spirit of truth; but, as no such account has yet been presented, we must, for the present at least, look upon that which we have just examined as containing a proof of a small positive decline, and of a very considerable comparative decline, in the mercantile marine of the country." "As Mr. Cobbet must have known, long before his letters were reprinted, that such an account had been presented in the usual regular and official form, we must suppose that he objects to it as wanting perhaps that spirit of truth' which so evidently characterises his own publications. We shall, however, take the liberty to state the result. "In the year 1802, the number of vesand cleared outwards, was as follows, viz. sels and their tonnage, which entered inwards “Inwards, 17,355 vessels, 2,273,594 tons. "Outwards, 16,364 vessels, 2,087,789 tons. "Whereas in the year 1801, as may be seen by a reference to the accounts for that year, they amounted only to 15,844 vessels, 2,158,775 tons, entered inwards; and 15,908 vessels, 2,150,501 tons, cleared outwards." When one considers the easy taxability of the rent derived from all this shipping, and of that yielded by our lands, houses, machines of manufacture, and canal-craft; when one considers that coals, cattle, and many other objects of popular consumption, are not yet touched by the Midas fingers of the chancellor of the exchequer; when one considers that a land-tax, co-extensive with the whole mass of our colonial possessions, would be but a just retribution for the utility of our protection,--one is tempted to suspect that taxation is yet in its in fancy, and that the sprawling arms of the full-grown giant will at once open loans in Calcutta, and budgets at Surinam. AET. LI. A Supplement to a comparative View of the Public Finances containing as Account of the Management of the Finances to the present Time. By W. MORGAN, F. R. S. 8vo. pp. 114. THE financial writings of the acute and accurate Mr. William Morgan, which comprehend so admirable an hostile criticism on the conduct of Mr. Pitt, during his chancellorship of the exchequer, are here continued to an advanced period of the administration of Mr. Addington. They prove, that a precisely analogous system of management still prevails; and that whatever grounds of alarm or admiration justly operated before, are still entitled to agitate or tranquillize the attentive public. It appears to us, that Mr. Morgan appreciates, very equitably, the amount of the national incumbrances, but that he somewhat undervalues the national resources. Mr. Pitt's errors were chiefly two. During peace, he always endeavoured to raise the funds, by overstrained statements of the produce of the revenue; whereas he ought then to have depreciated them, in order to accelerate the extinction of the debt. During war, he often attempted to raise the supplies within the year; whereas a bolder system of borrowing, and a more lenient system of taxation, would have interfered less sensibly with the comforts of the people; and his loans, instead of being made in a five per cent. stock, redeemable at par, were mostly made in a three per cent. stock, likely to rise on a peace greatly above sixty, and thus to cost, for its redemption, vastly more than the capital advanced. An active attention to prefer those forms of taxation, which, like the land-tax, are reconvertible into capital, is another very important duty of the minister of finance; but the structure of our two houses of parliament renders the taxation of fixed property more difficult than it ought to be. The expenders of rents are the most unproductive and useless class of citizens; their income is a fairer object of erosion, than that of the industrious, commercial, productive, or useful classes. The concluding paragraphs well merit the serious attention of every friend to British prosperity: "It was my intention to have proceeded further with this subject, as well as to have noticed several other particulars connected with the present management of the finances; but the nation is involved in another war, and these, though in themselves very serious evils, are now rendered matters of comparatively little importance. The inaries which the late minister successive! come tax, and all the other dreadful ausili tried to no purpose, are united in one general mass, and, as if his successor wished to ex ceed even the boldest of his attempts, the funds themselves are to become an object ef taxation. If the war begins with an attac so direct and undisguised, upon all publie faith and security, what limits shall be prescribed to the sacrifices which may be de manded during the course of it. But here I shall drop the subject. Having completed my account of the finances to the conclusion of the late war, and of the truce which suc ceeded it, I shall leave others to pursue the discussion through the present contest. be "In all my publications on this subject, it has been my earnest endeavour, as far as lay within my abilities, to warn the nation of the danger to which it was exposed, from the extravagance and profusion which hav dissipated the public treasure-and feeling as I do, an ardent wish for its welfare at happiness, I am grieved to think of how it tle avail every effort has proved to check tie growth of an evil which increases the distress. and must terminate in the ruin of the ki dóm. As I have already observed, the ind ference of the nation in a season so big with danger, is truly awful and astonishing. Incumbered with a debt of more than five hur dred millions, and just soothed with the hoje of emerging from a war the most expense and sanguinary, we can behold ourselves prived of this hope, and plunged at once into another war, more dreadful and ruinaus without the slightest murmur of appreher sion or discontent. Whether the present a just and necessary war, or not-whether is arises from the inordinate ambition of party, or the wretched incapacity of the other. the consequences must be equally fatal to credit and resources of the country. Solora as the annual expenditure requires fifteen twenty millions to be raised over and abuse the annual income, the pressure must length accumulate till it exceeds the streng to bear it. The expedients which have bo once tried without success for raising the greater part of the supplies within the yea are again proposed, and will probably is adopted. But this attempt to relieve pose rity by increasing the present burthens raise a sum sufficient for discharging the pric cipal, when it is hardly possible to prov for the interest of the debt, is absurd and i prudent in the highest degree, and can on serve to hasten the catastrophe which it is de signed to prevent. The public, however, their present state of insensibility, rather th |