Opinion of the Court. 38 Cal. 111.) There is, moreover, a kind of appendancy or appurtenancy of one easement to or upon another easement, in some cases, which is sometimes called a secondary easement. It passes with the principal easement, as being necessary or convenient to the enjoyment of the same. The grant of a right of pasturage carries the right of way to and from the pasture. So, that of drawing water, or of fishing, or hunting, gives a right of access and egress to and from the estate in which it is to be enjoyed. (Washburn on Easements, p. 39; Alexander v. Tolleston Club, 110 Ill. 65.) In the case at bar, a certain right of way, or right of access and egress to and from the trotting park, passed with the privileges of using the fences and buildings for advertising purposes, as being necessary and convenient to the enjoyment of such privileges. The right conferred upon appellants by the contract was more than a mere revocable license, as claimed by appellees, because Willoughby & Hill actually constructed the fence at an expense to themselves of $2300, and fully executed their part of the agreement. (Washburn on Easements, pp. 29, 30, et seq.; Van Ohlen v. Van Ohlen, 56 Ill. 528.) They acquired, by the terms of their contract, a certain interest in these premises, which was in the nature of a right of way in gross, and which a court of equity will regard as at least an equitable charge or burden thereon in their favor. The next question is, whether the Chicago Jockey and Trotting Club, immediate assignee from Lawrence & Martin, took the lease and improvements subject to this burden or freed from it. In order to determine this question, it is necessary to determine whether the club had notice, actual or constructive, of the rights of appellants under the contract, or made its purchase under such circumstances as put it upon inquiry as to those rights. To bind a purchaser of a servient estate by a servitude charged thereon, he should have notice thereof, as in case of other incumbrances upon land. (Washburn on Easements, 42, note 2; McCann v. Day, Opinion of the Court. 57 Ill. 101.) The contract was recorded on the second day of August, 1878. Was it an instrument of such a character that its record operated as notice to the club? The 31st section of the Conveyance act provides, that "deeds, mortgages, and other instruments of writing relating to real estate, shall be deemed, from the time of being filed for record, notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors, though not acknowledged or proven according to law." The 38th section of the same act provides, that "the term 'real estate,' as used in this act, shall be construed as co-extensive in meaning with 'lands, tenements and hereditaments,' and as embracing all chattels real." The lease from Magie & Tree to Lawrence & Martin was a chattel real, and was entitled to record to give notice of the leasehold interest of the lessees therein. The contract in question, conveying the use for certain purposes of the fences and buildings upon land, which is particularly described, and involving a right of way upon the land in order to enjoy such use, is an instrument in writing relating to a chattel real. Under the 28th section of the Conveyance act it is an instrument "relating to or affecting the title to a chattel real." It imposes a charge or burden upon the leasehold interest of Lawrence & Martin, and designates an interest, which is carved out of that estate or included in it. We do not perceive why it is not embraced in the class of instruments whose record affects subsequent purchasers and creditors with notice. (Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445; Dundy v. Chambers, 23 id. 369; McCann v. Day, 57 id. 101; Harris v. Johnson, 31 N. J. Eq. 174.) The "Chicago Driving Park" is affected with notice of the rights of appellants, because it was a purchaser pendente lite. It is claimed that the privilege accorded by Lawrence & Martin to appellants, to use the fences and buildings for advertising purposes, is a violation of the provisions in the lease from Magie & Tree, and that for this reason the enforcement of the agreement against the "Chicago Driving Opinion of the Court. Park" might lead to a forfeiture of the lease. That is a matter which concerns the lessors, and of which they alone can take advantage. If the contract is a violation of the terms of the lease, the lessors might yet choose to ratify it, or consent to such use of the premises as appellants claim. Such violation, if it exists, does not make the contract void, but only voidable. (Webster v. Nicholls, 104 Ill. 160.) The court of chancery had jurisdiction to restrain the defendants below from any interference with the exercise, by appellants, of their privileges under the contract. If the owner of land enters into a covenant concerning the land, concerning its use, subjecting it to easements or personal servitudes and the like, and the land is afterwards conveyed or sold to one who has actual or constructive notice of the covenant, the grantee or purchaser will take the premises bound by the covenant, and will be compelled, in equity, either to specifically execute it, or will be restrained from violating it; and it makes no difference whatever, with respect to this liability in equity, whether the covenant is or is not one which, in law, “runs with the land." Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. secs. 689, 692, 1295, 1342. The decree of the Superior Court, and the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming said decree, are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Judgment reversed. This case was originally assigned to Mr. Justice DICKEY. As no opinion was written by him before his death, the case was re-assigned at the November term, 1885. APPEAL-in chancery-suit to enjoin a board of education in respect to its management of schools and school fund. An appeal does not lie directly to this court from an order of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing a bill in chancery seeking to enjoin a board of education from paying out public money in support of a school, on the grounds, first, that the board have rented a building for such school, and propose to rent the same from year to year; second, that the school is kept at a place not authorized by a vote; and third, because the school is sectarian, and in the interest of a religious denomination. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. AMOS WATTS, Judge, presiding. Mr. M. MILLARD, pro se. Mr. JOHN B. BOWMAN, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE SHOPE delivered the opinion of the Court: This is a bill in chancery, filed in the circuit court of St. Clair county by appellant, against appellees, as members of the board of education of a district in that county, to enjoin them from paying out the public funds of the district in support of one of the schools of the district. The grounds alleged in the bill for equitable interposition are: First, that the board of education have rented a building or room in which to hold said school, for several years, and propose to continue so doing, and that such renting is from year to year, when, it is alleged, they have no power to rent a building, from year to year, for school purposes; second, because the school is kept at a place not authorized by a vote of the people of the district; and third, because, as it is alleged, the school Opinion of the Court. is sectarian in its character, and subordinated to the interests of a religious denomination in such way as to assist in the support of the church and the propagation of its tenets. A demurrer was sustained by the circuit court to the bill, and the complainant electing to stand by his bill, a decree was entered dismissing the bill, and for costs. The complainant thereupon brings the cause directly to this court by appeal, and seeks a reversal of the decree of the circuit court. By the statute of the State, (sec. 8, chap. 37,) entitled "Courts," it is provided that the Appellate Courts of the State shall have jurisdiction of all matters of appeal or writs of error from the final judgments, orders or decrees of the circuit court in any suit or proceeding at law or in chancery, other than criminal cases, and cases involving a franchise, or freehold, or the validity of a statute, and that appeals and writs of error from such final orders, judgments or decrees shall lie directly to the Supreme Court, in all criminal cases, and in cases involving a franchise, or freehold, or the validity of a statute. By the 89th section of the Practice act, (Starr & Curtis, 1482,) it is provided that criminal cases below the grade of felony shall be taken to the Appellate Court, "and in all criminal cases above the grade of misdemeanors, and cases in which a franchise, or freehold, or the validity of a statute, or construction of the constitution, and in all cases relating to the revenue, or in which the State is interested, as a party or otherwise, shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court." The validity of the acts prescribing that appeals shall be taken to, and writs of error prosecuted from, the Appellate Court, has been so frequently sustained by this court that no discussion of that subject will be necessary. Young et al. v. Stearns et al. 91 Ill. 221; Fleischman v. Walker et al. id. 318; Meeks v. Leach et al. id. 323. It will be apparent, we think, from a statement of the scope and purpose of the bill, and a reading of the sections of the |