DISPUTATION LXIX.

ON OBEDIENCE, THE FORMAL OBJECT OF ALL THE DIVINE

PRECEPTS.

I. THE obedience which is the formal object of all the divine precepts, and which is prescribed in all of them, is properly and adequately prescribed to the will conducting itself according to the mode of liberty; that is, as it is free, that [moderetur] it may regulate the will conducting itself according to the mode of nature, that is, that it may regulate the inclination according to the prescribed obedience.

II. This liberty is either that of contradiction or exercise, or that of contrariety or specification. According to the liberty of exercise, the will regulates the inclination, that it may perform some act rather than abstain from it, or the contrary. According to the liberty of specification, the will regulates the inclination, that, by such an act, it may tend towards this rather than towards that object.

III. From this formal object of all precepts, and its relation thus considered, arises the first distribution and that a formal one, of all the precepts, into those which command, and those which forbid; that is, those in which the commission or the omission [of an act] is prescribed.

IV. A precept which forbids is so binding, as not to allow a man to commit what is forbidden. For we must not perpetrate wickednesss that good may come; yet this is the only reason why we might occasionally be allowed to perform what has been forbidden.

V. A precept which commands is not equally rigidly binding, so as to require [quoque vel momento] in every single moment of time the performance of what is commanded; for this cannot be done, though the period when man will or will not perform it, is not left to his option; but performance of it must be administered according to the occasions and exigencies which offer. Thus it was not lawful for Daniel to abstain for three days from calling upon his God.

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VI. When a precept which forbids, and one which commands, are directly contrary-whether it be according to the act, "Thou shalt love God, and not hate him," "Thou shalt hate the world and not love it;" or, whether it be according to the object, "Thou shalt love God, and not love the world;" "Thou shalt hate the world, but shalt not hate God;" then the transgression of the law which forbids, is more grievous than that which commands, because it recedes further from ob.dience, and because the commission of an evil which has been forbidden includes in it the omission of a good which has been commanded.

DISPUTATION LXX.

ON OBEDIENCE TO THE COMMANDS OF GOD IN GENERAL.

I. BECAUSE the yielding of obedience is the duty of an inferior, therefore, for the performance of it, humility is requi site. This, generally considered, is a quality by which any one [natus est] becomes ready to submit himself to another, to undertake his commands and to execute them; and, in this instance, to submit himself to God.

II. Obedience has respect partly to an internal act, and partly to one that is external. The performance of both these is required for entire, true, and sincere obedience. For God is a Spirit, and the inspector of hearts, who demands the obedience of the whole man, both of the inward and the outward man-obedience from the affections of the heart and from the members of the body. The external act without the internal is hypocrisy; the internal, without the external, is incomplete, unless man be hindered from the performance of the external act without his own [præsente] immediate fault.

III. With this, nearly coincides the expression of the scholastic divines" to perform a command either according to

the substance of the act only, or also according to the required quality and mode," in which sense, likewise, Luther seems to have uttered that expression-"Adverbs save and damn."

IV. The grace and special concurrence of God are required for the performance of entire, true, and sincere obedience, even for that of the inner man, of the affections of the heart, and of a lawful mode. But we allow it to be made a subject of discussion, whether revelation, and that assistance of God which is called "general," and which is opposed to this special aid, and is distinguished from it, be sufficient only to perform the external act of the body and the substance of the act.

V. Though that special grace which moves, excites, impels and urges to obey, physically moves the understanding and [affectum] the inclination of man, so that he cannot be otherwise than affected [sensu] with the perception of it, yet it does not effect or elicit the consent except morally, that is, by the mode of suasion, and by the intervention of the free volition of man, which free volition not only excludes coaction, but likewise all antecedent necessity and determination.

VI. But that special concurrence or assistance of grace, which is also called "co-operating and accompanying grace," differs neither in kind nur efficacy from that exciting and moving grace which is called preventing and operating, but it is the same grace continued. It is styled "co-operating" or "concomitant," only on account of the concurrence of the human will which operating and preventing grace has elicited from the will of man. This concurrence is not denied to him to whom exciting grace is applied, unless the man offers resistance to the grace exciting.

VII. From these premises, we conclude that a regenerated man is capable of performing more good than he actually performs, and can omit more evil than he omits; and, therefore, that neither in the sense in which it is received by St. Augustine, nor in that in which some of our divines understand it, is efficacious grace necessary for the performance of obedience-a circumstance which is highly agreeable with the doctrine of St. Augustine.

COROLLARY.

Coaction only circumscribes the liberty of an agent, it does not destroy or take it away; and such circumscription is not made, except through the medium or intervention of the nat ural inclination; the natural inclination, therefore, is more opposed to liberty than coaction is.

DISPUTATION LXXI.

ON THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE LAW IN GENERAL.

I. As MERE obedience, considered in the abstract, is the formal object of all the precepts of the divine law, so the acts in which the obedience that must be performed is prescribed, are the material objects of the same precepts.

II. For this reason, these acts will at length be said to be conformable to law, annd performed according to law, when obedience [informaverit] has given form to them; that is, when they have been performed from obedience, or through the intention and desire of obeying. This desire to obey is necessarily preceded by a certain knowledge that those acts have been prescribed by God, according to this expression of the apostle: "Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin."

III. Hence, it is apparent that a good intention does not suffice to justify an act, unless it be preceded by a command of God and a knowledge of such command; though, without a good intention, no act, even when commanded by God, can of itself be pleasing to him. But it is our wish that, under the term "actions," omission is also understood to be comprehended.

IV. A good work, therefore, universally requires these conditions: (1.) That it be prescribed by God. (2.) That man certainly knows it to have been commanded by God. (3.) That it be performed with the intention and desire of obeying

God, which cannot be done without faith in God. To these ought to be added a special condition, which belongs to Christ and to his gospel-that it be done through faith in Christ, because no work is agreeable to God after the commission of sin in a state of grace, except in Christ, and through faith in him.

But the acts which are prescribed in the law, are either of themselves and in their own nature indifferent; or they have in them something why they are pleasing or displeasing to God-why they are prescribed by him or forbidden. The law, which prescribes the former of these, [the indifferent acts,] is called "positive," "symbolical," and "ceremonial." That which prescribes the latter is styled "the moral law" and "the decalogue;" it is also called "the law of nature." these last, we shall afterwards treat at greater length.

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VI. The material acts, in which obedience is prescribed to be performed by the moral law, are either general, and belonging to the observance of the whole law and of all and each of its precepts; or they are special, and peculiarly prescribed in each of the precepts of the decalogue.

VII. The general acts are the love, honor and fear of God, and trust in him. The special acts will be treated in the particular explanation of each of the precepts.

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DISPUTATION LXXII.

ON THE LOVE, FEAR, TRUST, AND HONOR WHICH ARE DUE FROM MAN TO GOD.

I. THESE general acts may be considered either in the first act or in the second. In the first, they come under the denomination of affections; in the second, they retain to themselves the appropriate name of acts. But in consequence of the close union and agreement of nature between an affection and a second act, love, fear, trust and honor, receive the same denomination of "an affection," and "an act."