So far as section II is concerned, this question seems to have been disposed of by the Supreme Court of the United States, the final authority,-in the case of Silz v. Hesterberg; supra. In that case a statute of the State of New York which prohibited the possession of game during the closed season was held not to be an unconstitutional regulation of commerce, even though it applied to game lawfully taken in a foreign country during the open season there. The rule was applied which has been repeatedly held, that laws passed by a State in the exercise of the police power, not in conflict with laws of Congress on the same subject and indirectly or remotely affecting inter-State commerce, are nevertheless valid laws. It was said that the purpose of the law was not to regulate inter-State commerce, but, by laws applicable alike to foreign and domestic game, to protect the people of the State in the right to use and enjoy the game of the State. While these provisions may incidentally affect the right of one importing game to hold and dispose of it in the closed season, the effect is only incidental. It is true that in that case there was an open season, while here there is no time during which the fish may be possessed for sale though they may be taken in the manner allowed by the statute at any time. The right to preserve game has its origin in the police power, and may be enforced by adequate police regulation though commerce may be indirectly affected. When the power is conceded, then the extent to which, and when and how, it shall be exercised are for the determination of the legislature, so that such exercise does not result in the arbitrary destruction of constitutional rights. The legislature has deemed it expedient for the protection of domestic fish of the varieties named not to fix any absolutely closed season, but to prohibit certain methods of taking fish and permit them to be taken with hook and line at all times,-not to absolutely prohibit the possession of such fish at any time, but only the possession of fish below a certain size and of fish intended for sale, without reference to where or when they have been taken. The principle of the Silz case applies to this condition. The object of section II is not to regulate interState commerce, but, by laws applicable alike to foreign and domestic fish, to protect the people of the State in the right to use and enjoy the fish of the State, and the effect upon importers of fish is incidental, only. With regard to section 12 the case is different. That section deals with inter-State commerce, and that only. So far as it concerns fish caught within the State it is valid, for since fish are the common property of the people of the State, and may be taken only upon such terms as the State, acting for the benefit of the people, may allow, the ownership acquired by such taking is qualified and is subject to the regulations imposed by law, (Geer v. Connecticut, supra,) but so far as it concerns sound and wholesome fish taken outside the State, as in this case, it is void. A State has no power to wholly exclude a lawful article of commerce produced in another State or country. While it may regulate the introduction of an article, including a food product, so as to insure its purity, the police power does not extend to its total exclusion. (Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1.) In that case an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine to the extent that it prohibited its introduction from another State and sale was held void. In Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, an act for the protection of the public health by providing for inspection in Minnesota, before slaughter, of animals designed for human food was held to be an unconstitutional regulation of inter-State commerce. The same doctrine was applied to a similar Virginia statute, in Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78. So it was held in regard to a statute prohibiting the driving or conveying into the State of Missouri of Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle between the first day of March (Hannibal and the first day of November in each year. and St. Joseph Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465.) And the same principle was affirmed in the cases concerning the importation of intoxicating liquors into States whose laws prohibited their manufacture or sale. (Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. 125 U. S. 465; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 id. 100.) In all these cases the statute prohibited the bringing of the forbidden article into the State, but the case is not different where the statute prohibits the transportation of the article out of the State. Commerce between the States is as much restricted by detaining the property involved within the State as by keeping it out. Sound, wholesome fish constitute a valuable article of food and are property. The owner of such fish taken in another State or a foreign country has the right to bring them into Illinois for any lawful purpose. He may not have the possession of them here for the purpose of sale, but he may have them for his own consumption, to give away, or he may store them. He has the right to receive another's fish for storage. If, being the owner, he desires to ship them to another State he has the right to do so, or if, having them in store for another, the owner orders him to ship them to another State he may do so. This transportation of commodities from one State to another is inter-State commerce, and section 12 of the act, so far as it prohibits such transportation, is unconstitutional and void. The judgments in cases No. 7978 and No. 7981 will be affirmed and in No. 7979 and No. 7980 will be reversed, and the latter causes will be remanded. Nos. 7979 and 7980 reversed and remanded. THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, Appellee, vs. ALBErt Wisner, et al. Appellants. Opinion filed February 23, 1912. I. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-item of engineer's estimate for "lawful expenses" is proper. An item of the engineer's estimate reading, "six per cent for lawful expenses, $3625.50," is not insufficient because not expressly limited to the cost of making, levying and collecting the assessment, as section 10 of the Local Improvement act requires a statement in the estimate that it does not exceed the probable cost of the improvement and lawful expenses attending the same. 2. SAME-effect where estimate contains the item "six per cent for lawful expenses." Where the engineer's estimate contains an item of "six per cent for lawful expenses," followed by the amount, it is still discretionary with the city council to provide by the ordinance that some sum, not exceeding six per cent of the assessment, shall be applied toward the payment of the cost of making and collecting it. 3. SAME-Section 53 of Local Improvement act means that all interests in land needed must be acquired. Section 53 of the Local Improvement act, providing that no special assessment shall be levied for any local improvement until the land necessary therefor shall be acquired and in possession of the municipality, is not complied with by acquiring the right of one who has a mere easement in the land, but means that all rights and interests therein shall be acquired, so that the municipality shall have an absolute right not only to construct but to maintain the improvement. 4. SAME-city must acquire right from owners of the fee to lay sewer in a highway. Assuming that the highway commissioners may, so far as the rights of the public are concerned, consent to the construction by a city of a sewer in a highway outside of the corporate limits of the city, it is still necessary, under section 53 of the Local Improvement act, that the city shall obtain the consent of the owners of the fee. (Cochran v. Village of Park Ridge, 138 Ill. 295, distinguished.) 5. SAME what does not amount to joint use of improvement by city and town. The fact that the grant by highway commissioners to a city of the right to construct a sewer in a highway beyond the corporate limits of the city is conditioned upon the construction by the city of a certain number of catch-basins for the benefit of the highway does not render the improvement one for the joint use of the city and town, and the improvement does not, by reason of such condition, cease to be a local improvement. 6. SAME―when court should not adopt opinions of witnesses as to benefits. It is error for the court, in determining the question of benefits in a sewer assessment proceeding, to base its judgment on opinions of the witnesses for petitioner made without regard to existing conditions or the location of the land, it being the opinion of such witnesses that two pieces of property were benefited the same by a sewer which drained one and did not drain the other, and that lands which were high and well drained were benefited the same as low lands at times partially submerged. APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. DAVID T. SMILEY, Judge, presiding. GEORGE A. MASON, BAYLEY & WEBSTER, Edwin A. MUNGER, DANIEL S. WENTWORTH, and JOHN F. SPOHN, for appellants. WILLIAM J. DONLIN, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook county confirming an assessment against the lands of appellants for the cost of constructing a combined sanitary and storm-relief sewer in the city of Park Ridge, and extending west of the city, in a public highway of the town of Maine, to the Desplaines river. One objection overruled by the court was that the engineer's estimate was insufficient because the item "six per cent for lawful expenses, $3625.50," might include things not authorized by law, and should have been expressly limited to the cost of making, levying and collecting the assessment, as authorized by section 94 of the Local Improvement act. The provision of that section is, that in cities of the class of Park Ridge the city council may, in the ordinance for the assessment, provide that a certain sum, not to ex |