dent from the face of the plat it was the intention of the proprietor to set apart certain grounds for public use.Smith v. Town of Flora, 64 Ill. 93; Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 id. 29; Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood, 118 id. 61.” In Elliott on Roads and Streets (2d ed. sec. 18,) it is said: "Where a plat of a town or city is made and recorded and lots are designated thereon, with spaces left which fairly indicate that they are set apart to the public, the spaces thus indicated are presumptively streets." In Ingraham v. Brown, 231 Ill. 256, it was said, on page 259: "The strip runs across the entire subdivision, and while not named upon the plat as a street, it is marked upon its margin with the figures '138,' and the surveyor, in his certificate attached to said plat, certifies that 'all measurements are taken in feet and parts of a foot, and the several sizes of the lots and blocks and widths of streets and alleys are marked on their margins, as shown upon the plat.' We are unable to understand why the figures '138' were placed upon the margin of said strip, as platted, if it was not the intention of the surveyor to indicate upon the plat, by such figures, the width of said strip and that it was set apart as a public street. In order to show an intention to dedicate said strip to the use of the public as a street it was not necessary that the strip be named as a street, as such intention. may be established in any conceivable way by which it may be made manifest that it was intended to set said strip aside. as a public street. 'A survey and plat, alone, are sufficient to establish a dedication, if it is evident from the face of the plat it was the intention of the proprietor to set apart certain grounds for public use.' (Thompson v. Maloney, supra.) 'Where a plat of a town or city is made and recorded, and lots are designated thereon, with spaces left which fairly indicate that they are set apart to the public, the spaces thus indicated are presumptively streets.'-Elliott on Roads and Streets, (2d ed.) sec. 18."

We are of the opinion that by the plat an offer to dedicate said strip to the public as an alley was made, and the only remaining question to be determined is, does the record show an acceptance of the offer to dedicate the strip before the offer of dedication was withdrawn? If the plat was a statutory plat the offer could only be withdrawn by a vacation of the plat under the statute, but if it was a common law plat the offer of dedication might be otherwise withdrawn before acceptance. The evidence shows that the streets of the subdivision have been improved by the city by paving, constructing sidewalks, putting in sewers, placing lamp-posts, etc., in the streets. It is urged, however, that this particular strip had not been so improved. This is true to a large extent, as the land was open and there was but little occasion to travel upon this strip; but it was not necessary that all the streets and alleys of the subdivision should be improved at once and utilized by the city or be lost to the city. An acceptance may be express, as by some positive act of the municipality evidenced by an ordinance or resolution, or an acceptance may be implied from the acts of the city or the public, as by making improvements or by travel; and where it clearly appears that the principal streets and alleys of a subdivision have been accepted by the municipality, the presumption then obtains that all the streets and alleys of the subdivision have been accepted, unless there is something which shows the acceptance to have been limited, and there is no proof in this record that the city declined to accept any portion of the plat, and that being true, the acceptance of a part was an acceptance of the whole plat. In Village of Lee v. Harris, 206 Ill. 428, it was said, on page 435: "It is insisted that an acceptance of some of the streets and alleys of a plat does not constitute an acceptance of the whole, and that proof of the acceptance of a part is not sufficient to vest the village with right to the use, possession and control of all the streets and alleys shown on a plat. We do not so un

derstand the law, but, on the contrary, hold the true rule and doctrine to be, that an acceptance by a city or village of some of the streets and alleys appearing on a plat is an acceptance of the entire system of streets and alleys so appearing, unless the intention to limit the acceptance is shown." And it is further said in that case: "The immediate opening and use, by the public, of all the streets in ground laid out and platted into lots, for their entire length, or an immediate formal acceptance by some competent public authority, is not necessary to give effect to the dedication of land to the public use, of a street, by the making of a town plat and the selling of lots with reference to the plat. The public authorities must be allowed a reasonable time for opening and improving public streets, as their resources and the public necessity may allow and require." In Village of Augusta v. Tyner, 197 Ill. 242, it was said, on page 246: "It is true that a street may be accepted in part and the remainder rejected, if it is proved that such was the intention of the public authorities. An acceptance of some of the streets named in a plat will not constitute an acceptance of the whole, if it is shown that there was an intention to limit the acceptance." The record further shows that on two occasions,-first in 1903 and again in 1910, the city recognized the legal existence of this alley by ordinances which were passed by the city council, one of which granted to one of the appellants the right to lay railroad tracks across the said strip to connect its property with the right of way of the railroad company. In People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 237, it was said, on page 241: "An express acceptance may be shown by some order, resolution or action of the public authorities made and entered of record." And in Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Bay City, 129 Mich. 264, (88 N. W. Rep. 638): "A resolution of the common council authorizing the construction of a railroad through land dedicated to the city as a street is effective as the acceptance by the city of an offer to dedi

cate." To the same effect is the case of Schaefer v. Selvage, (Ky.) 41 S. W. Rep. 569.

There is ample evidence in this record to show an acceptance of the strip in question by the city as a public alley before the same was conveyed by Kerr to the appellants, and the attempt on their part to appropriate said strip by fencing the same in with their lots was without avail. The superior court therefore properly held the appellants were not entitled to an injunction restraining the city from keeping said strip open as a public alley.

Finding no reversible error in this record the decree of the superior court will be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

George Price, Appellee, vs. THE DRAINAGE COMMISSIONERS OF UNION DISTRICT No. 1, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 21, 1911-Rehearing denied Feb. 8, 1912.

1. DRAINAGE—effect of construction of a ditch and branches by voluntary action. Where a drainage ditch and branches are constructed by voluntary action of the land owners interested, there is an implied dedication by each of the several owners in favor of the others of an easement over his land for a ditch of such size and character as is assented to by the voluntary action of parties.

2. SAME-district organized under section 76 of Farm Drainage act must pay for additional land taken. The existence of the easement arising from the voluntary action of land owners in constructing ditches and drains does not authorize a drainage district subsequently organized out of the territory, under section 76 of the Farm Drainage act, to appropriate additional land for enlarging and repairing the ditches without the consent of the owner of the land or without paying him just compensation for the additional land taken or damaged.

3. SAME-measure of damages where district organized under section 76 of the Farm Drainage act takes additional land. Where a district organized under section 76 of the Farm Drainage act takes and damages additional land for enlarging and repairing the ditches without the consent of the land owner and without condemning the land, the land owner must recover in one action all

damages, both present and prospective, and the measure of such damages is the difference between the fair cash value of his farm before the improvement of the ditch and its fair cash value after the work was completed.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. MORTON W. THOMPSON, Judge, presiding.

SWALLOW & SWALLOW, for appellant.

ACTON & ACTON, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court: Appellee, George Price, brought an action of trespass against the drainage commissioners of Union Drainage District No. 1, towns of Vance and Catlin, in Vermilion county, and recovered a judgment for $500, and the drainage district has removed the case to this court by appeal, basing the right of an appeal direct to this court on the ground that the constitutionality of a statute is involved. No question is raised as to the jurisdiction of this court.

The controversy arises out of the following facts: Appellee is the owner of 240 acres of farm land, a part of which is in Union Drainage District No. 1. He and other persons owning adjoining lands constructed, by voluntary agreement, a ditch and branches across the land of appellee and adjoining lands in order to make a combined system of drainage for the mutual benefit of the several land owners. Said ditch and its branches constituted a system of drainage by user. The main ditch as originally constructed across the lands of appellee was from 10 to 12 feet wide for a distance of 1350 feet, and for 750 feet it was from 10 to 100 feet wide. In December, 1910, some of the land owners in this system of drainage concluded that the original ditch was insufficient and that it should be widened and deepened to afford complete drainage. Appellee declined to make the improvements proposed, and thereupon certain