Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken. Previous to reaching Fayetteville I had despatched to Wilmington from Laurel Hill Church two of our best scouts with intelligence of our position and my general plans. Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and on the morning of the 12th of March, the army tug Davidson, Capt. Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from the outer world. On the same day, this tug carried back to Gen. Terry, at Wilmington, and Gen. Schofield at Newbern, my despatches to the effect that on Wednesday, the 15th, we would move for Goldsboro, feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for Goldsboro, which I expected to reach about the 20th. The same day, the gunboat Eolus, Capt. Young, United States navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear River, one opposite the town, the other three miles below." While Gen. Sherman had been advancing to Fayetteville, some movements had taken place at Wilmington, N. C., intended to prepare the way for cooperation with him. It was on Jan. 15th that Gen. Schofield, with the 23d corps, left Gen. Thomas, as has been stated, for the Atlantic coast. The troops moved with their artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports, to Cincinnati, Ohio, and thence by railroad to Washington, D. C., and Alexandria, Va. Although it was midwinter and the weather unusually severe, the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffering on the part of the troops. In February an order was issued by the Secretary of War creating the department of North Carolina, and assigning Gen. Schofield to the command. The ultimate object of his operations was to occupy Goldsboro, N. C., and to open railroad communication between that point and the sea-coast, and further to accumulate supplies for Gen. Sherman's army and to join it, in its approach, at or near Goldsboro. Wilmington was made the first point to capture, as it would afford a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City in the event of the junction being made at Goldsboro; and also as it would be of great value to Gen. Sherman in case the movement of the main army of the enemy or other circumstances should render advisable a concentration of Sherman's army at some point further south than Goldsboro.

With the 3d division of the 23d corps, under Major-Gen. J. D. Cox, Gen. Schofield reached the mouth of Cape Fear River on Feb. 9th, and landed near Fort Fisher. The other troops were to follow. Major-Gen. Terry, with about eight thousand men, then held a line across the peninsula, about two miles above the fort, and

occupied Smithville and Fort Caswell on the south side of the river, while the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Porter, occupied positions in Cape Fear River, and off the coast covering the flanks of Gen. Terry's line. On the west bank, Fort Anderson was occupied by the enemy with a collateral line running to a large swamp about three-fourths of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson, running across the peninsula from Cape Fear River to Masonboro' Sound. This position was impregnable against a direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing the sound above his left, or passing around the swamp which cov vered his right. The first movement of Gen. Schofield consisted in pushing forward Gen. Terry's line on Feb. 11th, supported by Gen. Cox's division, which drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in a new position close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold it in force. Efforts were then made to turn his left by the aid of a fleet of boats to cross the sound, but the weather prevented. Finally Gen. Schofield determined to attempt to turn the enemy's right. Gen. Cox's and Gen. Ames' divisions were crossed over to Smithville and joined by Col. Moore's brigade of Gen. Couch's division, which had just debarked. They advanced along the main Wilmington road until they encountered the ene-, my's position at Fort Anderson and the adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while Gen. Cox with the other two brigades and Gen. Ames' division moved around the swamp covering the enemy's right, in order to strike the Wilmington road in the rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles. The enemy, by means of their cavalry, discovering the movement of Gen. Cox, hastily abandoned their works on both sides of the river during the night of Feb. 19th, fell back behind Town Creek on the west, and to a similar position covered with swamps on the east. Thus the main defences of the Cape Fear River and of Wilmington were captured, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance and a large amount of ammunition.

On the next day Gen. Cox pursued the enemy to Town Creek, behind which he was found intrenched. The only bridge over had been destroyed. Gen. Terry, on the east bank, also encountered the enemy in superior force, and Gen. Ames' division was recrossed and joined him during the night. On the 20th Gen. Cox crossed Town Creek, and gaining the flank and rear of the enemy attacked and routed them, capturing two guns and three hundred and seventy-five prisoners, besides the killed and wounded. During the night he rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artillery, and advanced toward Wilmington without opposition. Meanwhile, Gen. Terry being unable to advance, so occupied the attention of the entire force of Gen. Hoke that he was unable to reenforce those defeated by Gen. Cox. On Feb. 21st Gen. Cox

secured a portion of the enemy's bridge across Brunswick River, and passed a portion of his troops to Eagle Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear River above Wilmington. The enemy immediately set fire to his steamers, cotton, and military and naval stores, and abandoned the city. Early the next morning, Feb. 22d, Gen. Cox entered without opposition. The force in front of Gen. Terry fell back, and were pursued by him across Northeast River.

The Federal losses in these operations were about two hundred officers and men killed and wounded. That of the enemy was estimated at one thousand killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. Fifteen heavy and fifteen light guns were captured, with a large amount of ammunition.

As Gen. Schofield had no rolling stock at Wilmington, and was nearly destitute of wagons, he was compelled to operate from Newbern for the capture of Goldsboro. He had already sent to that place about 5,000 men, and ordered Gen. J. N. Palmer to move with as little delay as possible upon Kinston, in order to cover the workmen repairing the railroad. Gen. Ruger's division of the 23d corps was sent to reënforce Gen. Palmer, by way of Morehead City. As Gen. Palmer had not moved on the 25th, Gen. Cox was ordered to take the command and push forward at once. At the same time the division of Gen. Couch, which had just arrived at Wilmington, was prepared as rapidly as possible, together with the division of Gen. Cox, then under Brig.-Gen. Reilly, to join the column moving from Newbern by a land march from Wilmington. On March 6th the two divisions were ready to move for Kinston, and proceeded by way of Onslow and Richlands. On the 8th Gen. Cox had advanced to Wise's Forks, about one and a half miles below Southwest Creek, behind which the force of the enemy, consisting of Gen. Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had retired. Meanwhile Gen. Cox sent two regiments, under Col. Upham of the 15th Connecticut, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. But the enemy having been reënforced by a portion of the old Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek above the Dover road, and came down in the rear of Col. Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, about seven hundred men. They then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between Gen. Carter's and Gen. Palmer's divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but were checked by Gen. Ruger's division, which was just arriving on the field. Only light skirmishing took place, from which the loss was small. As the enemy was equally as strong as Gen. Cox, and receiving reenforcements all the time, Gen. Cox intrenched his force to await the arrival of Gen. Couch. On the 9th the enemy pressed his lines strongly without making an assault; and on the 10th, having received further reënforcements, and perhaps heard of the approach of Gen. Couch's

column, they made a heavy attack upon the left and centre of Gen. Cox, but were decisively repulsed with a heavy loss. They retired in confusion, leaving their dead and wounded and a large number of arms and intrenching tools. During the night they fell back across the Neuse and burned the bridge. The loss of Gen. Cox was about 300 in killed and wounded; that of the enemy was estimated at 1,500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. During the night the column of Gen. Couch arrived. Gen. Schofield was delayed in crossing the Neuse until the 14th, for want of pontoons, when it was effected without opposition. Meanwhile the enemy had abandoned Kinston and moved rapidly toward Smithfield, to join the force under Gen. Johnston, to resist the advance of Gen. Sherman from Fayetteville. After occupying Kinston and repairing the bridge over the Neuse and the railroad track, Gen. Schofield moved on the 20th toward Goldsboro, which he entered on the evening of the 21st with slight opposition from the enemy.

Meanwhile Gen. Terry, with a portion of the command which had remained at Wilmington, moved from that point on March 15th, reaching Faison's depot on the 20th, and advanced to Cox's bridge, securing the crossing of the Neuse on the 22d.

The columns of Gen. Sherman commenced their march from Fayetteville on Wednesday, March 15th. His plan was, that Gen. Kilpatrick should move up the plank road to and beyond Averysboro, a village on the Cape Fear River, about forty miles south of Raleigh. Four divisions of the left wing, with as few wagons as possible, were to follow him; the rest of the train, under the escort of the two remaining divisions of the wing, were to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro. In like manner Gen. Howard was to send his trains well to the right, under a good escort, toward Faison's depot and Goldsboro, and to hold four divisions light and ready to go to the aid of the left wing if it should be attacked while in motion. The weather continued bad, and the roads were almost impassable, requiring repairs at almost every foot to admit the passage of the wagons and artillery.

Gen. Kilpatrick advanced, followed by Gen. Slocum, who moved up the river or plank road on the 15th to Kyle's landing. About three miles beyond, at Taylor's Hole Creek, Gen. Kilpatrick encountered the rear-guard of the enemy, with which he skirmished heavily. At his request Gen. Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. On the next morning the column advanced in the same order, and found the enemy in an intrenched position, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry. They were in front of the point where the road branched off toward Goldsboro

through Bentonville. It appeared that Gen. Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow and swampy neck between the Cape Fear and South Rivers, in

order to check the progress of Gen. Sherman, that time might be gained for the concentration of Gen. Johnston's forces in the rear at Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro. The force of Gen. Hardee was estimated at 20,000 men. Gen. Sherman found it to be necessary to dislodge him, both to gain possession of the road to Goldsboro and to keep up as long as possible the feint of an advance on Raleigh. The position of the enemy was a difficult one to carry, by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine barren.

Gen. Williams, with the 20th corps, was ahead, and Gen. Ward's division in the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of a brigade of heavy artillery armed as infantry, posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery enfilading a clear field over which lay the way of approach. A brigade under Gen. Corse was sent by Gen. Williams to the left to turn this line. By a quick charge it broke the enemy's brigade, which retreated rapidly back to a second line better made and more strongly held. On the retreat the enemy were made to suffer by Winniger's battery of artillery, which had been put in position by Major Reynolds, chief of artillery. On the advance of Gen. Ward's division over the ground, three guns and 217 prisoners were captured. Of the latter 68 were wounded. Of the enemy's dead, 108 were buried by the troops. As the second line was developed, the division of Gen. Jackson was deployed forward on the right of Gen. Ward, and two divisions of Gen. Jefferson C. Davis' 14th corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear River. At the same time Gen. Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert, was ordered to mass his cavalry on the extreme right, and in concert with the right of Gen. Jackson, to feel forward for the Goldsboro road. He succeeded in getting a brigade on the road, but it was attacked so furiously by a division of the enemy under Gen. McLaws, that it fell back to the flank of the infantry. Late in the afternoon the entire line advanced and drove the enemy within his intrenchments, and pressed him so hard that during the night, which was stormy, he retreated. In the morning he was followed by the division of Gen. Ward through and beyond Averysboro, when it became apparent that Gen. Hardee had retreated toward Smithfield instead of Raleigh. The Union loss was 12 officers and 65 men killed and 477 wounded. The loss of the enemy is unknown.

The division of Gen. Ward remained to keep up a show of pursuit, and the rest of Gen. Slocum's column turned to the right and built the bridge across the South River and took the road to Goldsboro. At the same time Gen. Kilpatrick crossed the river to the north in the direction of Elevation, and moved eastward, watching the left flank. The right wing of

Gen. Howard was still working its way over the heavy roads toward Bentonville and Goldsboro. The cavalry of the enemy crossed in front of Gen. Sherman, to join their infantry at Smithfield, burning the bridges across Mill Creek. Smithfield is 22 miles northwest of Goldsboro, on the railroad leading from the latter place to Raleigh, and on the left bank of the Cape Fear River, 27 miles from Raleigh. Goldsboro is at the junction of the railroad from Raleigh to Newbern and that from Richmond to Wilmington.

On the night of the 18th Gen. Slocum's column encamped on the Goldsboro road, about five miles from Bentonville and twenty-seven miles from Goldsboro. The column of Gen. Howard was two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward, at the junction of the roads leading to Goldsboro. The next movement is thus described by Gen. Sherman :-" All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed Gen. Howard to move his right wing by the new Goldsboro road, which goes by way of Falling Creek Church. I also left Slocum and joined Howard's column, with a view to open communication with Gen. Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and Gen. Terry from Wilmington. I found Gen. Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek Church, with one regiment forward to the cross-roads near Cox's bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from Gen. Slocum about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of rebel cavalry (Dibbrell's), which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under Gen. Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and Hazen's division of the 15th corps, still back near Lee's store, to fight defensively until I could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive station, and with the three remaining divisions of the 15th corps come up on Gen. Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, I received couriers from both Gens. Schofield and Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro on the 21st, and Gen. Terry was at or near Faison's depot. Orders were at once despatched to Gen. Schofield to push for Goldsboro, and to make dispositions to cross Little River in the direc tion of Smithfield as far as Millard; to Gen. Terry to move to Cox's bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to Gen. Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek

Church; and at daylight, the right wing, Gen. Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville."

It appears that on the advance of the head of Gen. Slocum's column from his camp on the night of the 18th, it first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry, but soon found its progress hindered by infantry and cavalry. The enemy attacked his advance and gained a temporary advantage, capturing three guns of Gen. Carlin's division, and driving the two advanced brigades back on the main body. Gen. Slocum at once deployed the two divisions of the 14th corps of Gen. Davis, and brought up on their left the two divisions of the 20th corps of Gen. Williams. These were placed on the defensive, and a line of barricades prepared. Gen. Kilpatrick also massed his cavalry on the left. In this position six assaults were made on the left wing by Gen. Johnston, with the combined forces of Gens. Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham. During the night ensuing, Gen. Slocum got up his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Gen. Hazen's division of the 15th corps, which enabled him to make his position impregnable. Gen. Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield, with as little incumbrance as possible, for the purpose of overwhelming the left wing before it could be relieved. The right wing, in its advance to the aid of Gen. Slocum, found the cavalry of the enemy watching its approach without being able to offer any serious resistance until the head of the column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade, at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle field of the previous day. The cavalry were quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. As the 15th corps advanced, Gen. Logan found that the enemy had thrown back their left flank, and constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward Gen. Slocum, in the form of a bastion, with its salient on the main road to Goldsboro; thus interposing between Gen. Slocum with the left wing on the west, and Gen. Howard with the right wing on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek and covered the road to Smithfield. Gen. Howard proceeding cautiously soon made strong connection with Gen. Slocum on the left, and at 4 P. M. of the 20th, a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, which put Gen. Johnston on the defensive, with Mill Creek and a single bridge in his rear. Gen. Sherman having nothing to gain by a battle, now pressed the enemy steadily with skirmishers alone, using artillery on the wooded space held by him, and feeling the flanks of nis position, which were covered by swamps.

On the next day, the 21st, a steady rain pre vailed, during which Gen. Mower with his di vision, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and nearly reached the bridge across Mill Creek, which was the only line of retreat open to Gen. Johnston. Fearing the enemy might turn upon Gen. Mower with all his reserves, to overwhelm him, and perhaps yield his parapets for the purpose, Gen. Sherman ordered a general attack by his skirmish line, from left to right. Meanwhile Gen. Mower was able to regain his connection by moving to his left rear. During the night ensuing the enemy retreated toward Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into Gen. Sherman's hands, with many dead unburied and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill Creek. The loss of the left wing about Bentonville was reported at 9 officers and 145 men killed, 51 officers and 816 men wounded, and 3 officers and 223 men missing; total, 1,247. Of the enemy, 167 dead were buried, and 338 made prisoners by the left wing. The loss of the right wing was 2 officers and 35 men killed, 12 officers and 289 men wounded, and 1 officer and 60 men missing; total, 399. Of the enemy, 100 dead were buried and 1,287 made prisoners by the right wing. The aggregate loss of Gen. Sherman, exclusive of the cavalry, was 1,646.

The result of this affair gave to Gen. Sherman full possession of Goldsboro, with the two railroads to Wilmington and Beaufort on the coast. The 22d was passed in burying the dead and removing the wounded at Bentonville, and on the next day all the troops moved to the camps about Goldsboro, already occupied by Gen. Schofield, there to rest and receive supplies of food and clothing.

During this march Gen. Sherman's army passed over an average breadth of forty miles of country, from Savannah to Goldsboro, and consumed all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn meal, &c. It was stripped so bare as to make it necessary for the enemy to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. It caused the abandonment by the enemy of the whole sea-coast from Savannah to Newbern, with the forts, dockyards, gunboats, &c. The real object of the march, says Gen. Sherman, "was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865." The troops remained in their camps during the remainder of the month of March. Meantime Gen. Sherman visited City Point and conferred with the President, Gen. Grant, and others.