lated. Free schools must be organized and sustained for a time in part by northern capital. Loyal presses, too, must be established, and the social structure renovated and placed upon its new basis of freedom, order, and law. While this change was going on, though superintended mainly, and supported in part by persons who had previously resided in the regions to be reclaimed, aid would be required for some time from those sections which had not been despoiled by the ravages of war. To the various local refugee societies letters were addressed, and their cooperation, counsel, and suggestions sought. These organizations welcomed with great cordiality the new movement, and united with it as branches, or entered into harmonious cooperation with it. The American Union Commission, as thus organized, had its headquarters in New York city, but included auxiliaries in Boston, Baltimore, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago, Cairo, Memphis, Nashville, Charleston, and other points. Its officers were Rev. Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., President; Rev. Lyman Abbott, Corresponding Secretary; H. G. Odiorne, Esq., of Cincinnati, Western Secretary; H. M. Pierce, LL.D., Recording Secretary; A. V. Stout, Esq. (President of Shoe and Leather Bank), Treasurer; and an Executive Committee of six members. Its fundamental article, approved, as was the whole work and purpose of the Commission, by the Government, stated that it "is constituted for the purpose of aiding and cooperating with the people of those portions of the United States which have been desolated and impoverished by the war, in the restoration of their civil and social condition upon the basis of industry, education, freedom, and Christian morality.

About the 1st of October, 1864, the Cominission was fully organized for its work, and found at first abundant occupation in relieving the immediate necessities of homeless refugees, who were brought from the South in Government transports and landed upon the wharves in the most destitute condition. Nearly 100,000 were

thus thrown upon the charity of the benevolent during seven or eight months of 1864-'65. The Commission gathered them into barracks or "homes" at St. Louis, Cairo, Louisville, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, New York, and other points in the North, fed, clothed, and provided them with medical care, and where it was possible procured for them places, where, by their own industry, they could obtain a livelihood. Experience in other organizations proved that the retention of large numbers in camps and barracks in a state of idleness, was injurious alike to their health, their morals, and their subsequent efficiency, and hence the Commission sought as speedily as possible to place all who were able to work in situations where they might obtain their bread by their labor. The extraordinary campaigns of General Sherman, and the sudden collapse of the rebellion, rendered a different system necessary in the Seaboard States. It was neither practicable nor desirable to bring the thousands who flocked into Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, Newbern, Goldsborough, Petersburg, and Richmond, to the North. They must be aided in their dire necessity at home, and as soon as practicable assisted to sustain themselves. Provisions were accordingly shipped to Savannah, Charleston, Newbern, Richmond, and other points, and careful and trustworthy agents despatched with them to see to their honest and faithful distribution. Pauperism, or the dependence upon charity without effort at self-help, was sternly discouraged; the cities were districted, and the applicants visited at their homes.

The Commission disbursed in money and clothing from its New York office in six months, $70,000, and the various auxiliary boards probably fully as much more. (The Boston Branch expended $32,000.) Schools were opened in Richmond and other cities of the South. Seeds and agricultural implements were also furnished to the impoverished people of the Southern States, that they might be able to resume their long interrupted industry.

racks, and in strengthening the defences of

All this seemed to indicate Gen. Sherman's intention to make the city a base for further operations southward, and to hold it with a powerful garrison. From his recent experience of the facility with which a cavalry force could temporarily interrupt his long line

of railroad communication, he was disposed to hasten this work, and the end of the month found Atlanta transformed into a considerable depot of supplies, and so protected by works that a moderate force could hold it against an enemy numerically much superior. The departure of the great body of the inhabitants, by lessening the number of persons to be subsisted, added to the capacity of the garrison to withstand a protracted siege.

Gen. Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of Jonesboro, receiving his supplies by the Macon road. His army numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia; and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Gov. Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta, through the following communication:

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, MILLEDGEVILLE, Sept. 10th, 1864. Gen. J. B. Hood, Commanding Army of Tennessee: GENERAL: As the militia of the State were called out for the defence of Atlanta during the campaign against it, which has terminated by the fall of the city into the hands of the enemy, and as many of them left their homes without preparation, expecting to be gone but a few weeks, who have remained in service over three months (most of the time in the trenches), justice requires that they be permitted, while the enemy are preparing for the winter campaign, to return to their homes, and look, for a time, after important interests, and prepare themselves for such service as may be required when another campaign commences against other important points in the State. I, therefore, hereby withdraw said organization from your command, in the hope that I shall be able to return it with greater numbers and equal efficiency, when the interests of the public service require it. In this connection, I beg leave to tender to you, general, my sincere thanks for your impartiality to the State troops, and for your uniform courtesy and kindness to me individually. With assurances of my high consideration and esteem, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH E. BROWN.

To allow their principal Southern army to rust in inactivity, was not, however, the intention of the rebel authorities, who, whatever public statements they might make as to the insignificance of Gen. Sherman's conquest, knew that it was a vital blow aimed at the heart of the Confederacy, and that this was the belief of the Southern people. Something must be done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal army, or Georgia, and perhaps the Gulf States, would be irretrievably lost. In this emergency Jefferson Davis started on a tour of inspection through the South, and at Macon, on Sept. 23d, delivered a public address on the crisis, so marked by indiscreet admissions that many of the Confederate papers at first refused to believe that it was genuine. He alluded with undisguised vexation to the depletion in Gen. Hood's ranks caused by absenteeism, and promised, if the deserters would return to duty, that Gen. Sherman should meet "the fate that befell the army of the French Empire in its retreat from Moscow. Our cavalry," he said, "and our people, will

harass and destroy his army as did the Cossacks that of Napoleon; and the Yankee general, like him, will escape with only a bodyguard." These remarks foreshadowed a new policy, borrowed from that which Gen. Sherman himself had so successfully employed in the capture of Atlanta, and which, considering the long catalogue of rebel reverses in Georgia, had the merit of boldness, if not of farsightedness. The whole army of Gen. Hood, it was decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee River at that place. Should this be accomplished, Atlanta would be isolated from Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated from Nashville, and Gen. Sherman, cut off from his primary and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest, to be relinquished almost as soon as gained, and would be obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would then fall from lack of provisions, or in consequence of the successful attacks of the Georgia militia.

In connection with this movement, Gen. Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee, where the Federal force was barely adequate to prevent him from interrupting communications between Nashville and Chattanooga. Not the least favorable result anticipated from this movement was the restoration of the morale of their army, which, dispirited by constant retreats and reverses, its leaders naturally supposed would be encouraged to greater efforts by an aggressive campaign. On the other hand, the effect of abandoning their conquests, to meet a defeated army operating in their rear, would be likely to perplex and disconcert the Federals. Such was the ingenious plan devised by the authorities, and, to a less able general than Sherman, its vigorous execution might have been productive of enormous disaster, including, of course, the abandonment of the conquests gained during a long and arduous campaign. The sequel will show that he was fully master of the situation, and that the boasts of the rebel papers, that "the great flanker was outflanked," were destined to prove illusive.

A week sufficed to complete Gen. Hood's

arrangements, and by the 2d of October his army was across the Chattahoochee and on the march to Dallas, where the different corps were directed to concentrate. At this point he was enabled to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to Chattanooga; and there remained open, in case of defeat, a line of retreat southwest into Alabama. From Dallas he advanced east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, captured the insignificant stations of Big Shanty and Ackworth, effecting a thorough destruction of the road between the two places. He

also sent a division under Gen. French to capture the Federal post at Allatoona Pass, where he had ascertained that a million and a half of rations for the Federal army were stored, on which he probably depended to replenish his commissariat. The natural strength of the position was such that ten thousand men could easily hold it against ten times their number, as long as their supplies held out, besides cutting off railroad communications between Chattanooga and Atlanta. This of itself might have compelled the evacuation of the latter city, and was a sufficient inducement to make the attack.

Gen. Sherman, however, aware that his seat in Atlanta was insecure while this long line of communications lay so exposed to interruption, had anticipated and partially provided against such a movement as this; and immediately upon hearing that Gen. Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, he despatched Gen. Corse with reënforcements to Rome, which he supposed the enemy were aiming at. During the previous week he had sent Gen. Thomas with troops to Nashville to look after Forrest. His bridges having meanwhile been carried away by a freshet which filled the Chattahoochee, he was unable to move his main body until the 4th, when three pontoons were laid down, over which the armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio crossed, and took up their march in the direction of Marietta, with fifteen days' rations. The 20th corps, Gen. Slocum, was left to garrison Atlanta. Learning that the enemy had captured Big Shanty and Ackworth, and were threatening Allatoona, and alive to the imperative necessity of holding the latter place, Gen. Sherman at once communicated by signals instruction to Gen. Corse at Rome to reenforce the small garrison and hold the defences until the main body of the Federal army could come to his assistance. Upon receiving the message Gen. Corse placed nine hundred men on the cars, and reached Allatoona before the attack of French. With this addition the garrison numbered 1,700 men, with six guns.

Early on the morning of the 5th, Gen. French, with 7,000 troops, approached Allatoona, and summoned the Federal commander, "in order to save the unnecessary effusion of blood," to make an immediate surrender; to which the latter replied: "I shall not surrender, and you can commence the unnecessary effusion of blood whenever you please." The battle opened at 8 A. M., and was waged hotly until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Driven from fort to fort, until they reached their last defence, the garrison fought with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of the great stake for which they contended. Their general was wounded early in the action, but relaxed in no degree his efforts to repel the enemy. On one occasion the opposing forces mingled in a bayonet charge. During the heat of the contest Gen. Sherman reached the summit of Kenesaw Mountain, whence he repeatedly signalled, to Gen. Corse

to hold out to the last. The announcement of approaching succor animated the garrison to renewed exertions, and they threw back the assaulting columns of the enemy again and again, finally compelling them to retire, beaten and disheartened, in the direction of Dallas. Their retreat was hastened by the rapid approach of Stanley's (4th) corps from the direction of Pine Mountain. The enemy left 700 to 800 killed, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of the Federals, and their total loss must have exceeded 1,000. The garrison lost 600 men. The town of Allatoona was reduced to a mere wreck by the severe fire of the enemy, and all the Federal artillery and cavalry horses were killed; but the valuable stores were saved, and the fort and pass held. The only important injury done by the rebels, was the destruction of six or seven miles of railroad between Big Shanty and Allatoona, which Gen. Sherman immediately commenced to repair.

For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona, Gen. Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the movements of Hood, who, he suspected, would march for Rome, and thence toward Bridgeport, or else to Kingston.

The 23d corps, commanded by Gen. Cox (Gen. Schofield, its commander, having previously been ordered to look after the defences of Chattanooga), was at once sent toward the former place, and, by the 10th, the whole army was on the march thither. Gen. Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held by Col. Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery. The garrison immediately took to the rifle-pits surrounding the works, and kept the enemy's skirmishers at bay, and in the midst of a brisk contest a flag of truce approached, with the following message:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
IN THE FIELD, Oct. 12th, 1864.

To the Officer Commanding the United States forces at Resaca, Ga. :

surrender of the post and garrison under your command; and should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is taken by assault, no prisoners will be taken. Most respectfully, your obedient servant, To which Col. Weaver replied: J. B. HOOD, General.

SIR: I demand the immediate and unconditional

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,
THIRD DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

To Gen. J. B. Hood:

Your communication of this date just received. In reply, I have to state that I am somewhat surif the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will prised at the concluding paragraph, to the effect that be taken." In my opinion, I can hold this post. If you want it, come and take it.

I am, General, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, CLARK R. WEAVER, Comd'g Officer. W. W. MCCAMMON, A. A. A. G.

During the whole day continuous masses of rebel troops were passing the forts, but no serious attack was made upon the garrison, the