aster at Bull Run taught the Government that success would result only from the most extensive, careful, and thoroughly organized military preparations.

On the other hand the people of the insurrectionary States had, at first, looked upon secession as hopeless, if it should be powerfully opposed by the Federal Government and Northern people; but within a short period they had become convinced that the North would not fight, and therefore flattered themselves that certain success was within their grasp. Their amazement at the valor, bravery, and vigor of the Northern troops has been inexpressible, and with the loss of all hope of foreign assistance, they have seen their prospects of success fading away.

The course of the Government relative to the slave property in the Confederate States was designed to be in strict conformity with its views of the Constitution and laws. But as the Southern States were in insurrection, there was no obligation to return fugitive slaves to them; consequently all slaves who came within the army lines were treated as freemen.

As to prisoners captured by either side there was no recourse but to exchange, according to the laws of war. This the Federal Government hesitated to do, for the reason that it might be construed into acknowledging belligerent rights on the part of the Confederates. The necessity of exchange became urgent, and the friends of prisoners were clamorous that something should be done for their relief. The Administration practically ignored the question, being impressed with the idea that it would derogate from the dignity of its position to accept any interchange of courtesy. By exchanging prisoners, nothing is conceded or admitted except what is patent to the world-that actual war exists. Previous to the battle of Bull Run the number of prisoners on either side was not large. By that disaster the Southerners captured about 1,400 northern troops. They released numbers at different points on parole, and the matter was compromised in various ways. In September an exchange took place between Gen. Pillow and Col. Wallace, of the Federal

army.

On the 1st of November Gen. Fremont made a treaty with Gen. Price, of Missouri, among the provisions of which was one for the exchange of prisoners. Certain parties named are authorized, whenever applied to for the purpose, to negotiate for the exchange of any and all persons who may hereafter be taken prisoners of war and released on parole; such exchanges to be made upon the plan heretofore approved and acted upon, to wit: grade for grade, or two officers of lower grade, as an equivalent in rank for one of a higher grade, as shall be thought just and equitable." This was signed by both parties. Gen. Hunter, having succeeded Gen. Fremont on the 7th of Nov., repudiated this treaty.

At the close of the year three commissioners

were appointed by the Federal Government to proceed to the Confederate States and examine the condition of the Union prisoners there. They were refused admission within the Confederate territory, and thus the fate of prisoners was left to the discretion of each commander, who exchanged them at his will. But, while such were the terms on which exchanges were effected for those taken as prisoners on either side upon land, only an informal regulation had been established respecting the persons detained on a charge of piracy, because found waging war against Federal commerce on the high seas, and in retaliation for whose treatment the Confederate authorities imprisoned in the common jail a corresponding number of United States officers.

In his message to Congress on the 20th of July, Mr. Davis refers to a despatch sent to Washington, as before stated, and after stating the reasons upon which it was sent, thus proceeds: "To this end I despatched an officer under a flag of truce to President Lincoln, and informed him of my resolute purpose to check all barbarities on prisoners of war by such severity of retaliation on prisoners held by us as should secure the abandonment of the practice. This communication was received and read by an officer in command of the United States forces, and a message was brought from him by the bearer of my communication that a reply would be returned by President Lincoln as soon as possible. I earnestly hope this promised reply (which has not yet been received) will convey the assurance that prisoners of war will be treated in this unhappy contest with that regard for humanity which has made such conspicuous progress in modern warfare. As measures of precaution, however, and until this promised reply is received, I shall retain in close custody some officers captured from the enemy, whom it had been my pleasure previously to set at large on parole, and whose fate must necessarily depend on that of prisoners held by the enemy.'

The foreign policy of the Government was conducted on the principle that the troubles of the country formed a domestic affair of its own, and the interference of foreign nations was neither desired nor would be allowed. The prompt manner in which the Confederate States were acknowledged as belligerents by France and England is a proof that not a doubt was entertained by the Governments of those nations of the ultimate independence of the new Confederacy.

After the adjournment of the extra session of Congress in July, the plan of the Government was to make the most ample and perfect preparations to recover and repossess the strongholds in the Confederate States. In its progress due regard was had to the will of Congress, and the requirements of the emergency. With a surprising unanimity among the people, its measures were steadily sustained.

The army around Washington was reorgan

ized, greatly increased in numbers, and brought up to the highest state of discipline. In its front the camps of the flower of the Southern States were spread, and the year closed with the two armies watching each other. The one

was growing more formidable and better prepared for the approaching strife, while the other was growing weaker by the overstrained effort to maintain a position which it finally yielded without a single blow.

WHEN the new year began, the anticipations of the two antagonists were materially changed. The South, rendered exultant and hopeful by the successes at Bull Run and Leesburg or Ball's Bluff, believed that foreign interference was certain, and that the war would be short. Under these influences a serious state of apathy was beginning to prevail. The enlistment of troops was for the short period of twelve months, and the naval preparations for defence were on a limited scale.

Meanwhile the North had begun to realize the gigantic nature of the contest in which it was engaged, and to put forth corresponding efforts of preparation. Besides the organization of vast armies, naval preparations were commenced on an immense scale, and embracing every variety of improvement. The Federal Government also, in order to strengthen itself, had resorted to the imprisonment of all persons who by words or actions manifested a strong sympathy for the Southern cause. At the same time many newspapers whose general spirit was hostile to the Government, were suppressed, and their circulation forbidden.

The Secretary of the Navy, in his report of July 4th, 1861, presented the following statement of the vessels at that time in service:

"Of the 69 vessels, carrying 1,346 guns, mentioned as available for service on the 4th of March last, the sloop Levant has been given up as lost in the Pacific; the steamer Fulton was seized at Pensacola; and one frigate, two sloops, and one brig were burnt at Norfolk. These vessels carried 172 guns. The other vessels destroyed at Norfolk were considered worthless, and are not included in the list of available vessels.

"These losses left at the disposal of the department 62 vessels, carrying 1,174 guns, all of which are now, or soon will be, in commission, with the exception of the

"The squadron on the Atlantic coast, under the command of Flag-officer S. H. Stringham, consists of 22 vessels, 296 guns, and 3,300 men.

"The squadron in the Gulf, under the command of Flag-officer William Mervine, consists of 21 vessels, 282 guns, and 3,500 men.

"Additions have been made to each of the squadrons, of two or three small vessels that have been captured and taken into the service. The steamers Pawnee and Pocahontas, and the flotilla under the late Commander Ward, with several steamboats in charge of naval officers, have been employed on the Potomac River, to prevent communication with that portion of Virginia which is in insurrection. Great service has been rendered by this armed force, which has been vigilant in intercepting supplies, and in protecting transports and supply vessels in their passage up and down the Potomac.

"The squadron in the Pacific, under the command of Flag-officer John B. Montgomery, consists of six vessels, 82 guns, and 1,000 men.

"The West India squadron is under the command of Flag-officer G. J. Pendergrast, who has been temporarily on duty, with his flag-ship, the Cumberland, at Norfolk and Hampton Roads, since the 23d of March. He will, at an early day, transfer his flag to the steam-frigate Roanoke, and proceed southward, having in charge our interests on the Mexican and central American coasts, and in the West India Islands.

"The East India, Mediterranean, Brazil, and African squadrons, excepting one vessel of each of the two latter, have been recalled.

"The return of these vessels will add to the force for service in the Gulf and on the Atlantic coast, about 200 guns and 2,500 men.”

He also stated in his report that 259 officers of the navy had resigned their commissions, or been dismissed from the service, since the 4th of March; for which reason many of the vessels were necessarily sent to sea without a full complement of officers. Many, however, who had retired to civil pursuits, had promptly come forward in this time of their country's need, and voluntarily tendered their services, while many masters and masters' mates were also appointed from the commercial marine. So promptly did seamen present themselves at the naval rendezvous of all the principal seaports, under the authorized increase and abbreviated term of enlistment, that only one or two ships experienced any detention for want of a crew, and none beyond two or three days. Never, as the Secretary states, has the naval force had

CLASS OF VESSELS.

so great and rapid an increase, and never have our seamen come forward with more alacrity and zeal to serve the country.

In the need of a substantial class of vessels suitable for performing continuous duty off the coast in all weathers, the department contracted for the building of 23 steam gunboats, each of about 500 tons burden, and made preliminary arrangements for several larger and fleeter vessels, in addition to taking measures for carrying out the order of Congress of the preceding session for the construction of seven sloops of war, with the addition of one more. At each of the Northern navy yards, Portsmouth, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, two of this last class were directed to be built. The following table comprises a summary of the vessels purchased for naval service during the year 1861:

Of side-wheel steamers nine were first-class steamships, all of them costing from $85,000 to $200,000 each, except one, the Alabama, which was bought for $23,000. Among the steamers were eighteen ferry-boats and tug-boats, the former purchased from the Brooklyn and New Jersey companies.

The armed vessels were almost exclusively ordered, on entering into the service, to proceed to the Southern ports, for the purpose of enforcing their blockade, and the result of their operations is shown in the following summary of vessels, captured and destroyed from April 23 to November 15. These are 7 ships, 12 barks, 9 brigs, 115 schooners, 8 sloops, and 7 miscellaneous, the last including the steamer Salvor, loaded with arms, from Havana, and bound to Tampa Bay. Most of these vessels contained valuable cargoes, and three of them were privateers. A few were recaptured prizes, and were restored to their owners.

The year 1861 will always be famous in naval history for the material change then first fairly established in the construction of vessels of war, by rendering them as nearly impenetrable as possible to the heaviest shot, by means of a coating of iron plates. The superiority of a few guns of the heaviest calibre to the large batteries of the older ships was then first generally appreciated, and the whole system of ship-building in the navies of France and England, as also of some of the minor naval powers of Europe, underwent a more complete change than had followed the introduction of steam. The building of wooden vessels was entirely abandoned, except in some special cases where they were to be covered with plates of iron, and the day of old wooden frigates and line

of-battle ships was looked upon as having passed.

The subject came before Congress in 1861, and on the 3d of August an act was approved, directing the Secretary of the Navy "to appoint a board of three skilful naval officers to investigate the plans and specifications that may be submitted for the construction and completing iron-clad steam-ships or steam-batteries, and on their report, should it be favorable, the Secretary of the Navy will cause one or more armored, or iron or steel-clad steam-ships or floating steam-batteries to be built; and there is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $1,500,000.” Commodores Joseph Smith and H. Paulding, with Capt. C. H. Davis, were appointed this board, and their report was presented of the date of Sept. 15. While considering iron-clad ships as without doubt formidable adjuncts to coast and harbor fortifications, the board questioned their advantages and ultimate adoption as cruising vessels, chiefly on account of the enormous weight added to the vessel by the armor, which involved greater power to propel her, and at the same time largely increased the cost of construction. To meet the immediate demand for vessels as far as practicable invulnerable to shot, and adapted by their light draught of water to penetrate our shoal harbors, rivers, and bayous, the board recommended "that contracts be made with responsible parties for the construction of one or more iron-clad vessels or batteries, of as light a draught of water as practicable consistent with their weight of armor." They also advised the construction in our own dock-yards, of one or more of these vessels upon a large and more perfect scale

when Congress shall see fit to authorize it. The report concludes with a synopsis of the propositions and specifications submitted, amounting to 17 in number, the terms of construction for the different vessels ranging from $32,000 to $1,500,000. Three only of these were selected as worthy of recommendation, the others being put aside, either owing to too great cost or for other reasons. The three proposals recommended were those of J. Ericsson, New York; Merrick & Sons, Philadelphia; and C. S. Bushnell & Co., New Haven, Conn. Of these the remarks of the board are as follows:

"J. Ericsson, New York.-This plan of a flosting battery is novel, but seems to be based upon a plan which will render the battery shot and shell-proof. It is to be apprehended that her properties for sea are not such as a seagoing vessel should possess. But she may be moved from one place to another on the coast in smooth water. We recommend that an experiment be made with one battery of this description on the terms proposed, with a guarantee and forfeiture in case of failure in any of the properties and points of the vessel as proposed. Price, $275,000; length of vessel, 174 feet; breadth of beam, 41 feet; depth of hold, 113 feet; time, 100 days; draught of water, 10 feet; displacement, 1,245 tons; speed per hour, 9 statute miles.

"Merrick & Sons, Philadelphia.-Vessel of wood and iron combined. This proposition we consider the most practicable one for heavy armor. We recommend that a contract be made with that party, under a guarantee, with forfeiture in case of failure to comply with the specifications; and that the contract require the plates to be 15 feet long and 36 inches wide, with a reservation of some modifications, which may occur as the work progresses, not to affect the cost. Price, $780,000; length of vessel, 220 feet; breadth of beam, 60 feet; depth of hold, 23 feet; time, 9 months; draught of water, 13 feet; displacement, 3,296 tons; speed per hour, 91 knots. "S. C. Bushnell & Co., New Haven, Conn., propose a vessel to be iron-clad, on the rail and plate principle, and to obtain high speed. The objection to this vessel is the fear that she will not float her armor and load sufficiently high, and have stability enough for a sea vessel. With a guarantee that she shall do these, we recommend on that basis a contract. Price, $225,250; length of vessel, 180 feet; breadth of beam feet; depth of hold, 12 feet; time, 4 months; draught of water, 10 feet; displacement, tons; speed per hour, 12 knots." The recommendation was adopted by Congress, and the 3 vessels ordered to be built.

The contract made with Capt. Ericsson stipulated for the completion of his battery within 100 days from the signing of the contract, which was October 5, 1861; and the extraordinary provision was introduced, that the test of the battery, upon which its acceptance by the U. S. Government depended, should be its withstanding the fire of the enemy's batteries at the

shortest ranges, the United States agreeing to fit out the vessel with men, guns, &c. The vessel was not completed, and delivered to the U. S. Government for trial until March 5, 1862. Soon after taking command of the Western Department, Maj.-Gen. Fremont became convinced of the necessity of preparing a fleet of gunboats and mortar-boats, for the purpose of commanding the Mississippi and other navigable waters of the West, and decided upon the plans and ordered the construction of the number of each he deemed necessary. Their completion, and the furnishing of them with their armament and crew, and the collection of the requisite land force to accompany them, was not completed till February, 1862.

The fleet consisted of twelve gunboats, carrying an armament in all of 126 guns, viz.: Benton... Essex.. Mound City. Cincinnati

Louisville.

Carondelet.. St. Louis....

Cairo... Lexington.. Tyler.......

Pittsburgh..

....

16 guns. 9

18

18 64

18

None of these guns were less than 32-pounders, some were 42-pounders, some 64-pounders, and one (on the Essex) threw a shell weighing 128 lbs. In addition to these, each boat carried a Dahlgren rifled 12-pounder boat howitzer on the upper deck. Several of the larger guns on each boat were rifled. Naval officers regarded the 10-inch Dahlgren shell guns as their most efficient weapons. The Benton carried two of these guns in her forward battery; the others carried one each.

Seven of the gunboats were iron-clad, and able to resist all except the heaviest solid shot. These boats cost on an average $89,000 each. The other five were of wood, but strongly and substantially built; all were fast sailers.

Besides these, thirty-eight mortar-boats were ordered, each about sixty feet long and twentyfive feet wide, surrounded on all sides by ironplate bulwarks, six or seven feet high. The mortar itself weighed 17,200 lbs., had a bore easily admitting a 13-inch shell, and from the edge of the bore to the outer rim was seventeen inches. The mortar bed weighed 4,500 lbs.

The mortar-boats were thoroughly tested before being used in actual service, and were found to produce but slight recoil, and the concussion caused by the iron bulwarks was remedied. With a charge of 11 lbs. of powder the mortars threw a shell, weighing 215 lbs. a distance of 2 miles; and with a charge of 15 to 23 lbs. the same shell was thrown from 3 to 34 miles.

There was also a sufficient number of steamboats and tugs provided for towing and transport service. The fleet was placed under the command of Flag-officer Andrew H. Foote, an experienced and able commander in the navy; and each boat was in charge of a lieutenant commanding, who had already seen service.