him to make provision for the body while in this world, it is evident, as facts prove, that he would forsake God, and seek happiness in broken cisterns, or created worldly objects.

But philosophers, through mistaken views of the nature of sin, and not distinguishing as they ought between absolute and relative good and evil, have made themselves believe that our natural appetites and propensities are not, neither can be considered as evil; so are ready to exclaim, what, is hunger a sinful appetite? Here let every one candidly consider what sin is. Now all will grant, that a propensity to evil is an evil propensity; and if this is an active principle, inherent in a being who is a proper moral agent, it is a moral evil; and moral evil is sin. It is generally granted, that our appetites may be gratified either lawfully or unlawfully.

When a person eats no more than is necessary to the life and support of the body, he gratifies his hunger no more than God allows. But if he eats to excess, is intemperate, all say he is wrong, and has done what the law forbids. And it is as wrong to gratify any other appetite to excess.

Again. Every agent, in all he does, aims at some ultimate end; otherwise he aims at no end in any thing done. He must aim at some end ultimately, or do one thing for the sake of another, ad infinitum; which is aiming at nothing; and is a thing impossible in a moral agent. And if an agent's ultimate end is evil, it must be granted all he does with such an aim is wrong. What then is the ultimate end of all men, while unrenewed? Let any person give a full attention to this subject, and he will say, no unrenewed man aims at any thing higher, than the gratification of his own personal desires; self gratification is his end as far as he is able, without any regard for the glory of God, or the happiness of his kingdom.

Now then, what is the ultimate end of unrenewed persons in eating? On examination, every one must come to this conclusion; that he eats for the sake of the pleasure food affords, or to gain strength and preserve life with a view to further ends; and his last end is to gratify some personal desire, without any regard to God or the happiness of man. Is not his aim then in eating sinful? Do not the desires of this appetite lead him to pursue a course, which is hostile to God, and the general good? And as this appetite will operate in all unrenewed men; in the same manner all his other appetites will operate; and whether he gratifies them to excess or not, his ultimate

aim is the gratification of some personal desire, without any regard to the authority or honor of God; and hence in all he does, while such is his end, he is committing sin.

But to represent our appetites, such as hunger, thirst, and what are termed natural affections, as sinful or evil in their tendency and operation, appears so shocking to many, that they discard the sentiment at once; and scarcely any will give the subject a candid examination. Yet, as the word of God and facts prove that mankind are governed by corrupt principles, they adopt some other theory to account for the prevalence of sin. Hence some have believed, that when Adam ate the forbidden fruit, he not only lost the moral image of his Maker, but had produced in him a principle of selfishness, which is the root or fountain from which all sinful acts proceed in moral agents.

This selfishness has been defined and described in different ways. Some say it is self-love, or a love for self; or setting up a private interest in opposition to public good. However it may be defined, we ought to inquire what ideas the terms communicate. Is this selfishness an active principle distinct, and different in its nature, from the appetites we have considered?

All must grant selfishness has some ultimate end; this end must be agreeable to the feelings of this principle; desires must arise from it to obtain its end; and those will govern the person in all his pursuits and actions. What then is its ultimate end? Is it the glory of God, or happiness of mankind, or good of God's kingdom? No. What then? It may be answered, it is the person's own individual good or interest. And what is this, only the gratification of his own desires? Suppose riches be his end. What good occurs to him from them; except the gratification of his numerous desires? In this all the happiness he enjoys consists. And as far as his desires are gratified, he has obtained all he does, or in fact, can desire. So far he has arrived to his ultimate end. Here this selfishness aims at the gratification of its desires as its final end. The same is true of the appetites, as they have been described. Selfishness may be gratified, as is necessary for the support and comfort of the body, and no further; and as its ultimate end is sinful in all its operations, it is itself sinful. What then is the difference between this selfishness, in its nature and operations, and the nature and operations of the

ap

petites, as they have been represented? According to each theory, it is wrong to gratify these active principles to an excess; and to aim, in all that is done, at a wrong or bad end ultimately. Of course, there is no difference in their nature and operation. And no one can conceive of any selfishness more ruinous to the general good, than those appetites are, when they operate without any regard to the authority, and glory, or happiness of God's kingdom, as they always do, when there is no benevolent principle to govern and regulate them. And if we consult experience, we shall find it testifies in favor of the sentiments advanced.

Are mankind conscious of any active principle in them, entirely distinct in its nature and operations, from the appetites which have been described? When they eat, is it hunger which prompts them, or some selfish principle distinct from it? When parental affection moves parents to promote the good of 1 their children, are they conscious of some other principle as governing them, distinct from the affection they have for their offspring? And the same question may be asked in relation to all their other appetites. Experience does not teach men, that they are governed by any other active principles, than these appetites. We know it is hunger, which prompts us to eat; it is a feeling of love parents have for their children, which leads them to seek what they view as necessary to their good. We know it is a natural propensity, which inclines the different sexes to unite in matrimony. And neither experience nor observation teaches, that mankind are governed by any other principles, than these several appetites. These are selfish in all their operations; and aim ultimately at nothing higher or better, than the gratification of the desires arising from them, as far as men are able. And no principle can be conceived, more ruinous to happiness finally, than the effects these appetites have produced, and will continue to produce.

Hence as soon as Adam lost the moral image of God, the appetites, created in him with a view to his good in this world, were the only active, governing principles remaining in him. From that day he loved the objects of this world supremely. He at once experienced a desire to accumulate property, to be esteemed by men; and he pursued the means necessary in bis view to these ends; and as he had no love for God, his heart was in fact placed supremely on this world. He served the creature, and not the Creator; he forsook God, the living

fountain, and sought broken cisterns to satisfy his thirst. In like manner his posterity have lived. These appetites were now, in their operation, positively wrong or sinful. But this did not constitute his primary depravity. A total want of love to God was that, in which his imperfection, or moral depravity, primarily consisted. As long as love to his Maker governed, all he did was in harmony with the law, authority, and honor of his God. And as soon as this love ceased, all he did terminated in self gratification ultimately, and was sinful.

I know many ridicule the idea of placing any part of our depravity in a mere privation. But is the body perfect, if eyes are wanting? Does not the privation of this sense constitute a great imperfection? If a man as long as he has eyes, would walk in the right way, and would certainly deviate from it, as deprived of this sense, would not all consider eyes to see a great blessing, and the want of them a great evil? So the want of a benevolent appetite is a great moral imperfection and evil; in consequence of which, all the other senses or appetites lead us astray from God, as both facts and experience have abundantly proved, from the day in which man revolted from God.

G. Page 184.

The kind and degree of power, necessary to constitute a meral agent, or fit object of praise and blame, has long been a subject of dispute; and there is not much hope of bringing it soon to a satisfactory conclusion. With a view, however, to this end, this note is added. Two ideas are implied in all the actions of a moral agent. One is, that he is governed by motives; and the other, that in all his actions he has some aim and design. That he is a designing agent, and is influenced by motives, all will grant. This implies, that in all his actions he aims at the attainment of some object or end, by such means as, in his view, are adapted to it. The end operates as a motive. If the end is pleasing to his feelings, he is influenced to use every exertion to attain it. If an object is disagreeable or painful, he will be influenced to avoid it. This necessarily implies, that his mind is endued with some property, which is pleased or disgusted by all objects within his view; a property, which is affected antecedent to action, and which gives rise

to every exertion. This is requisite, in order for him to be influenced by motives, and to act with design.

Some contend for a self-determining power; and some, for an efficiency in men to produce all their voluntary exercises, as essential to praise and blame. According to these theories, man is endued with a power antecedent to volition, a power which is to produce volitions. In order for this power to operate, or exert itself to produce volitions, some object must please or disgust it, and in this way influence it to act. If this be not the fact, the agent, in exerting his power, is not governed by any motive. And if objects are neither pleasant nor painful to this power, it is in a state of indifference; and if a man can exercise his power in this state, he must act without design. For his supposed power is not inclined towards any object, and of course he cannot aim at one object more than another ; or, in such a state, he aims at no object, or acts without any design. I see no way to avoid this conclusion. Hence, if moral agents are influenced by motives, and act with design, then this supposed power is of such a nature, that in view of objects it is pleased or disgusted, and in this way influenced to obtain the object, if agreeable, and to avoid it, if painful. Then what is the difference between this power, whether self-determining, or efficient, and what is called by me the faculty of taste, or the heart? The taste, and this supposed power, are each of them pleased or the contrary with all objects in view; and by this means are influenced to act, to seek, or avoid the object, and in the pursuit aim at the possession, or avoidance of it, according to the pleasure or pain the object or end affords.

If this self-determining and efficient power is totally destitute of any feeling, than how is it to be put in motion, or excited to exertions? It certainly cannot be influenced by motives, nor act with design. Power, which has no feeling, does not differ in its nature from those powers we call a lever, or a screw. And if it ever exerts itself, it must be put in motion by some antecedent power. The agent must have in view some pleasing object, and have a desire to obtain it. Then the agreeable object operates as a motive, and influences him to exert this supposed power to reach it, just as we use a screw to raise a weight. And for this antecedent to act, its nature must be the same with the nature of the faculty termed taste. Hence, whatever power may be considered as essential to praise