Thus liberty of action may be, and sometimes is, abridged. God has established a general, but not a universal connexion between voluntary exertion, and the action, or effect, willed. Accordingly mankind generally, though they do not always, act according to their choice. This liberty may be destroyed by restraining and constraining forces. And when we are made to act contrary to our wills, the actions are not ours; as agents, we do not produce them, and of course are not answerable for them. Can any person desire any other or greater liberty, than to act as he wills? When those actions follow, which his will is exerted to produce, what more can he desire? But this privilege God has granted to mankind, and made the enjoyment of it, generally, sure to them by his unalterable determination. Hence he has given to man all the liberty, which it is best for him to enjoy.

That I have given a just idea of liberty, may appear more evident by attending to first principles in relation to action.

1. If we were as incapable of pleasure and pain as inanimate matter is, we should never be the subjects of desires. In this unfeeling state, we should not have any idea of good or evil. No person can, at first, get an idea of pleasure and pain, without knowing them by experience. And till he knows what pleasure and pain are, he cannot have a notion of relative good and evil. If men could perceive, as they now do, and at the same time had no more feeling than lifeless matter, they would not know what ideas the terms pleasure and pain, good and evil, convey. As well might a man born blind know what is meant by light and colors; or a deaf man, what is meant by sounds. This is too evident to be denied. But if mankind had no feelings, and no idea of good and evil, desires could not possibly have an existence. For good and evil are the only objects of desire. Whatever is agreeable, we desire to attain; and whatever is disgustful, we wish to avoid. But are objects ever desired by us, however good or evil in reality, if they are unknown to us? When we have once felt pleasure and pain, whatever we apprehend will give us pleasure is desired; and whatever in our view will give us pain, we feel an aversion to it. Hence if we had no feelings, we should have no idea of good and evil, and no desire for one object or aversion to another. Accordingly, that the feelings of pleasure and pain are necessary to the operations of desire, is a first principle, which all ought to admit."

2. If mankind had no feelings and desires, they would nev er act; or, in other words, they would never seek one thing, or avoid another. For they would exist in a state of perfect indifference. If no objects are desired, none will be sought. This is a truth so evident, nothing can make it plainer.

3. In a state in which mankind have nothing to seek, volitions and external actions are needless. For in every volition and external action, the attainment or avoidance of some object is aimed at. But in a state of perfect indifference, we should never aim at any thing. Of course, there would be no occasion or use for voluntary exertions, and external actions.

4. Liberty, therefore, would be a useless privilege. Is it a privilege to be at liberty to act according to our pleasure, when actions are needless, and when we have no pleasure to gratify? Is a freedom to act as our pleasures, desires, or inclinations, would dictate, of any worth, where such operations have no existence ?

Keeping these things in view, we may easily see what liberty is, and how the idea of it is first acquired. Children are very fond of play things. A top affords them much pleasure. They have strong desires to amuse themselves with it. Whilst playing with it, without the least hindrance or opposition from any quarter, they enjoy liberty. They follow their inclinations, will and act as their desires prompt them, without any opposition. But if a restraint could be laid on their minds, so as to prevent those voluntary exertions which are necessary to put their bodies in motion, they would then experience an opposition to willing. This would give them uneasiness, and excite complaints. Because they cannot will as they wish. There are hindrances and obstacles in the way. If, also, they should will to run, and some person were to hold them and prevent the actions willed, then they experience opposition. This would give them uneasiness, and excite complaints.

Now they have experienced two very different conditions. The first in which they acted agreeably to their wishes, without opposition or hindrance; the other, in which they experience such opposition as wholly prevents their acting as their inclinations prompt them. These two conditions they will compare together, and discern a great difference in them. The ideas they have of this difference they cannot communicate without words. That condition in which they act without any hindrance, is called a state of freedom or liberty; a state in which

they act freely. In this state they enjoy what is called liberty or freedom. And what is this, but the privilege of willing and acting according to their wishes and inclinations; or pursuing the objects of their desire without any hindrance? They might call the other condition, in which opposition prevents their acting as they wish, a state of bondage; a state in which they do not follow their own inclinations, but are obliged to act contrary to their desires, and as other agents dictate. Hence liberty implies a state or condition, in which moral agents act as they please: a state in which they experience no hindrance, no opposition, and meet no obstacle to prevent their going the way their hearts lead them.

This teaches, that all our sensations of pleasure and pain, and our desires, are antecedent to the need or use of liberty. For if we did not experience these operations, there would be nothing to prompt us to will, or act, in any sense. There would be no end for us to answer by any exertion, because there is nothing which we have the least inclination to seek. But when we experience these desires, then we wish to act without any hindrance. The privilege of gratifying the feelings of the heart, without any hindrance, without meeting any opposition to prevent the actions which are necessary, is an object earnestly desired. This privilege, or liberty of acting, is highly valued by every moral agent. So that liberty is a precious privilege, rather than a quality or property, or any operation of the mind. Liberty does not consist in any action or operation of the mind; but is a privilege of acting without any obstacle to prevent. It is an absurdity, to say that liberty and voluntary action are the same thing. If voluntary exertion is an action, and this action is liberty, then liberty is action of action. Liberty of action is a very common phrase. And if liberty and voluntary exertion are the same thing, and voluntary exertion is also an action, then liberty and action are convertible terms. Use the word action instead of liberty, then the liberty of action is nothing but the action of action. Those who assert that liberty is nothing but voluntary exertion, have no way to avoid this absurdity. But if liberty is the privilege of acting according to our wishes and inclinations, without any thing to restrain us, this absurdity is avoided. When mankind will and act agreeably to their wishes and desires, without experiencing any restraint or constraint, do they not

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act freely? Do they not enjoy perfect liberty? Can they conceive of any greater liberty than this? Is there any other kind, which they would prefer to it?

I know many in answer to these interrogations would say, they wish for liberty to fly, to create, to gratify all their desires by a single act of the will. This, they might say, is a higher and more desirable kind of liberty, than any which mankind now enjoy. This statement, I would observe in reply, contains a fallacy. The thing, which they call liberty, is power. And by giving the thing a wrong name, they deceive themselves. By liberty to fly, to create, and the like, a power is the thing intended. If by power is meant volition, then a liberty to fly, for instance, is only willing this event. This is making an act of the will and liberty the same thing; which we have already seen cannot be true. And if by power is intended a connexion between an act of the will and the thing willed, so that the latter shall follow the former, then by a liberty to fly they mean no more than this connexion. Whether power is an act of the will, or a connexion between willing and the thing willed, still liberty and power are not the same thing. This has already been proved. But to illustrate this fallacy more fully, let it be observed, 1. A moral agent aims at some end in every action. he is sick, health is an object or end desired.

When

Means

2. To the attainment of ends, means are necessary. must be used to recover health; for this is the appointment of Jehovah. God works by means in the attainment of his ends. And according to his ordination men cannot obtain their ends, only by using the means adapted to them. If God had seen fit, ends might have been connected immediately with the will. Then nothing would have been necessary to obtain health, when we are sick, but to will it. But the determination of God is such, we cannot attain our ends, except by the intervention and use of means.

Now a person, when sick, is at liberty to use means to recover his health. He is at liberty to will, and to act, He enjoys this liberty, this privilege, and is using it. He has not power to recover health by a single act of his will, nor to give efficacy to the means he uses. Hence mankind enjoy liberty, and use it in pursuit of their ends; when at the same time they have not power to attain them. Does a person's inability to recover his health abridge his liberty? Surely not; he may act with perfect freedom, as long as he has life. Do not man

kind act freely, as their inclinations lead them, when laboring in the field, and attending to other pursuits of life? Yet it is not in their power, in innumerable instances, to obtain their ends. This shows there is a plain and obvious distinction between liberty and power. Men may act freely in pursuit of their ends, yet not have power to obtain them. If liberty and power were the same thing, and if men have not power to arrive at the ends they seek, they have no liberty. This notion of liberty contradicts facts. Because we know by experience it is a fact, that we are acting freely in numerous instances, where we have not power to attain what we seek, and so finally fail of it. Hence to say, a power to attain our ends is liberty, is to assert we are not free, while acting freely; which is a manifest absurdity.

To bring these remarks to a point, attention to the following things is necessary. I have a strong desire to visit a friend, who lives west from this place. A volition, which would move my body westerly, would accord with my desire. If some power should constrain me to will an opposite motion of the body, the will would act contrary to my desire. In this case I do not enjoy liberty of will. For liberty of will is a privilege of willing as my desires dictate. And if I will to have my body move to the west, yet some force carries it to the east, then liberty of action, in this instance, is destroyed. For actions directly contrary to those willed take place. But so long as the will obeys the heart, and actions are obedient to the will, I am free. I will and act agreeably to my desire. I enjoy the liberty of willing as I wish, and of acting as I wish, and in the exercise of this liberty I visit my friend. At the same time I have not power to visit him by flying over the distance he is from me. Hence our object, when we wish for liberty to fly, is power, not liberty.

We may wish to have liberty extended; to have a thousand events connected with the will, which are not. To have this wish gratified, our power must be enlarged. If God had connected flying, or the creation of a world, with an act of the will, as he has the motion of our hands, we could as easily fly, and create, as we now can move our hands. This enlargement of our power is an object ardently desired by many. By an increase or enlargement of our power in this way, our liberty would be extended beyond its present limits. But if our liberty was extended by an increase of power, it is still the same kind of liberty-a liberty to will and to act as we please. Our liberty is not greater, unless its extension is the thing meant