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SECTION VI.

OF TRUTH OF VEGETATION.-CONCLUSION.

CHAPTER I.-Of Truth of Vegetation.

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§ 1. Frequent occurrence of foliage in the works of the old masters § 2. Laws common to all forest trees. Their branches do not taper, but only divide....................

§ 3. Appearance of tapering caused by frequent buds

§ 4. And care of nature to conceal the parallelism

§ 5. The degree of tapering which may be represented as continuous § 6. The trees of Gaspar Poussin

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§ 7. And of the Italian school generally defy this law § 8. The truth, as it is given by J. D. Harding

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§ 9. Boughs, in consequence of this law, must diminish where they divide. Those of the old masters often do not

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§ 10. Boughs must multiply as they diminish. Those of the old masters do not......

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§ 11. Bough-drawing of Salvator

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§ 12. All these errors especially shown in Claude's sketches, and concentrated in a work of G. Poussin's

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§ 13. Impossibility of the angles of boughs being taken out of them by wind

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§ 24. The near leafage of Claude. His middle distances are good

§ 26. Altogether unobserved by the old masters. Turner

27. Foliage painting on the Continent

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Always given by

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§ 31. Local colour, how far expressible in black and white, and with what

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§ 34. Hunt and Creswick. Green, how to be rendered expressive of light, and offensive if otherwise

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CHAPTER II.-General Remarks respecting the Truth of

Turner.

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§ 1. No necessity of entering into discussion of architectural truth § 2. Extreme difficulty of illustrating or explaining the highest truth 404 § 3. The positive rank of Turner is in no degree shown in the foregoing pages, but only his relative rank

§ 4. The exceeding refinement of his truth

§ 5. His former rank and progress

§ 6. Standing of his last works. Their mystery is the consequence of their fulness

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§ 1. The entire prominence hitherto given to the works of one artist caused only by our not being able to take cognizance of character 408 § 2. The feelings of different artists are incapable of full comparison 409 § 3. But the fidelity and truth of each are capable of real comparison ... 409 § 4. Especially because they are equally manifested in the treatment of

all subjects

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§ 5. No man draws one thing well, if he can draw nothing else ......... 410 § 6. General conclusions to be derived from our past investigation

§ 7. Truth, a standard of all excellence

§ 8. Modern criticism. Changefulness of public taste

§ 9. Yet associated with a certain degree of judgment

§ 10. Duty of the press

§ 11. Qualifications necessary for discharging it

§ 12. General incapability of modern critics

§ 13. And inconsistency with themselves

§ 14. How the press may really advance the cause of art

§ 15. Morbid fondness at the present day for unfinished works

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§ 16. By which the public defraud themselves

§ 17. And in pandering to which, artists ruin themselves

§ 18. Necessity of finishing works of art perfectly

§ 19. Sketches not sufficiently encouraged

§ 20. Brilliancy of execution or efforts at invention not to be tolerated in young artists

§ 21. The duty and after privileges of all students

§ 22. Necessity among our greater artists of more singleness of aim

§ 23. What should be their general aim

MODERN PAINTERS.

PART I.

OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

SECTION I.

OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEAS CONVEYABLE BY ART.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

If it be true, and it can scarcely be disputed, that nothing has been
for centuries consecrated by public admiration, without possessing
in a high degree some kind of sterling excellence, it is not because
the average
intellect and feeling of the majority of the public are
competent in any way to distinguish what is really excellent, but
because all erroneous opinion is inconsistent, and all ungrounded
opinion transitory; so that, while the fancies and feelings which
deny deserved honour, and award what is undue, have neither root
nor strength sufficient to maintain consistent testimony for a length
of time, the opinions formed on right grounds by those few who
are in reality competent judges, being necessarily stable, commu-
nicate themselves gradually from mind to mind, descending lower
as they extend wider, until they leaven the whole lump, and rule
by absolute authority, even where the grounds and reasons for them
cannot be understood. On this gradual victory of what is con-
sistent over what is vacillating, depends the reputation of all that is
highest in art and literature; for it is an insult to what is really

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great in either to suppose that it in any way addresses itself to mean or uncultivated faculties. It is a matter of the simplest demonstration, that no man can be really appreciated but by his equal or superior. His inferior may over-estimate him, in enthusiasm; or, as is more commonly the case, degrade him, in ignorance; but he cannot form a grounded and just estimate. Without proving this, however, which would take more space to do than I can spare, it is sufficiently evident that there is no process of amalgamation by which opinions, wrong individually, can become right merely by their multitude.1 If I stand by a picture in the Academy, and hear twenty persons in succession admiring some paltry piece of mechanism or imitation, in the lining of a cloak, or the satin of a slipper, it is absurd to tell me that they reprobate collectively what they admire individually: or, if they pass with apathy by a piece of the most noble conception or most perfect truth, because it has in it no tricks of the brush nor grimace of expression, it is absurd to tell me that they collectively respect what they separately scorn, or that the feelings and knowledge of such judges, by any length of time or comparison of ideas, could come to any right conclusion with respect to what is really high in art. The question is not decided by them, but for them; -decided at first by few: by fewer in proportion as the merits of the work are of a higher order. From these few the decision is communicated to the number next below them in rank of mind, and by these again to a wider and lower circle; each rank being so far cognizant of the superiority of that above it, as to receive its decision with respect; until, in process of time, the right and consistent opinion is communicated to all, and held by all as a matter of faith, the more positively in proportion as the grounds of it are less perceived.

The opinion of a majority is right only when it is more probable, with each individual, that he should be right than that he should be wrong, as in the case of a jury. Where it is more probable, with respect to each individual, that he should be wrong than right, the opinion of the minority is the true one. Thus it is in art. 2 There are, however, a thousand modifying circumstances which render this process sometimes unnecessary,-sometimes rapid and certain,-sometimes impossible. It is unnecessary in rhetoric and the drama, because the multitude is the only proper judge of those arts whose end is to move the multitude (though more is necessary to a fine play than is essentially dramatic, and it is only of the dramatic part that the multitude are cognizant). It is unnecessary, when, united

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