Economic development

OTHER ASPECTS OF STATE HOOD

The proponents of Alaskan statehood claim that statehood would advance the economic development of Alaska. This hope does not conform to historical fact. Hawaii and Alaska have had Territorial status for about the same length of time. Yet, Hawaii has progressed at a far more rapid pace, economically, than has Alaska. Hawaii s economy compares quite favorably with that of the States. It is not the political status that accounts for the differential in the rate of their economic growth. The growth of Hawaii can be principally ascribed to favorable physical characteristics, the temperate climate, and her arable lands.

The vote in Alaska

The office of Delegate is the highest elective office in Alaska. The total vote cast for that office in the 1954 election was 26,999. This compares with the latest estimate civilian population of 132,000. No attempt will be made to analyze the reason for the meager ratio of vote to that of population.

When compared to congressional districts which cast from 150,000 to 200,000 votes, the voting differential is startling. This vote sharply and clearly shows up the fantastically excessive disproportionment of allowing 2 Senators to be elected by the choice of 27,000 voters.

Loss of individual liberties, the growth of national political power, the reduction of States rights

The past 25 years, can be noted for the vast and alarming growth and concentration of power in the National Government. A parallel concentration continues to take place in the executive branch of our Government. These increasing concentrations of power coincide with a reduction of powers of the States, the loss of sovereign rights and liberties of the people and the deprivations of the legislative powers and responsibilities of Congress.

Statehood for these Territories would accentuate the inequalities of senatorial representation. It would tend to strengthen the national concept and weaken States rights. It would increase the pace of nationalization of local government services and concentrate power in the Federal Government and in the executive branch.

There is no standard of measurement of political power. There is however a standard for the measurement of the exercise of power. This standard is the percentage of the national product siphoned off by our Government. The following table illustrates the increase in the Federal absorption of our national production: Government expenditures and gross national product

The above table indicates that Federal spending of our national production increased from 2.5 percent in 1929 to 21.4 percent in 1953. An increase of more than eightfold. In the same period, the spending by States decreased from 7.3 to 6.7 percent of our national production.

The founders of our Constitution envisioned a government of limited national power. The residuary power of the States was conceived to be far greater quantitatively than the powers granted to the Federal Government. The grant

of two Senators to each State was based upon these assumptions. Appointment by legislatures was devised to safeguard this objective.

The above table proves that the exercise of Federal power, 21.4 percent of production, is more than three times the exercise of State power, 6.7 percent. This shift from State power to Federal power coincides with the alteration of our mode of selection of Senators from that of legislatures to that of popular suffrage. The equitable measure of representation for a dominant national government is that of representation in proportion to population. That is the only possible protection of the majority of the people against the preponderant power of a minority of the people.

Statehood, by increasing the power of the minority, will tend to break down Our two-party system. It leads to blocs and coalitions based on sectional and popular interests. The function of party organization to compromise between sectional and national interests is bypassed.

Instead of considering legislation in accordance with sound principle, excessive power encourages the consideration of legislation by political expediency and the pressures of the electorate. Theories are evolved afterward to accommodate acts of political expediency.

The

The senatorial powers to be assigned by H. R. 2535 will not lie dormant. powers of senatorial representation granted to these two Territories invite their abuse by reason of the fact that these powers are not coupled with corresponding and balancing accountability and responsibility.

For example; Alaska, with two Senators, would possess one-fiftieth of the power to determine the expenditure of more than $60 billion per year. That share of power to spend is $1,200 million. Yet Alaska's responsibility for the collection of the amount to be spent, $60 billion, as represented by her Federal taxes, is only $48 million or more than 1,000 times less than the total national expenditure. Alaska's 2 Senators would be accountable to a population of 132,000 (27,000 votes) although her 2 Senators would enjoy the senatorial power possessed on the average by about 3 million people of the Nation.

Representation in the United States House of Represent

This problem poses a number of unpleasant alternatives. The present bill would increase the members of the House by three seats allotted to the Territories. The membership of the House is increased from 435 to 438 Members. Although the membership of the House is to be increased, the increase is made not because of any advantages or need to increase the size. In fact, the present limitation of 435 members was a careful decision as to the maximum desirable membership. The proposed increase by three seats is provided in this bill for the purpose of accommodating the proposed new members. It is intended to anticipate the necessity for reducing the Representatives from other States if the membership is permanently limited to 435 Members.

Hawaii bases her claim to two Representatives upon the United States Census population figure of 499,794. The latest estimate of her population would indicate that after 1960 her representation would probably be reduced to one Representative. Yet the membership of the House is being permanently increased by 2 seats to accommodate Hawaii's proposed Representatives and 1 seat to accommodate Alaska's Representative, although, as of today, Hawaii is only entitled to one Representative.

If H. R. 2535 is amended so that the increase of membership in the House is temporary and will be reduced to 435 after the 1960 census, then the additional representation from Hawaii and Alaska will be included at the expense of representation from some other State. That reduction will probably be at the expense of those States who have failed to increase their population in pace with the national rate. The States that have shown a loss of population between the 1950 census and the July 1, 1952 estimates are:

If the membership of the House is retained at 435 by an amendment in the House or Senate, then we commit ourselves to reducing the representation of other States by either 2 or 3 seats to be allotted to these territories.

The Federalist, paper No. 58, warns us against a multitudinous representative assembly. Excessive numbers leads not to democratic processes but, on the contrary, to government by the few.

The latest United States census population estimates (1954) for these territories are:

Due to our military bases, the ratio of military personnel to the civilian population is far greater in these Territories than exists in the other States. The military personnel consists of citizens and inhabitants of the 48 States. Yet, the census makes no differentiation but adds the military_population to the civilian in computing their entitlement to representation. This method violates the intent of amendment 14, section 2 of our Constitution.

Article II, section 2 of the proposed Hawaiian constitution provides: "No person shall be deemed to have gained or lost residence simply because of his presence or absence while employed in the service of the United States." Thus we find that both Federal civilian and military personnel are excluded from the right of suffrage by this section. Yet, their numbers are added to establish a base for Hawaii's entitlement to representation in the United States House of Representatives.

This section would appear to constitute an abridgement and denial of the right to vote. If so, then amendment 14, section 2 provides that the basis of representation shall be reduced in proportion. This writer suggests the desirability of congressional action to conform the apportionment of representation in Hawaii and Alaska with the requirements of amendment 14, section 2 of the United States Constitution.

The Alaska Statehood Committee reports that Alaska is politically impotent in Washington because it has no voting representative in either House of Congress. During this writer's short tenure here, both Hawaii and Alaska have had the benefit of the finest, most capable, and diligent delegates. They would bring honor to any constituency. They have distinguished themselves by outstanding service to this Nation and to the territories they represent.

Most Representatives are limited to serving on one standing committee of the House. These committees vary considerably in the volume and importance of the legislation referred to them. The distinguished delegates from Hawaii and Alaska enjoy the unique advantage of membership on three major committees: Agriculture, Armed Services, and Interior and Insular Affairs. The Delegate from Alaska, in addition, serves on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

Their service on these committees gives them the advantage of an association with fellow committee members which no other Representative enjoys. This opportunity enhances their influence and power.

The great mass of decisions made by Congress are made without a vote. The influence upon legislation in Congress cannot be measured by the right to vote. It is not a pleasant task to vote in opposition to measures which have adverse political repercussions for a fellow Member of the House. It is not conductive to political goodfellowship. The distinguished delegates are saved from this necessity. When balanced out, the disadvantages of the lack of a vote are far outweighed by the advantages accruing to the delegates.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Chairman, the following conclusions and recommendations are respectfully submitted to this committee as an equitable disposition of this problem: 1. Statehood for Hawaii ought to be deferred until she has unquestionably eliminated communistic influences in her political, economic, and social structures. 2. Statehood for both Hawaii and Alaska should be deferred pending the adoption of an appropriate constitutional amendment to provide for representation in the United States Senate on a basis proportionate to population.

3. If statehood is to be granted upon the basis of equal representation in the Senate, then admission should be approved by three-fourths of the States pur

suant to a constitutional amendment providing for the admission of States by the same procedure that is now required to amend our Constitution.

4. Congress should immediately grant to each Territory the autonomy of statehood with full power of self-government in such form as may be recommended by the Territories.

The autonomy would include:

(a) Complete executive power with the right of election of Governor.

(b) Full legislative power over all Territorial affairs, including public lands, fisheries, and subsurface resources.

(c) Exclusive judicial jurisdiction.

5. The enactment into Federal statute of such reasonable restrictions, comparable to limitations in their proposed constitutions, as may be recommended by the Territories to safeguard individual liberties and to insure a republican form of government.

6. The immediate and outright grant to Alaska of specifically described public lands to be selected by the Territory from vacan, unappropriated, and unreserved lands, not to exceed 20 million acres.

7. Grants of $7 million each year for a period of 5 years to defray the cost of governmental services assumed from the Federal Government.

This solution would strengthen and unify this Nation in the years to come._It would help preserve the rights of the States and the liberties of our people. The cause of justice and freedom would be advanced.

INDIAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION,
Philadelphia 2, March 1, 1955.

Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: Enclosed is a statement of the Indian Rights Association for inclusion in the hearings on S. 49 as suggested in your letter of February 14, 1955.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE E. LINDLEY,
General Secretary.

STATEMENT OF INDIAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA, PA., ON S. 49 Concern of the Indian Rights Association in S. 49 has to do with the interests of Alaskan natives.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States (Feb. 7, 1955) places squarely upon Congress the responsibility for fulfilling the obligations of the Nation to make an honorable and moral settlement of the land claims of Alaskan natives.

Great care should therefore be taken that nothing in a Statehood Bill shall in any way take away from the possibility of a fair recognition of the rights of such natives. Because we believe there are some provisions in S. 49 that threaten or impair native claims we suggest the following amendments to/or changes in the bill:

1. In section 203, strike out all of the paragraph under "Second" and insert in place thereof the "disclaimer" clause from H. R. 2535, section 203, paragraph "Second".

The provisions of S. 49 in this respect, base the protection of native land rights upon the narrow conception of possession defined as "real property that is owned by/or for a period of at least 3 years prior to the enactment of this Act, has been in the possession and actually in the use of any Indian. ***"

Such a narrow conception of possession by the original inhabitants of Alaska is entirely out of harmony with traditional policy of the United States as written into enabling acts over the years as Territories were admitted into the Union.

Such a conception would also be contrary to the spirit of the act of 1884 (23 Stat. 24) where it is stated: "the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under which such persons shall acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress."

For full 70 years Alaskan natives have waited for this promise of the Congress to be implemented and fulfilled. As settlement of Alaska speeds up, the task of

earning a livelihood becomes more complex and difficult. Their traditional methods of securing a living are based upon use of the land-hunting, trapping, grazing, and fishing. In all justice their rights to the land, including fishing rights, should be confirmed to them as these rights become more valuable and their settlement increasingly difficult. We therefore urge the incorporation in the bill of the provision from the House bill (H. R. 2535) which disclaims: "all right and title *** to any lands or other property_(including fishing rights) the right or title to which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) or is held by the United States in trust for said natives; that all such lands or other property belonging to the United States or which may belong to said natives, shall be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States until disposed of under its authority. ***"'

Such provision would afford to the Congress an opportunity and time to fulfill its moral responsibility to the Alaskan natives in providing for the settlement of their land claims. The Senate bill authorizes the State of Alaska to select lands which may be found to be subject to valid claims of Alaskan natives.

2. On page 34, strike out section 205, paragraph (g) (2), which would repeal the provisions of the Tongass Timber Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 920) that income from the Tongass National Forest should be set aside in a special fund until such time as the rights of the natives in the Tongass Forest are determined.

This provision, which we ask to have stricken, by freeing the money received from timber sales in the Tongass Forest, would tend to delay a decision as to the rights of Alaskan natives in the income from such sales. Furthermore, distribution of the Tongass timber fund, before the rights of the natives are determined, would amount to a violation of a promise of fair treatment given the natives by a prior Congress.

3. On page 56, strike out paragraph (a) of section 219. This paragraph, if left in the bill, would take away the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to reserve lands for native use. To the natives this authority may become very valuable in case a special or emergency need called for quick action to set aside lands for their use. The authority to have reservations established is vital to the protection of the rights of the natives, and should be retained.

4. The provision in section 219 (b) should be broadened to grant authority to the Secretary to grant trust patents to lands for both individual natives and tribal or community groups. Most Alaskan natives are very poor. Unaccustomed as they are to land taxes the granting of patents-in-fee would almost certainly, in many instances, lead quickly to the loss by the native owner or owners of land so granted to them. Certainly provision should be made for trust status of native holdings where that seems necessary for their protection.

Senator JACKSON. At this point I would like to place in the record of the hearings a letter from Judge Albert Branson Maris, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge Maris is chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Laws of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Under date of February 21, 1955, he has proposed certain amendments to the pending legislation, particularly with regard to:

(1) Providing for the changed legal status of Palmyra when statehood is conferred on Hawaii.

(2) Providing for specification as to which judicial division in Alaska shall supervise the drawing of lots between delegates to the constitutional convention in the event of a tie vote.

(3) Providing for clarification of the relationship of the Federal and States courts in Alaska following approval of statehood.

The committee will consider the informative report by Judge Maris further at the appropriate time.