1802.

BOOK VI. surely his right to the throne of the Carnatic was not created by any treaty with the Company. It had, for a long series of years, been acknowledged, and proclaimed by the English, as resting on a very different foundation. At the commencement of their political and military operations in the Carnatic, the right of Mahomed Ali, by inheritance, to the musnud of his ancestors, was the grand plea which they made use of against the French; and a zeal for the rights of the lawful Prince, one of the colours with which they were most anxious to adorn their conduct. If, by the violation of a treaty, an hereditary sovereign incurs the forfeiture of his sovereignty, how would the case stand, not to speak of other sovereigns, with the East India Company itself? At a previous epoch, the Directors themselves had vehemently declared, that the treaty was violated; namely, by the assignments which the Nabob had granted on the districts set apart for securing the subsidy. All the rights, therefore, which a violation of the treaty could forfeit, were of course forfeited, on that occasion. Yet the Directors by no means pretended that they had a right to dethrone the Nabob on that occasion.*

66

In the letter of Ali Hussain to the agents of the family in England, Being informed," he says, "on the 29th, that a public notification had been made through the different streets of Madras, that the Ameer's son would be placed on the musnud on the 31st instant, under the influence of government, I immediately addressed the Governor with the advice of the regents, on the suggested measure, and proposed to accept the terms which had been at first offered; a measure which my mind revolted at, but which seemed to be demanded by the trying exigencies of the moment: and I felt confident within myself, that, if my offer had been accepted, the liberality of the British nation would have never held me bound, by conditions which had been so compulsorily imposed on me; or would have ameliorated a situation, that had been produced by means, which neither honour, nor justice could bear to contemplate. My address was wholly and totally disregarded." +

Of this offer no mention whatsoever appears in the correspondence of the Company's servants with their employers.

On the 6th of April, 1802, the deposed Nawaub died. He was residing in the apartments of the Sultana Nissa Begum, his paternal aunt, when the malady, supposed a dysentery, began; and, in display of the resentments of the family,

• Vide supra.

+ Papers, ut supra, ordered to be printed 21st and 23d of June, 1802.

his situation was concealed from the English government, and the medical assis- CHAP. X. tance of the English refused, till the case was desperate. Nearly at the same 1803. time, died Ameer Sing, the deposed Rajah of Tanjore.*

restored to the

Pondicherry having been restored to the French, agreeably to the treaty of Pondicherry Amiens, Bonaparte alarmed the English by sending out a great list of military French, and officers,; seven generals, and a proportional number in the inferior ranks, re-taken by with 1,400 regular troops, and 100,000l. in specie. The speedy renewal of the war gave them relief from their fears. Possession of Pondicherry was resumed by the English in 1803; but the French Admiral, Linois, had intelligence sufficiently prompt, to enable him to escape with the fleet. †

* Papers, ut supra, i. 95, 95, 145, 146.

+ Papers, ordered to be printed in 1806, No. 25, p. 192.

CHAP. XI.

Two sets of Princes, connected with the English; one, whom they made resign both the military, and the civil powers of their government; another, whom they made resign only the military part-Endeavour to make the Peshwa resign the military part of his government-Negotiations for that purpose from 1798 to 1802-Negotiations with Dowlut Row Scindia for a similar purpose-The dependance of all the Mahratta states expected as the effect of the resignation to the English of the military power of any one of them-Negotiation with Scindia ineffectual-War between Scindia and Holkar-The Peshwa driven from Poona-For the sake of being restored by English arms, the Peshwa consents to the resignation of his military power-A treaty for that purpose signed at Bassein-The GovernorGeneral expects, that the other Mahratta states will not dare to quarrel with the English on account of the treaty of Bassein-Scindia assembles his troops, and marches to the vicinity of Boorhanpore-Persevering attempts to make Scindia execute a treaty similar to that of Bassein-The Peshwarestored-Probability of a war with the Mahratta Princes on account of the treaty of Bassein-Junction of the armies of Scindia and the Rajah of Berar-Scindia and the Rajah required by the English to quit their present menacing position, and replace their armies at their usual stations-Scindia and the Rajah evading compliance, the English regard them as enemiesArguments by which the Governor-General endeavoured to prove that the line of policy which led to this crisis was good-Investigation of those arguments.

BOOK VI. THE relations, which the British government endeavoured to establish with

1802. Relation in which the

the Princes of India, were different in different circumstances. Those with whom their connection was the most intimate, the Nabob of Carnatic, the Anglo-Indian Rajah of Tanjore, the Nabob of Oude, formed one class. Another was formed stood to dif- by those who stood in the circumstances of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and other ferent classes Mahratta powers.

government

of the Indian Princes.

From the Princes of the first class, it had lately been the object of the

British government to take away not only the military, but likewise the civil CHAP. XI. power, in the countries to which their titles respectively extended; and, leaving

them the name of sovereign, to make them simply pensioners of state. With the rest, this object had been completely attained: With the Nabob of Oude, it was found expedient to make something of a compromise. A sort of delegated administration, which, however, he bound himself to carry on according to the pleasure of the delegator, was left to him in civil affairs, in a portion, not much more than a third, of his former dominions.

To this point the relations of the British government had advanced by degrees. At first they were neither very strong, nor very definite. The English, for their own security, found it necessary to aid the Princes in defending themselves; and the Princes agreed to re-imburse the English for the expenses which they incurred. The powers of government, that is, in India, the powers of the sovereign, may be looked upon as divided (in India they are very conspicuously divided) into two portions; the one, the military power; the other, the civil power; the one consisting in authority over the military force; the other in the administration of what is called the civil or non-military affairs of the state, the collection of the revenue, judicature, and police.

The English arrived at the first remarkable stage, when they made the Princes, with whom they were most nearly connected, strip themselves of their military power, to place it in the hands of the English. At this stage affairs remained during a considerable number of years. The sovereigns, placed in these circumstances, held their civil power in a state of absolute dependance. When the civil power, also, was taken away from them, nothing of sovereign remained, but the name. They were in the situation of the Rajah of Sattarah, only in the hands of a people, to whom it was agreeable to treat them with more indulgence.

With the Princes of the second class, the object at which the British government had begun to aim, was, to make each of them resign the military part of his power to the English. In respect to the Nizam, the business had been effectually accomplished by the treaty of 1800; when he agreed to receive the subsidiary force of the English, and alienated a great proportion of his dominions to defray its expense. The eagerness with which Lord Wellesley endeavoured to establish the same relations with the principal Mahratta states, he himself informs us, was extreme.

1802.

It had suited the English, in their transactions with the Mahratta people, to Endeavours of suppose in the chieftain, called the Peshwa, a species of sovereign authority, General to

the Governor

1802. make the

stitute for his

BOOK VI. over the rest of the Mahratta potentates; an authority, which it was abundantly evident that he did not exercise, and to which it was equally evident that the rest of the Princes paid no respect. In the spirit of this policy, it was the wish Peshwa sub of Lord Wellesley to induce the Peshwa, in preference to all the rest of the Mahratta chiefs, to consign the defence of his government and dominions to a British force, and to alienate a part of those dominions for the maintenance of and to alienate that force; an arrangement which that Governor denominates," an intimate alliance, founded upon principles which should render the British influence and military force the main support of that power.”

own army a British military force;

the sove

reignty of a country equal to its expense.

Negotiation for this pur

pose in

1798.

In 1798, when the Nizam consented to transfer the military powers of government within his dominions to the English, a similar proposal of "general defensive alliance, and mutual guarantee," † as it is called by Lord Wellesley, was strongly pressed upon the Peshwa. The moment was conceived to be favourable. "The authority of Baajy Rao," says the Governor-General, "was then reduced to a state of extreme weakness by the imbecility of his counsels, by the instability and treachery of his disposition, and by the prevalence of internal discord; and in that crisis, his government was menaced with destruction, by the overbearing power of Scindia. It was evident that the Peshwa could not expect to be relieved from the oppressive control of Scindia, and to be restored to a due degree of authority within his own dominions, by any other means than by the aid of the British power." The Governor-General informs us, that Bajee Rao did even apply to him for assistance. But when he was made to understand, that it would be granted only on the condition of permanently confiding his defence to a British force; that is, of transferring his military power to the hands of the English, " he deliberately," says the Governor-General, "preferred a situation of degradation and danger, with nominal independence, to a more intimate connection with the British power;-which," adds the Governor-General, sufficiently disclosing his views, "could not be formed on principles calculated to secure to the Peshwa the constant protection of our arms, without, at the same time, establishing our ascendancy in the Mahratta empire." § The length of time, during which the Peshwa amused the Governor

Governor-General's Narrative of the late Transactions in the Mahratta empire: East India Papers, Mahratta War, 1803, ordered to be printed 5th and 22d of June, 1804, p. 304. + Ibid.

Governor-General's instructions to the resident at Poona, dated 23d of June, 1802, transmitted in Letter from the Gov. Gen. to the Secret Committee, dated 24th of December, 1802, and received the 9th of May, 1803. Ibid. p. 34.

Ibid.