1790.

BOOK VI. have made the Nabob in appearance, what he had always been in reality, a pensioner of the Company. What may be said in defence of the Company is, that parliament scanned their actions with so much ignorance, as to make them often afraid to pursue their own views of utility, and rather take another course, which would save them from the hostile operation of vulgar prejudices.

CHAP. IV.

Cornwallis takes the Command-Second Campaign begins-Siege of Bangalore-March to Seringapatam-Operations of the Bombay Army-Battle at Arikera between Cornwallis and Tippoo-Army in Distress for Bullocks and Provisions-Obliged to return-Operations of the Mahratta Contingent-Negotiations with Tippoo-Debate in the House of Commons on the War with Tippoo-Preparations for a third Campaign-Reduction of the Fortresses which commanded the Passes into Carnatic, and threatened the Communications-Operations of the Nizam's Army, and of the Mahratta Contingent, in the Interval between the first and second March upon Seringapatam-Operations of the Bombay Army-Operations of Tippoo-March to Sering apatam-Entrenched Camp of the Enemy stormed before Seringapatam-Preparations for the Siege-Negotiations-Peace-Subsequent arrangements.

WHEN the breach with Tippoo first appeared inevitable, the Governor-Gene- CHAP. IV.

1791.

General re

command of

ral formed the design of proceeding to the coast, and of taking upon himself the conduct of the war. He resigned that intention, upon learning that General The GovernorMedows was appointed Governor of Fort St. George. But he resumed it, solves to take, when the success of the first campaign fell short of his hopes; and on the 17th in person, the of November, wrote to the Court of Directors, that, notwithstanding the good the war against Tippoo. conduct, both of the General and of the troops, yet, by the irruption of Tippoo into Coimbetore, by the loss of stores and magazines, and by the check given to Colonel Floyd, enough had been effected to impress unfavourably the country powers, and create a danger lest the Mahrattas and the Nizam should incline to a separate peace: That his purpose, therefore, was, to place himself at the head of the army, not with the overweening conceit that he would act more skilfully than General Medows, but from the supposition, that, holding the higher situation in the government, he could act with the greater weight, and at any rate convince the native powers, by his appearance in the field, of the serious determination with which the East India Company had engaged in the war.

Between the route to the centre of Tippoo's dominions, by one of the southern New line of operations. passes, and that by the line of Velore, Amboor, and Bangalore, lay a choice of

1791.

Book VI. difficulties; that, by the southern passes, presenting a line of operation, from Madras, the grand source of supply, both very long, and owing to the weakness of several of the posts very difficult to defend; and that, in the direction of Velore, affording little in the way of supply for the wants of the army, and demanding the preliminary operation of the siege of Bangalore, one of the strongest places in Mysore, distant ninety miles from Amboor, the nearest depot of the besieging army. The issue of the preceding campaign contributed probably to determine Lord Cornwallis in the choice of the latter.

Proceedings of
Tippoo.

Siege of Bangalore.

Tippoo, summoned from his negotiations in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, by intelligence of the march of Lord Cornwallis toward Velore, on the 5th of February; ascended rapidly by the passes of Changama and Policode; and was ready to receive the English army in its attempt to penetrate by any of the usual and easiest of the passes. Contriving the appearances of a march toward Amboor, which completely imposed upon the Sultan, Lord Cornwallis turned suddenly to the north, and was at the head of the pass of Mooglee, before it was in the power of the enemy to offer any obstruction to his march. The English army began to move from the head of the pass on the 21st of February; and it was the 4th of March before the cavalry of the enemy appeared in considerable force. A mind like that of the Sultan was not very capable of entertaining more than one object at a time. All his military operations were suspended while he was preparing at Pondicherry the means of assistance from the French. When he was deceived in his hopes of resisting the English in the pass by their ascent at Mooglee, he was wholly engrossed by the thought of his Harem, left at Bangalore. Dispositions might have been made, to impede his enemy in front, and harass them in the rear, in every possible route. The Sultan, on the other hand, chose to go, in person, at the head of his army, to remove his women and valuables from Bangalore, a service which might have been performed by any of his officers with 500 men; and he allowed the English General to arrive within ten miles of his object, before he had occasion to fire a gun. An intended assault on the baggage on the morning of the 5th was frustrated by a skilful movement of the General; and in the evening the English took up their position before Bangalore, without any loss of stores, and only five casualties, after a day's exertion of the whole army of Tippoo.

Next day, as the cavalry, commanded by Colonel Floyd, and a brigade of infantry, were performing in the afternoon a reconnaissance to the south-west of the fort, they unexpectedly approached the line of encampment, which the Sultan had marked out, and which his army, by a circuitous and undiscovered march

were just beginning to enter. A body of about 1,000 horse, all who were not CHAP. IV. foraging, ordered to check the approach of the English, were the only part of 1791. the enemy yet seen by Colonel Floyd; and he moved against them with his cavalry, leaving the infantry in a swampy hollow, with orders there to wait his return. The retreat of Tippoo's horse discovered the rear of his infantry with baggage and guns; the temptation was great; the orders against an enterprise were forgotten; the flying enemy left their guns; the ground became irregular and strong; several charges had been made successfully on the right and the left, when Colonel Floyd advancing to dislodge the largest body of the enemy, received a musket ball, and fell. Though he was not mortally wounded, a retreat commenced; orders could not be distinctly communicated; great confusion ensued; but the infantry, which had been left under Major Gowdie, advanced with their guns to an eminence which commanded the line of retreat, and after allowing the cavalry to pass opened a fire upon the enemy which soon cleared the field. The danger was over, when Lord Cornwallis arrived with a division of the army to the support of the fugitives.

The Pettah, a considerable town surrounded by a wall and a ditch, was assaulted on the 7th. "Two ladders,” says Colonel Wilks, "would probably have saved many lives, but there was not one in camp; and, after a long delay in making a practicable opening in the gate, which the troops bore with the greatest steadiness and patience, the place was at length carried." The Sultan, the very same day, made a powerful effort for its recovery. A part of his army endeavoured to gain the attention of the English by a feint to turn their right, while the main body, by a concealed movement, entered the Pettah. Cornwallis had understood the stratagem, and reinforced the Pettah. So long as the struggle remained at firing, the superiority was on the side of the Sultan; but when the British troops had recourse to the bayonet, they pressed the enemy from quarter to quarter, and after a contest of some duration, drove them out of the town, with a loss of upwards of two thousand men.* The siege had continued till the

* "The casualties of the English on this day," (says Colonel Wilks, iii. 125) amounted to 131, but no loss made so deep an impression as that of Lieutenant-Colonel Moorehouse" (he commanded the artillery) "who was killed at the gate. He had risen from the ranks. But nature herself had made him a gentleman. Uneducated, he had made himself a man of science. A career of uninterrupted distinction had commanded general respect; and his amiable character universal attachment. The regret of his General, and the respect of his government, were testified by a monument erected at the public expense in the church at Madras.”—This is a generous tribute to singular worth; and deserves remembrance on account of both parties.

1791.

Book VI. 20th of March, the besiegers incessantly threatened by the whole of the enemy's force, the place not only not invested, but relieved at pleasure with fresh troops; when the Sultan, perceiving that operations were approaching to maturity for the assault, placed his guns, during a fog on the 21st, in a situation of some strength, whence he could enfilade and destroy the whole of the trenches, and open sap. The English General struck his camp as soon as he perceived this alarming design, and endeavoured to deter the enemy by threatening a general attack. The guns were removed, but carried back in the evening. And this with other causes determined the English General to overlook all impediments, which yet remained to be removed, and to give the assault on that very night. The intention was concealed from his own army till the last moment; and only communicated to the senior officer of artillery, who employed the intermediate space in perfecting, as far as possible, the breach, and taking off the defences of all the works which commanded it. The ladders were nearly planted before the garrison took the alarm. However carefully the intention of assaulting had been concealed, it was not unknown to the Sultan, who, at night-fall, moved his whole army within a mile and a half of the Mysore gate, warned the garrison of the impending trial, and appointed two heavy corps to fall upon both flanks of the assailants; though such effectual precautions were employed to protect them, as frustrated all his designs. The serious struggle had just begun in the breach, when a narrow circuitous way was discovered, which led a few men to the rampart. They waited coolly till joined by a sufficient number of their comrades to enable them to charge with the bayonet. Till the Kelledar fell, the garrison maintained a vigorous resistance. The English, as they penetrated, proceeded by alternate companies to the right and left, every where overcoming a respectable opposition, till they met at the opposite gate. The fury which almost always animates soldiers in a storm, when their own safety depends upon the terror they inspire, led to a deplorable carnage. The enemy crowding to escape had choked up the gate and the bodies of upwards of one thousand men were buried after the assault. The Sultan, when advertised of the attack, sent a large column to reinforce the garrison, which was approaching the Mysore gate, at the moment when the invaders had met above it from the right and the left. A few shot from the ramparts apprized them of the catastrophe; and the Sultan, who had shown great timidity during the siege, and availed himself very feebly of his means to annoy the besiegers, and waste their time, remained in a sort of torpid astonishment till the dawn, when he returned to his camp.

Nothing but the blunders of Tippoo appears to have prevented this enterprise