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stitutional right of appeal to the supreme court. Certificates of importance may be granted in any case, regardless of the amount claimed. In actions ex contractu (exclusive of actions involving a penalty) and in all cases sounding in damages the judgment, exclusive of costs, must be greater than $1,000 in order to obtain a writ of certiorari. The supreme court has original jurisdiction in cases relating to the revenue and in mandamus and habeas corpus. Such original jurisdiction on the part of the supreme court is not exclusive, and is exercised very sparingly by the court. The appellate court has no original jurisdiction.

An examination of the reports of the appellate and supreme courts during the past ten years has been made with a view of ascertaining more definite information as to the actual working of these courts. In the case of the Supreme Court the reports for the years 1910 to 1919 (Volumes 243 to 289, inclusive, but not including rehearings of 1909 cases) were carefully analyzed. The records of the court for this period were also examined for data as to the working of the certiorari law. For the appellate court an examination was made of such reports as were available for the same period; these included volumes 152 to 212, inclusive.

Ten thousand and sixteen cases are reported in Volumes 152 to 212, inclusive, of the appellate court reports. Of these 6,163 were affirmed and 3,692 reversed. One hundred and sixty-one were otherwise disposed of. These figures are analyzed in the tables on p. 895 of the Appendix.

Three thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine opinions are printed in the 47 volumes of the Supreme Court reports analyzed. Of these but 111 were cases involving the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Two thousand nine hundred and seventy-six were cases which had been taken direct to the Supreme Court from the trial courts. Seven hundred and ninety-two were cases which had come to the Supreme Court through the appellate court.

Of the 2,976 cases taken direct from the trial courts to the Supreme Court, 1767, or about 59 per cent, were cases in which there is a constitutional right of appeal to the Supreme Court and in which the Practice Act has provided for a direct appeal to that court. In other words, they comprise criminal cases above the grade of misdemeanor and cases involving a franchise, a freehold, or the validity of a statute. The remainder, 1,209, or about 41 per cent, were cases in which there is no constitutional right of appeal to the Supreme Court. They were, however, cases in which various statutes had provided for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.

Of the 792 cases which had come to the Supreme Court through the appellate court, 308, or approximately 39 per cent, came by certificate of importance, and 397, or about 50 per cent, by writ of certiorari. Sixty-six, or about 8 per cent, were cases in which there is a constitutional right of appeal to the Supreme Court, but in which no provision has been made for a direct appeal from the trial court to the Supreme Court. Twenty-one cases, the remaining 3 per cent, came to the Supreme Court by virtue of statutory appeals prior to the certiorari law of 1909.

The records of the Supreme Court show that during the period from 1910 to 1919 there were 1,660 applications for certiorari to that court. Of these, 469, or about 28 per cent, were allowed. One thousand one hundred and eighty-seven, or about 72 per cent, were denied. Four were pending before the court in December, 1919. The certiorari act of 1909 has greatly relieved the Supreme Court, and without it that court would have been seriously overburdened.

Tables presenting an analysis of the above figures are printed in the Appendix on p. 896, and on the insert at page 896.

V. PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION IN
ILLINOIS.

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the various suggestions which have been made for constitutional changes in the judicial article of the constitution of 1870. Suggestions which, if adopted, will effect a substantial reorganization of the judicial system will be discussed first. Proposals of amendment which assume that the judicial system will remain substantially as at present but which seek to correct certain specific defects now thought to exist in the present system will then be taken up.

Character of judicial article. At the outset attention should be invited to the problem of detail in connection with the judicial article of a proposed new constitution. In other words, to what extent is the system of judicial organization to be retained in the constitution, and to what extent is it to be left to the general assembly? The constitutional conventions in Illinois since 1818 have faced the problem of changing the judicial system to meet the needs of an increasing population. The constitution of 1848 established a rigid system which was soon outgrown, and the constitutional conventions of 1862 and 1869-70 were in a large part made necessary because of the unsatisfactory judicial organization so created. The constitution of 1870 introduced a number of elements of flexibility into the judicial organization but prescribed the details of the system in the text of the constitution itself. This system has created difficulty throughout the state, and was largely responsible for the constitutional amendment of 1904 permitting changes with respect to the city of Chicago.

The provision in the constitution of 1870 relating to Cook County was framed when the county had a population of 350,000. The present judicial organization in Cook County is to be found in the constitution itself. This system, which was suitable to the needs of a population of half a million, is unequal to the demands of a population of two and a half millions. Since the system itself is embodied in the fundamental law of the state, changes are impossible without altering the constitution itself. The establishment of the municipal court of Chicago required a constitutional amendment.

In view of the inconveniences which have arisen under the existing constitution as a result of the mass of detail in its judicial article, the suggestion will be made that the new judicial article omit reference to any other court than the supreme court, giving power to the

general assembly to create inferior courts. This is in substance the plan adopted by the framers of the constitution of the United States. Article III, Secion 1 of the federal constitution vests the judicial power in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judicial articles of the constitutions of the following states follow substantially the same language as that of the Federal constitution: Maine, Rhode Island and Oregon (by constitutional amendment, 1910). In Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont the constitutions do not vest the judicial power in any specific courts. In Iowa the constitution provides that "the judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district court, and such other courts, inferior to the supreme court, as the general assembly may, from time to time, establish." (Article V, Section 1). A proposed constitutional amendment was, however, submitted to and rejected by the people of California in 1918 giving the legislature power to provide for all courts inferior to the Supreme Court. A discussion of this proposal will be found in Transactions of the Commonwealth Club of California, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (June, 1918).

The adoption of such a scheme would give to the general assembly the power to create such courts as may be necessary to handle the judicial business of the state, and of the various parts thereof, for any period of time. A judicial system suitable to the needs of the state in 1920 may be unsuitable to its needs in 1950. Unless the proposed constitution is so framed as to permit the general assembly to provide such a system of judicial organization as will meet the needs of a future period, the same situation may develop under the constitution of 1920 which existed under the constitution of 1848 and which has continued in a lesser degree under the constitution of 1870.

If details as to the judicial system are omitted from the constitution, it will of course be possible to simplify greatly the judicial article. Most of the provisions contained in the present constitution can be omitted. If the plan is adopted of creating only the supreme court by the constitution, leaving the establishment of other courts to the general assembly, the constitutional provision should be so worded as to permit the organization of a unified judicial system with the supreme court as an integral part thereof.

Two complete plans have recently been published for the redraft of the judicial article of the constitution of Illinois. One draft is by Mr. Albert M. Kales and appears in the August, 1917, number of the Journal of the American Judicature Society. The essential elements in Mr. Kales' proposal are: (1) That three districts be constituted for the election of the members of the supreme court, two districts electing two members each; the third district (composed of the counties now in the seventh district) electing three judges; (2) The omission from the constitution of provisions for courts other than the supreme court, vesting jurisdiction "in such inferior courts and other tribunals as the legislature may from time to time ordain and establish", existing courts to remain until replaced as the result of legislative action; (3) Appointment of the clerk of the supreme court by the court itself.

Mr. Hiram T. Gilbert published in 1919 "A proposed judiciary article for the constitution of 1920 with explanatory notes". This proposal with the explanatory notes runs to forty-eight printed pages, and cannot be easily summarized but its essential elements are: (1) The detailed provision by the constitution for all parts of the judicial system, with an effort to make the judicial organization independent of legislative control. In carrying out this policy, methods of practice and procedure are to be taken from the general assembly and vested exclusively in the judicial department, subject to certain limitations; and the judicial department is to determine exclusively the number of its employees, and the amount of appropriations to be made to the judicial department. (2) The supreme court is to be given general supervision over the whole judicial organization of the state. (3) Clerks, sheriffs and employees are to be chosen by the courts themselves. State's attorneys are to be appointed and removed by the attorney general with the approval of the judges. (4) All courts inferior to the supreme court within Cook County (including justices of the peace) are to be consolidated into a court known as the Court of Cook County. All such courts outside of Cook County are to be consolidated into a court to be known as the circuit court. The court of Cook County, and the circuit court (outside of Cook County) are to have two divisions, the original division with branches each presided over by a single judge, and an appellate division composed of not less than three judges designated to this duty from among circuit judges. Branches of the original division are to hold sessions in each county of the state. (5) Judicial circuits are to remain, and at least four judges are to be elected in each circuit for fifteen year terms. Supreme court judges outside of Cook County are also to be elected for fifteen year terms. (6) The supreme court is to consist of nine judges, and the state is to be divided into seven districts. From each of six districts one judge is to be elected by popular vote. The seventh district (Cook County) is to have three judges, appointed by the governor upon the recommendation of a majority of the judges of the court of Cook County, each judge to serve "until his death, resignation, retirement or removal." (7) Judges of the court of Cook County are to be appointed by the governor, upon approval of a majority of the judges of the supreme court. Each judge is to hold office "until his death, resignation, retirement or removal." An election is to be held in Cook County each six years at which the qualified electors may express their disapproval of any judge, and as a result of such an expression of disapproval the office becomes vacant.

Judge Gilbert's proposal also contains provisions regarding judicial vacancies, the coroner, jury and grand jury. Aside from the attempt. to set up a judicial department completely independent of the general assembly, Judge Gilbert's aim seems to be much the same as that of Mr. Kales. They both aim at the establishment of a unified judicial system with larger powers over judicial procedure. The one seeks to accomplish this purpose by leaving present details out of the constitution, the other by placing all the details of judicial organization in the constitution.

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