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might well be taken that the Constitution by prohibiting certain types of interests in contracts, by implication prevents the general assembly from forbidding any other officers being interested in contracts and in fact guarantees them by the Constitution a right to be so interested. This, of course, was not the purpose of the framers of the Constitution, but illustrates the possible dangers of dealing with a matter piecemeal in different parts of the Constitution. It is much better in a matter of this kind to deal with the subject by one provision, as is done in the Constitution of 1870 with respect to the extension of terms of office (Art. IV, Sec. 28).

With respect to special and private legislation also a policy of prohibition runs throughout the Constitution. Upon this subject there is a series of clauses:

Art. IV, Sec. 22,

Art. IV, Sec. 16,

Art. IX, Sec. 3,

Art. X, Sec. 11,

Art. X, Sec.

5.

Art. XI, Sec. 1,

Prohibits local or special legislation in twentythree enumerated cases.

Prohibits appropriations in private laws. Requires that exemptions from taxation be only by general law.

Provides that fees shall be fixed only by general law.

Forbids special laws with reference to township organization.

Forbids the creation of corporations by special laws.

These provisions are supplemented by provisions requiring that laws relating to the courts be general and of uniform operation (Art. VI, Sec. 29), and that the jurisdiction of justices and police magistrates be uniform (Art. VI, Sec. 21).

To find what is prohibited as special legislation therefore requires a search of the whole text of the Constitution. In some cases judicial construction of these clauses has restricted their application. On the basis of Fergus v. Russel, 277 Ill., 20 (1917), the prohibition of appropriations of money in private laws means less than its language seems. to mean. On the other hand the prohibition of local or special laws "granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever", has come by interpretation to mean much more than its language seems to mean.

Language permitting or leading to technical constructions: An effort should be made in drafting a constitution to avoid imposing upon the courts the necessity of determining whether "or" is used in the sense of "and," and other types of technical constructions. Article IX, Sec. 9, of the Constitution provides for local improvements "by special assessments or by special taxation of contiguous property or otherwise." The phrase here would appear to permit a combination of special assessments and special taxation, but the Supreme Court has held the "or" of this clause to make necessary the use of one or the other methods, so that the words "or other

wise" mean "or otherwise than by special assessments alone or by special taxation alone", although the court also says it is proper to combine special assessments with general taxation or special taxation. with general taxation. A different interpretation of the word "or" would have been easily possible, especially with that word modified by the words "or otherwise". Kuehner v. City of Freeport, 143 Ill., 92 (1892).

Perhaps, however, the most technical case of constitutional construction in Illinois is that which relates to the qualifications of county commissioners. In Article X, Sec. 6, the Constitution provides that in counties not under township organization, three officers shall be elected to be known as "the board of county commissioners", quoting the title of the board. Section 7 of the same article provides for “a board of commissioners of fifteen persons" for Cook County, not quoting the name of the board. Elsewhere in the Constitution these boards are both referred to as "the county board". In Article VI, Sec. 17, (a section which should have limited itself entirely to judicial matters) qualifications are prescribed for membership in the "board of county commissioners", the title being quoted. The Supreme Court held that the qualifications prescribed in Art. VI, Sec. 17 did not apply to Cook County and could not be made so to apply by legislation, because the Cook County board was referred to elsewhere as "a" board, and because of the use made of quotation marks. People ex rel. Hoyne v. McCormick, 261 Ill., 413 (1914).

While, as indicated above, statements in varying language may be held to mean the same thing, slight variations, as in this case, may be held to establish a material difference in meaning.

Language when it has been put into a constitution is oftentimes capable of an interpretation different from that which its framers may have intended, and for this reason slight differences in phraseology oftentimes become important. In Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of 1870, it is provided that delegates to a constitutional convention shall be elected "in the same manner" as members of the Senate. This language was probably used without a great deal of attention, but has almost necessarily been construed to require the partisan nomination and election of delegates to a constitutional convention, a result which clearly could not have been intended.

The Constitution of 1870 permits the creation of probate courts in each county having a population of over 50,000. It would be easily possible under this provision for the court to have said that the general assembly, if it were to create probate courts at all, must create probate courts for all counties with a population of over 50,000, although the court actually reached the opposite view (Knickerbocker v. People ex rel. Butz, 102 Ill., 218). The provision of the Constitution of 1870 providing for the creation of appellate courts, in prescribing the jurisdiction of such courts might easily have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to vest an intermediate appellate jurisdiction in certain types of cases independently of legislative action once the appellate courts were established, and in fact the language could perhaps more readily be construed in that way were it not for

the fact that such a construction would materially handicap the general assembly in its powers with respect to the judicial system of the State.

Other types of difficulties with respect to draftsmanship: Difficulties of other types also present themselves in constitutional draftsmanship. For example, the use of definitions in a constitution is apt to be dangerous, and the definition of the word "office" in Article V, Section 24, has made a good deal of difficulty by drawing a rather artificial distinction with respect to appropriations under Article IV, Section 16. This difficulty has not been fully met by the decision. of the State Supreme Court in Fergus v. Russel, 210 Ill., 301; nor by the decree of the lower court in the same case, discussed in the Opinions of the Attorney General, 1916, pp. 13-24.

With respect to the re-apportionment of judicial areas, Art. VI, Sec. 13 provides for changes of circuits at a legislative session "next preceding the election for circuit judges, but at no other time". Under the Constitution circuit judges are all elected at the same time, and this provision makes no difficulty. With respect to Supreme Court judges, however, a similar provision in Article VI, Sec. 5 makes difficulty, because all Supreme Court judges are not elected at the same time. In case one judge only was to be elected at a certain time, his district could be changed only at a session preceding that election, and, if the Constitution were to be construed literally no other district could be changed at that time. The Supreme Court had, therefore, to deny any power to change or to hold that in changing one district. there was power to make incidental changes in other districts. People ex rel. Vandeventer v. Rose, 203 Ill., 46 (1903).

In some cases the adoption by reference, for another purpose, of a clause elsewhere in the Constitution may lead to an unexpected result. For example, it is probable that the qualifications for delegates to a constitutional convention, prescribed in Article XIV, Sec. 1, were not purposely intended to disqualify members of the two houses of the general assembly.

In some cases it will be desirable to bring into closer relationship provisions in the present Constitution dealing with the same subject. Some of the remarks above relate to this matter. Certainly, qualifications of members of boards of county commissioners should not be in an article dealing with the judicial department (Art. VI, Sec. 17). Provisions now in three parts of the Constitution dealing with eminent domain may well be brought together (Art. II, Sec. 13; Art. IV, Sec. 30; Art. XI, Sec. 14).

Particular attention should be called to the fact that the greater the detail in a constitution, the greater is the danger due to defects of draftsmanship. The danger here dealt with is not the danger due to the fact that conditions may change so as to make detailed constitutional regulations inapplicable, but the danger that in drafting provisions they may be so worded as to mean something not fully intended by their framers.

Nothing said here is intended to conflict with the views that a constitutional provision ought not to be changed merely to adopt a better phraseology, if the provision as now interpreted means what it is desired to have it mean; but uniformity of phraseology is always desirable where two clauses mean the same thing and there is no danger in establishing uniformity in such cases, either before or after judicial construction of the phrases.

IV. PROCEDURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION.

Submission of convention's work: The procedure of the convention will vary somewhat in accordance with the number of changes to be made in the Constitution and with the method of submitting the convention's work to popular vote. The convention of 1869-70 submitted its work in the form of nine separate proposals, one proposal containing a revised constitution and the eight other proposals constituting the more seriously controverted problems acted upon by the convention.

The convention of 1869-70 set a wise precedent for the convention of 1920. There will be a number of issues before the convention of 1920 which are seriously controversial in character and upon which the people will wish an opportunity and should have an opportunity to express themselves separately. On the other hand, there are a number of non-controversial matters in the present Constitution which need to be changed, and to submit each of these matters as an independent proposition would be useless, and would place an unreasonable burden upon each voter. Such non-controversial matters might well be submitted as a unit in a revised constitution, if the convention sees fit to do this. Under this plan the voters would be able to pass as a unit upon non-controversial matters and to pass separately upon each matter of a controversial character or of distinct popular interest. It would be foolish to submit a series of separate propositions to the voters as to such matters as the amendment of prior laws by reference to their titles, the reading of bills three times in each house of the general assembly, etc.

The Ohio convention of 1912 submitted 42 separate constitutional changes to the people. The Massachusetts convention of 1917-19 submitted three questions to be voted upon at one election and nineteen questions to be voted upon at another election. With forty-two questions submitted, the plan of separate submission becomes too burdensome, but there should be no difficulty about submitting to the voters of Illinois each controversial question separately and the non-controversial matters as a single unit.

The long intervals which elapse between the meetings of constitutional conventions make it desirable that the convention should undertake a complete re-examination of the existing constitution in order to make changes either of addition or of omission which may have become necessary since the framing of the present Constitution. However, such a complete re-examination can be had, and the work of the convention submitted without the undue multiplication of issues to be separately presented to the voters.

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