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lidity of the law before he became a member of the United States Supreme Court. It is therefore fairly clear that a majority of the federal Supreme Court are in favor of the constitutionality of minimum wage legislation for women and children. The fact that the United States Supreme Court may sustain the validity of minimum wage legislation does not of course necessarily mean that the validity of such legislation would be sustained by a state supreme court. The State Court is the final interpreter of the broad guarantees contained in a State Constitution, and may, if it sees fit, hold legislation unconstitutional as violative of due process of law, even though such legislation has been held not violative of the due process of law guarantee of the Federal Constitution.
Minimum wage legislation for men would be of doubtful validity in either the state courts or the United States Supreme Court. The case of Wilson v. New, 243 U. S., 332, which upheld the wage provisions of the Adamson Law, was clearly based upon a specific emergency and it would probably not be wise to reason from that case to any general view in favor of the validity of minimum wage legislation for men.
The discussion above has related to legislation which is either clearly constitutional or which would probably be held constitutional by the Supreme Court of Illinois. In a number of cases, legislation upon other matters has been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and it is possible to say that certain other types of proposed legislation not yet enacted in Illinois would be held invalid if they were enacted. A brief review should be given of types of legislation which would probably be held invalid.
(1) In another chapter of this bulletin will be found a full discussion of the problem of injunctions in labor cases, and of the legislative power to limit the authority of courts to punish for contempt in such cases. As has been indicated, legislation with respect to these matters has been enacted by Congress and by a number of state legislatures. On the other hand legislation of this character has been held improper in California, Massachusetts and New Jersey, and the judicial decisions of this state seem to lead to the conclusion that such legislation would be held invalid in this state under present state constitutional provisions.
(2) Legislation regarding the payment of wages, particularly that requiring the payment of wages in cash and that requiring coal to be screened in the payment of wages to miners, has been held unconstitutional in this state. The Supreme Court of Illinois has been pretty definitely of the view that legislation regulating the payment of wages. in this manner is unconstitutional. The leading cases upon this matter are cited in a note. Legislation of this character has been upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court, as not violative of due process of law, and there has been some tendency for courts which have once held such legislation invalid to change their view. However a large mass of
Millet v. People, 117 Ill. 294 (1886); Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171 (1892); Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380 (1892); Braceville Coal Co. v. People. 147 Ill. 66 (1893); Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 456 (1896); Kellyville Coal Co. v. Harrier, 207 Ill. 624 (1904.
possible legislation regarding the payment of wages is now unconstitutional in Illinois.
A proposed amendment to the constitution of Illinois was submitted to the people in 1894. This proposal read as follows: "That the general assembly shall have power and it shall be its duty to enact and provide for the enforcement of all laws that it shall deem necessary to regulate and control contracts, conditions and relations existing or arising from time to time between corporations and their employes." The affirmative vote on the proposal was 153,393, and the negative vote 59,558, but the amendment failed because not receiving a majority of the votes cast at the election.
(3) Hours of labor of men. In the case of Lochner v. New York (198 U. S. 45) the United States Supreme Court held invalid a law which limited the hours of labor in bakeries to ten hours a day. The same court in the earlier case of Holden v. Hardy (198 U. S. 366) held a limitation of the hours of men in mines and smelters constitutional, on the ground that labor in mines and smelters was hazardous and that the hours might be limited in such employments. The Lochner case was distinguished from Holden v. Hardy on the ground that labor in bakeries was not hazardous or unhealthful. In the case of Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917) the United States Supreme Court upheld an Oregon law which definitely limits the hours of labor of men, and practically departed from the view expressed in the Lochner case. The Oregon law was a general ten hour law, but was applied to establishments which had under other legislation been classed as hazardous, although all the employments to which it was related were not hazardous in the strict sense of the word. In view of the Bunting case, it is probably now true that the United States Supreme Court would uphold legislation restricting the hours of labor of men, although such legislation might be of doubtful validity if the hours were limited beyond ten hours a day.
It has now come to be generally recognized in this country that a state legislature may limit the hours of labor upon public works, whether such public works are conducted by the state or by a political subdivision of the state. Such legislation was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 217 (1903). In New York, California, Ohio and other states, legislation limiting the hours of labor of men upon public works was held invalid by state courts, and such decisions have lead to constitutional provisions prescribing an eight-hour day upon public works in New York, Ohio, California, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
No legislation has been expressly enacted in Illinois limiting the hours of labor upon public works, but decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois upon municipal contracts have made it clear that an Illinois court would regard such legislation as invalid. In the case of Fisk v. People, 188 Ill. 206 (1900), the Supreme Court took the view that the requirements of union labor and of an eight-hour day in municipal public works were invalid, and the attitude of the court pretty clearly indicated that it regarded such regulation as not merely beyond the
power of the city but also as unconstitutional. In the case of McChesney v. People 200 Ill. 146, the Supreme Court took the same view as to contract provisions fixing the eight-hour day and prohibiting alien labor. If it is desired to permit a statutory fixing of the hours of labor upon state and municipal public works, this would seem to require a constitutional change in this state.
(4) Legislation making exceptions in favor of union labor with respect to matters of discharge or with respect to employment is pretty clearly not permitted by the constitution of Illinois as now interpreted. In the case of Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176 (1900), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional legislation which sought to make it a criminal offense for an employer to attempt to prevent his employes from joining labor unions, or to discharge them because of their connection with labor unions; and this view is also substantially taken by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Coppage v. Kansas (1915). Legislation of this character would probably be invalid under the constitution of the United States even though there were a state constitutional provision expressly authorizing it.
In the case of Matthews v. People, 202 Ill. 389 (1903), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Free Employment Agency Act which prohibited superintendents of agencies from furnishing workmen or lists of workmen to employers whose men were either on a strike or locked out, the court taking the view that this created an unjust and unequal classification.
In the case of Fisk v. People, 188 Ill. 206 (1900) the court squarely took a view against the validity of an ordinance discriminating in favor of union labor upon local public works and said: “Under our constitution and laws, any man has a right to employ a workman to perform labor for him whether such workman belongs to a labor union or not, and any workman has a right to contract for the performance of labor irrespective of the question whether he belongs to a labor union or not." The case of the City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 205 Ill. 346 (1903) should also be cited in this connection, although the matter here related to the terms of an Act prohibiting the employment of aliens upon public works.
(5) In the case of Josma v. Western Steel Car and Foundry Co. 249 Ill. 508 (1911), the Supreme Court of Illinois held invalid legislation penalizing the employment of laborers from another community by misrepresentation as to the conditions of employment or the existence of a strike, saying that there was no distinction in this matter between laborers in another community and those in the same community, and that the classification was therefore invalid. A contrary view was taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of the Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 256 (1914). If legislation of the character held unconstitutional is desired in this state, a constitutional amendment for the purpose may be proposed, although it would seem possible to draft a law in such a way as to meet the objection raised by the court. If, as is contended by those favoring such legislation, the evil aimed at exists only with respect to the deceiving of laborers in another community, no harm would result
from the passage of legislation applicable to such deceit, irrespective of where the laborer might be.
(6) The subjects of old age and sickness insurance are discussed elsewhere in this bulletin. It is probable that constitutional provisions would be necessary to permit the enactment of legislation upon these subjects.
(7) Legislative power under the present constitution is pretty clearly not sufficient to authorize the State or its political subdivisions embarking upon the construction of houses or upon numerous other types of governmental enterprises. A wide expansion of authority with respect to governmental undertakings has taken place in Arizona, Oklahoma, North and South Dakota, and a constitutional amendment has recently been adopted in Massachusetts authorizing the state in times of emergency to engage in the furnishing of certain necessaries. Municipal debt limitations in the present constitution would oftentimes prevent the engaging in industrial enterprises, even if constitutional provisions were construed not to prohibit such enterprises; but if it is desired to have the state or its political subdivisions embark upon the enterprises here under discussion, constitutional changes will probably be necessary.
(8) A constitutional amendment was adopted in Massachusetts in 1918 authorizing the control of billboards and public advertising. A similar proposal was rejected by the people of Ohio in 1912. These matters are commented upon in Bulletin No. 7, upon eminent domain and excess condemnation. A constitutional change may be necessary if it is desired to regulate this matter by legislation although a recent decision of the Supreme Court of United States has gone far towards sustaining the regulation of billboards, and this case went to the federal Supreme Court from the state of Illinois. (Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526).
(9) Projects for the conservation of natural resources are now to a large extent within the state constitutional authority. Here again the problem is in part one of financing such projects, and this matter may require constitutional action if wider state and municipal powers are desired.
(10) The Court of Appeals of New York has sustained legislation limiting the night labor of women, (People v. Schweinler Press 214 N. Y. 395), and also legislation requiring a weekly day of rest in certain occupations.*
The labor party of Illinois desires that a new constitution "charge the legislature with the duty of providing by law for the reorganization of industries, impressing upon industries a co-operative character and providing for collective bargaining and for the election of labor members to boards of directors." It is questionable whether under the United States constitution legislation would be valid which interfered with the management of private industry and required the election of labor members to boards of directors of corporations. An economic tendency in the direction of greater co-operation between employers
People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121 (1915).
and employes in the management of industries is becoming apparent, and it may be that the courts will come to recognize the validity of legislation requiring such co-operation. It should of course be remarked that this matter has not been passed upon by the federal Supreme Court, and that future action in this field might be sustained, if taken. With respect to co-operative enterprises future legislation in Illinois has already done something by way of encouragement, and in the chapter of this bulletin dealing with corporations will be found a further comment upon the problem of co-operative organizations.
Certain decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois have been subjected to criticism, but do not prevent legislation in the field to which they apply. For example the case of Starne v. People 222 Ill. 189 (1906) held invalid an act requiring washrooms in mines, but the legislation was held invalid upon the ground of an improper classification and later legislation upon the same matter has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois (People v. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28, 1914). The case of Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 352 (1909) held unconstitutional an act regarding the assignments of wages as security for money loans, but did not prevent legislation in this field.