vehicular tunnels before jointly agreeing to build the railroad tunnels.

The Society of Terminal Engineers on January 22, 1919, adopted the following resolution in favor of the construction of railroad freight terminals:

WHEREAS, The port of New York is the only great port in the world the two sides of which are separated by so wide a body of water as to make lighterage necessary for all freight passing from one side to the other, and

WHEREAS, The expense and inconvenience due to this separation is daily becoming more onerous and apparent, as instanced by the present harbor strike and coal famine, therefore be it

Resolved, That the cities and states of New York and New Jersey co-operate without delay to overcome the bad effects of this separation by the construction of tunnels or a bridge, or both.

The New York Board of Trade at its meeting on June 11, 1919, adopted a similar resolution as follows:

Resolved, That the Federal Railroad Administration be requested promptly to connect the New York and New England Railroad systems by all-rail tunnel service under the Hudson River, Manhattan Island and the East River, with the Railroad systems terminating in New Jersey and Staten Island, since by so doing the route will be shortened, the cost of transportation between New England and Canadian points and points to the South and West will be cheapened, and the facilities of the Port of New York will be made to better serve the national commerce passing through the Port.

The report goes on to say:

The Hudson River is a barrier between the Western and Southern Railway systems and their New England and Canadian connections. The waterfront on the New York and New Jersey sides of the Harbor, because of the floating transfer of freight, is intensively used for railroad purposes to the partial exclusion of marine commerce, and dock improvements have not been and cannot be made with sufficient celerity to keep up with the continually expanding national and local demands for both rail and water requirements.

Whatever may be the future railway policy of the United States, it is generally conceded that terminal integration will go forward and not backward; and that the railroad terminals at each city will more and more come to be administered jointly. As a consequence of this change terminal rivalries will be eliminated, and it will be much easier than heretofore and especially at New York to adopt modern methods. Railroad rivalries have till now been the principal obstructing influences to port improvement.

Under what kind of authority and form of organization the port of New York shall ultimately be organized and administered is not yet clear. The Dock Commissioner's authority under the Mayor failed. The Board of Estimate authority is too cumbersome and irresponsible. It also will break down. Both fail to provide initiative and continuity of plan and policy, which in view of the great and rapidly developing economic and international responsibilities of New York, as the world's principal port of exchange, can no longer be neglected. State control at Boston, New Orleans and San Francisco has worked well, as is evidenced by the superior organization of these ports, but I question its applicability at New York. National control at Montreal has been highly successful and the federal government here, through the Department of Commerce, can at least advantageously examine into, and give publicity to, the greatest port organization problem of the world, and so direct public attention towards a better understanding of it.

At New York and at other ports, the federal government, through its control of railroad terminals will hereafter exercise a great, if not a dominating, influence over future development. By adopting the principle in vogue at South African ports, of administering the docks, railway terminals and trans-shipment sheds at each port as an integral part of the unified railway, highway, and water system of the country, I believe that we shall obtain the best results.

The query naturally arises, since port organization has made such progress elsewhere than at New York, why has it been delayed so long here? The answer is that from the beginning of railroading, the port has been regarded as if it were to be permanently separated into two parts by the Hudson River, and on this supposition immense vested interests in terminal properties and in floating equipment have been predicated. This enormous investment will in part be prejudiced by any comprehensive organization of the port on modern lines, which will coördinate the several factors involved. For instance, a large part of the floating equipment will be unnecessary expensive railroad location at waterfront terminals will be in large part needless since the railroads can transfer their terminals to cheaper back lands— substitution of inshore railroad terminals for railroad waterfront

terminals will result in the establishment of public terminal markets and will tend to destroy the present inefficient, wasteful, monopoly distribution of food-real estate speculations and private terminal developments about the harbor will, in some cases, be prejudiced since a connected system of railway terminals will tend to make one part of the harbor as good as another for the general purposes of commerce and manufacture. In other words and as a consequence of terminal integration, an unprecedented opportunity for port development will be opened up to private enterprise all the way from Sandy Hook, through the Hudson Valley, up and down the East River and along Long Island Sound to Jamaica Bay. In short, the effect of modernizing the port will have a far-reaching influence on waterfront values comparable to that of the new subways upon real estate values in the interior of the city. It is this prospective dislocation of values and the consequent temporary disarrangement of business which has for years retarded port development in the public interest at New York. It is necessary to overcome these natural but reactionary influences, and in no other way can the much needed change be accomplished. The recent consolidation of the railroad systems makes this revolutionary process possible. In fact, it will compel the change to be made in spite of all local restraining influences the most obstructive of which has been the smothering of popular discussion.

The pressure for additional docks for steamships has already resulted in the presentation of plans for new docks and the actual construction of some of those planned. In too many instances, however, the proposed docks are of the narrow, one story type, entirely unsuited for modern requirements which demand wide docks, with sheds two stories in height, adequate rail approach, mechanical equipment for loading and unloading, and adjacent facilities for temporary and permanent storage. It will not be easy to construct such docks at the congested center of the port, but if the railway terminal system of the port shall be coördinated with the docks, they can with equal advantage be located almost anywhere about the harbor waters.

It is so manifest that all parts of the port will be advantaged by connection with each other and with all land and water carriers, that if the New York and New Jersey Harbor Improvement Com

mission shall make this issue the essential part of their program, they will speedily attract public support and overcome interested private opposition to port development at New York. Physical unification of the terminal railway system of this port is the only programme for which general assent can be obtained and all other policies and proposed treaties urged in advance of this will stimulate discord and delay port improvement.

Facilities of the Port of New Orleans

By WALTER PARKER

General Manager, New Orleans Association of Commerce

EW ORLEANS, seeking to become in fact as well as in

theory, the port market of lowest resistance for the Mississippi Valley, has, in ten years, done the following constructive things:

Destroyed 250,000 open cisterns in order that the stegomyia fasciata, or yellow fever transmitting mosquito, can have no place there to breed. In this way the danger of yellow fever epidemics has been completely removed. Expense involved, about $12,000,000.

Rat proofed 150,000 buildings so rats can find no breeding places. Without rats there can be no rat epizootic and no rat fleas to transmit the disease to human beings in the form of bubonic plague. Expense involved about $9,000,000.

Caused the operation of quarantine regulations along the Gulf Coast to pass from the jurisdiction of the several states to the federal government. In this way, varying and irregular regulations against the bringing in of disease from tropical countries have been replaced by constant and wise regulations of a completely uniform character.

Built five miles of steel covered wharves along the harbor front at a cost of about $5,000,000.

Built the world's largest and most efficiently equipped cotton warehouse and terminal at a cost of about $3,500,000, exclusive of the land. It has a storage capacity of 425,000 bales, and an annual handling capacity of 2,000,000 bales. It is now being enlarged.

Built the world's most efficient grain elevator at a cost of $2,000,000; capacity, 2,250,000 bushels. It can load or unload four ships at one time. Handling capacity, 96,000 bushels per hour.

Built and equipped a complete municipal belt railroad which connects and serves all railroads entering the city, all wharves, landings, warehouses and industries. Investment, about $1,500,000.

Installed a complete and modern system of sewerage, drainage and pure water supply. Investment made and to be finished, about $40,000,000.