tions were combined. Much of the expense of elections could be saved in other directions, such as by combining certain local or nonpartisan elections in which the issues would not be greatly different, by the introduction of a system of permanent or central registration, and by abolishing the primary in certain cases and nominating candidates by petition. As Governor Lowden pointed out in the inaugural address above mentioned, the expense of elections "is not the most important consideration. The lengthening of the ballot and the increasing frequency of elections are tending to defeat the very purpose of democracy." This is a serious danger and is directly due to the excessive number of elections and of elective officers. A committee of the Chicago City Club, in a report made in 1912, pointed out that the voter in Illinois is “called upon to make intelligently and conscientiously all the way from twentyfive (25) to fifty-five (55) separate decisions at the polls-to pass upon the qualifications of hundreds of men who aspire to many offices of diverse character.” 61 The men's candidate ballot supplied to voters in Chicago at the general election of November, 1916, was three feet long and twenty inches wide and contained about 270 names arranged in six party columns. In addition, the voter was expected to vote the separate ballot for judges of the municipal court, containing the names of more than thirty candidates, and another so-called "little ballot," two feet long, containing five propositions-two city bond issues, park consolidation, banking law amendment, and tax amendment to the constitution. During the year 1916 the voters of Chicago were expected to choose or to assist in choosing more than three hundred different elective officials. To inform himself adequately regarding the merits and qualifications of the multitude of candidates is a task which the ordinary busy citizen is unable to perform without assistance. The Chicago Municipal Voters League and the Legislative Voters League are organizations formed for the purpose of affording this assistance 61 Short Ballot in Illinois, 7. and of enabling the voter to cast an intelligent ballot.62 Ordinarily, however, with regard to most of the candidates for minor and unimportant offices, the voter's only guide is the party label; and this circumstance tends to induce him in most cases to vote a straight party ticket by placing a cross at the top of the party column. Thus, in effect, he abdicates his supposed function of making an intelligent choice between candidates, and the real control rests in the hands of the party managers who draw up the party slate. The short ballot principle requires that the voter should not be expected to vote for petty officers, having merely ministerial duties, but only for a very few of the most important officers, who have some control over the determination of public policies. The introduction of the short ballot would not only enable the voter to vote more intelligently, but would also conduce to a better integrated administrative system. The management of elections in Illinois is very largely decentralized; and the expense of holding election, even when state officers are chosen, is a charge upon the locality. The state as a whole, however, is interested in the efficient and orderly management of elections, especially where state officers are to be chosen. The question may, therefore, in the near future become acute whether, in all except purely local elections, the state should not assume at least part of the expense and undertake the administrative control or supervision of such elections. 62 Jones, Readings on Parties and Elections, 321. XVII. THE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE LAW HE efficiency of law enforcement in Illinois is influenced THE by many factors, such as the character of the law, the nature of the conditions upon which the law is designed to operate, and the working of the machinery provided for its enforcement. The more nearly the laws express the opinion of the mass of the people, the more likely they are to receive that support of public opinion which is almost essential to their enforcement. If the population is fairly homogeneous, both the demands of public opinion for the enactment of laws and the support of such opinion in their enforcement is. other things being equal, more definite and certain than when the population exhibits a large degree of heterogeneity in race, color, and literacy. It is therefore of interest in this connection to note that, according to the United States census of 1910, over thirty per cent of the total population of Illinois are native whites of foreign or mixed parentage, over twenty-one per cent are foreign born whites and among Negroes the proportion of illiteracy is more than ten per cent. The foreign born and Negro population forms a considerably greater percentage of the total population in the cities than in the rural districts. From this great diversity in the composition and characteristics of the population upon which the laws are designed to operate, it results that the problem of efficient law enforcement is by no means a simple one. The efficiency of law enforcement in the state is also influenced by the character of the machinery provided for such enforcement. In this connection it is to be noted in the first place that some dependence is placed upon private initiative to effect this purpose. Thus, the provision of the Illinois criminal code giving the heirs of a person who has been lynched a right to an action for damages against the county or city in which the lynching occurred is an example of the utilization of private initiative for the purpose of coping indirectly with criminal lawlessness.1 The abatement and injunction act of 1915 also invokes private initiative in law enforcement by giving to any citizen of a county in which a disorderly house exists a right to maintain a bill in equity perpetually to enjoin and abate such a nuisance.2 Such organizations as the Anti-Saloon League, Law and Order League, Citizens' Association, and similar bodies are examples of private agencies organized, either primarily or incidentally, for the purpose of assisting in the enforcement of certain particular laws of the state.3 For the most part, however, dependence for law enforcement must, of course, be had upon the regular constituted officers and authorities established for that purpose, such as the governor, the courts, the militia, state and local commissioners and inspectors, the attorney-general, the states attorneys, sheriffs, mayors, constables, and police. These various officers do not constitute a unified department of justice for the state but merely a group of officers and agencies more or less independent of each other, between whom conflicts, friction, and lack of coöperation may and sometimes do arise. Thus, the enforcement of state laws is not infrequently impeded through the issuance of temporary injunctions by the courts. Conflicts may arise with respect to the enforcement of antiliquor or anti-vice laws between the law-enforcing officers of a county and of a city located within the county, as well as between state and local officers. In Cook county there are about a score of district governing agencies, most of them being largely independent of each other. Under these circum 1 Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 38, section 256w. 2 Laws of 1915, p. 372. 3 In the forty-seventh general assembly a bill was introduced providing an extension of the quo warranto statute so as to allow any public law-enforcing official, for example a mayor, to be brought into court on application of a taxpayer and compelled to show cause why he should not forfeit his office for failure to enforce existing laws. stances, conflicts between local law-enforcing officers, such as mayor and states attorney are the natural result, particularly when they belong to opposite political parties or factions. Under the cities and villages act, the mayor has the same authority as the sheriff to preserve peace and enforce order.* If there is an understanding as to a proper delimination of authority between these officers, this provision may work no harm; but on general principles it is not usually wise to intrust the same functions to be exercised by separate and independent officials in the same territory. The result of such a provision may sometimes be that responsibility is divided, and an opportunity is afforded whereby local officials may engage in the unedifying pastime of "passing the buck" in an attempt to shift responsibility for lawless conditions. Dependence in the first instance for the enforcement of state law rests upon local officers, sheriffs, constables, states attorneys, mayors, and police. Direct action by state authorities takes place ordinarily only when local authorities fail or are unable to cope with the existing lawlessness. In legal theory, sheriffs, states attorneys, and police are state officers; 5 but, for practical purposes, they bear more nearly the character of local officers, because they are, for the most part, subject to local control only. Under these circumstances, such officers are naturally influenced in enforcing state law by public sentiment in their respective localities; and if such sentiment is very strongly opposed to a particular state law, that law is not likely to be very strictly enforced. Thus the system of depending upon local officers for the enforcement of state law may bring about a species of extralegal home rule in the localities. The exercise by localities within the state of the dispensing power may result in the practically open defiance of state law. In 1874, the Chicago city council repealed the Sunday closing ordinance which Mayor Medill had attempted to enforce. This action of the council was a virtual notice 4 Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 24, section 21. |