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XVI. SUFFRAGE, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS

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OPULAR government in Illinois, as in other states, in so far as it is really popular government at all, is such only in a limited sense, inasmuch as certain classes of persons have always been excluded from direct participation in public affairs. Those upon whom the right to such participation has been conferred may be called for distinction, the "political people," or "the people," par excellence. In theory, the latter were supposed to represent adequately the interests of those who were excluded from direct exercise of political rights. The classes of persons who are legally excluded have been reduced at present, practically speaking, to almost an irreducible minimum Grounds of disqualification for exercising the right to vote include lack of residence, lack of citizenship, minority, conviction of an infamous crime, and sex (in the case of voting for certain officers). Ground of disqualification for holding public office include lack of residence, lack of citizenship, nonattainment of a certain age, conviction of certain crimes, and failure on the part of a holder of public moneys to make proper accounting for all such funds.1 It has been held that all persons are equally eligible to office who are not excluded by some constitutional or legal disqualification, and the fact of eligibility does not even depend upon the right of suffrage. In general, with scarcely any exceptions, the qualifications or disqualifications prescribed for voters in state elections apply. equally to national and local elections.

In order to be eligible to vote in such elections, Illinois requires a person otherwise qualified, to be a full-fledged citizen of the United States, so that mere declaration of his inten

1 Constitution, article Iv, section 4; article v, section 5; article VII.

2 People ex rel. v. McCormick, 261 Illinois, 413.

tion to become a citizen is not sufficient. Such citizenship may of course be acquired either by birth in the United States or by the process of naturalization, or through what may be called vicarious naturalization, i.e., the foreign born wife or minor child may become a citizen of the United States through the citizenship or naturalization of the husband or father. Moreover, it has been held that wives of sons made citizens through the naturalization of their father during minority are citizens entitled to vote, if otherwise qualified. Furthermore, under the ruling of the Illinois court, a foreign born wife of a citizen of the United States does not lose citizenship by the death of her husband and her subsequent marriage to an alien, and her minor children also become citizens by virtue of her citizenship.3

Under the constitution, all persons having the qualifications therein named have the right to vote, and the legislature has no power to restrict that right, except in the case of those convicted of infamous crimes. It would seem to follow from this that the right of insane persons to vote could not be restricted by the legislature. There is a dictum of the state supreme court, however, to the effect that the vote of a person non compos mentis ought not to be received. The legislature has, moreover, provided by law that inmates of poorhouses, insane asylums, and hospitals shall not, for purposes of voting, be deemed residents of the city or election district in which the institution is situated.1

The requirements in regard to residence are that a person, in order to be a voter in any election must have resided in the state one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding such election. In order to constitute a residence within the meaning of this provision, a "permanent abode " is necessary. What is meant by a "permanent abode" has been defined by the courts as depending largely on the person's intention or animus manendi, and this

3 Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Illinois, 250; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Illinois, 141 (142).

Sanner v. Patton, 155 Illinois, 553 (554); Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Illinois, 54 (55); Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 46, section 66a.

may be shown both by his declarations and his acts. It has been held that an absence even for years, if the party all the while intends it as a mere temporary matter, is not an abandonment of residence. With respect to the right of a college student to vote, the rule has been laid down that he "may vote in the place where the college is located if he is free from parental control, regards the place where the college is located as his home and has no other home to which to return; but his mere presence at the college is not sufficient, as his residence must be bona fide, with no intention of returning to his parental home after completing his studies." 6

The constitution of 1870 made no provision for the exercise by women of the right to vote, but they have nevertheless been entitled to exercise this right to some extent since 1891. In that year the general assembly passed an act granting to women the privilege of voting at elections for any officer of schools under the general or special school laws of the state. In order to exercise this privilege, however, they must possess all the qualifications applying to men voting in such elections, namely, age, residence, citizenship, and registration. Thus, where an immigrant has not received his naturalization papers, his wife cannot vote at school elections, while, on the other hand, the wife of a foreign born son, made a citizen during his minority by his father's naturalization, thereby acquires the right to vote at such elections, if otherwise qualified. The act of 1891, granting women the right to vote at school elections was passed in pursuance of the constitutional mandate laid upon the general assembly to provide a system of free schools. In providing for such a system, the general assembly could in its discretion select such method of choosing school officers as

Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 46, section 66; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Illinois, 141 (142); Moffett v. Hill, 131 Illinois, 239. Under the constitution, "no elector shall be deemed to have lost his residence in this state by reason of his absence on business of the United States or of this state, or in the military or naval service of the United States." Article VII, section 4.

Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Illinois, 54 (55); Report of the Attorney-General, 1910, p. 864; 1912, p. 1261; 1913, p. 598; 1914, P. 985, 993.

Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 46, section 332; Collier v. Anlicker, 189 Illinois, 34; Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Illinois, 250.

it might deem proper, and the qualifications of those voting for school officers need not be the same as those of electors as defined by the constitution, except in the case of school officers named in the constitution. The only school officers so named are the state superintendent of public instruction and the county superintendent of schools, and, consequently, for these officers women cannot vote. The mere fact that women have the right under the act of 1891, to vote for school officers other than the two named in the constitution does not entitle them to vote upon propositions submitted at school elections, such as one for the establishment of a township high school. The provisions of the act of 1891 relating to woman suffrage were incorporated in the general revised school law of 1909; and under the latter law, women possessing the usual qualifications of voters were also made eligible to any office under the general or special school laws of the state.

8

The right of women to vote was further extended by an act of 1913, providing that all women having the usual age, residence, and citizenship qualifications should be allowed to vote at elections for presidential electors, the state board of equalization, clerk of the appellate court, county collector, county surveyor, members of board of assessors, board of review, sanitary district trustees; for all officers of cities, villages, and towns (except police magistrates); upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of such municipalities or other political divisions of the state; for the following township officers: supervisor, town clerk, assessor, collector, and highway commissioner; and they might also participate and vote in annual and special town meetings. This act has been upheld as constitutional in so far as it authorizes women to vote for the officers named, since the latter are within legisla

8 Plummer v. Yost, 144 Illinois, 68; People ex rel. v. English, 139 Illinois, 622; People v. Welsh, 70 Illinois Appellate, 641; Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 122, sections 269, 270.

9 Laws of 1913, p. 333. Since highway commissioners are not township officers in counties not under township organization, women do not have the right to vote for them in such counties. Report and Opinions of the Attorney-General, 1914, P. 519.

tive control, none of them being of constitutional origin. The right of women to vote under this act, however, is not quite as extensive as might appear on the face of the act. Thus women cannot vote for county collector in counties where this office is exercised ex officio by the sheriff or county treasurer since the latter officers are of constitutional origin. Again, women may not vote for the county commissioners of Cook county, who are constitutional officers, nor for the president of such board of commissioners, nor for a judge of a city court, since the manner of selecting this officer is indirectly indicated by the constitution. Moreover, limitations rest upon the right of women to vote upon certain propositions. Thus, women have no right, as a rule, to vote at referendum elections provided for in the constitution, such as upon a proposition for changing a county seat, or for the holding of a constitutional convention. Moreover, it has been held that women are not authorized, under the act of 1913, to vote upon the question of organizing a high school district, since school districts are not among the municipalities mentioned in the act and do not become political subdivisions of the state until after organization. Furthermore, it has been held that women are not entitled to vote for delegates to national nominating conventions or for party committeemen at primaries.10

As to the actual participation of women in the suffrage, it may be said that, in 1894, the number of women registered in Chicago was about 30,000 of whom about 24,000 voted. Ten years later the number registered was less than 2,000, of whom only about 1,000 voted. In 1909, in an election in which they could vote only for university trustees, 700 registered and less than 500 voted. This falling off in the registration and vote

10 Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 Illinois, 305; People ex rel. v. Czarnecki et al., 265 Illinois, 489; Franklin v. Westfall, 273 Illinois, 402; People ex rel. v. Peltier et al., 265 Illinois, 630; People ex rel. v. Militzer, 272 Illinois, 387; People ex rel. v. Byers, 271 Illinois, 600; Opinions of the Attorney-General, 1915, p. 307, 416, 861. The attorney-general has held that the mere fact that women have been made voters does not confer upon them the privilege of serving on juries. Report and Opinions of the Attorney-General, 1913, p. 655. On the other hand the attorneygeneral has held that a woman may hold the office of deputy sheriff. Ibid., 1914,

p. 1339.

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