ernment for assistance, but President Cleveland nevertheless sent troops into the state for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the United States in spite of the protest of the governor, who denounced the action of the president as a violation of the fundamental right of local self-government. The action of the president, however, was subsequently upheld by the supreme court of the United States.4 44

The governor is also the agent of the state in its dealings with other states in connection with the extradition of fugitives. When a person who is accused of having committed a crime in Illinois has escaped into another state, it is the duty of the governor of Illinois to make requisition upon the governor of the state to which the fugitive has fled to deliver him up. If he has escaped to a foreign country, the governor may call upon the secretary of state of the United States to make the request for the extradition upon the authorities of such foreign country. When a person accused of a crime in another state has escaped into Illinois, it is the duty of the governor of Illinois to give him up upon demand of the proper authority, of the other state. The governor, however, may first hold a hearing in order to satisfy himself as to the regularity of the proceedings, and if he deems it inexpedient to give the prisoner up, he cannot be compelled by legal process to do so.45

Under the constitution, the governor is authorized to grant pardons, reprieves, and commutations of sentence for all offenses against the state, whether felonies or misdemeanors. 46 The governor cannot pardon a person who is being tried for an offense against the state but must wait until after his conviction. The governor might even pardon a person after his release upon the expiration of the term for which he was sentenced, if new evidence conclusively proves his innocence. The effect of this is to restore to the ex-convict the rights of citizenship which he forfeited as a result of his conviction. A pardon

44 In re Debs, 158 United States, 564.

45 Report and Opinions of the Attorney-General, 1914, p. 158-159; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 Howard (United States), 66.

46 Article v, section 13.

under these circumstances, however, would be a rather empty consolation, but the state makes no general provision for indemnity in such cases, which, on the whole, seldom occur.

The exercise by the governor of the pardoning power is subject to such regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying therefore. The legislature has provided that application shall be made to the governor by petition in writing giving the facts of the case and the reasons why the petition should be granted, accompanied by statements of the judge and prosecuting attorney who figured in the case, and a notice of the application shall be published in a newspaper of the county where the conviction was had.47 These provisions are intended to prevent ex parte proceedings and to bring to light all facts bearing on the case. Prior to 1897 governors were much burdened with the consideration of applications for pardon, and in some cases perhaps yielded unwisely to the entreaties of friends of convicts. Governor Altgeld especially was severely criticized for alleged undue and excessive exercise of the pardoning power. Among those whom he pardoned were certain so-called anarchists who had participated in the Haymarket riot of 1886. A double lynching which occurred at Danville in 1895 was said to have been inspired by the fear that the governor might pardon the prisoners.48 In his first regular message to the general assembly, Governor Tanner recommended the creation of a board of pardons in order to assist the governor in the exercise of the power and to remedy some of the abuses that had grown up in connection with it.49 Accordingly by an act of 1897, the legislature created the state board of pardons, composed of three members appointed by the governor and senate. The manner of applying for pardons since the creation of this board is much the same as before except that the notice of application is addressed to the board and the petition for pardon is filed with the board instead of with the governor. The board holds hearings on ap47 Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 104a, sections 1 and 2.

48 Chicago Tribune, May 28, 1895.

49 Senate Journal, 1897, p. 173.

I

plications for pardons or commutations and makes a report on each case to the governor accompanied by the conclusions and recommendations of the board. Such recommendations, however, have merely advisory force and the governor may disregard them if he sees fit. The governor is ordinarily too much occupied with other business to give personal attention to each case, and therefore usually follows the recommendations of the board. By an act of 1899, the board was given the further power of passing upon the cases of prisoners who desire to be released on parole. In order to avoid encroachment upon the governor's constitutional power of pardon, the final release of the prisoners is made to depend upon the approval of the governor.50 By the consolidation act of 1917, the state board of pardons is abolished and its powers and functions are transferred to the newly created state department of public welfare.51 The introduction of the parole and probation systems in Illinois has reduced the necessity for the frequent exercise by the governor of his power of pardon or commutation. The governor may sometimes exercise his power of pardon, commutation or reprieve for some ulterior purpose. Thus Governor Dunne granted a reprieve to a man sentenced to be hanged for murder in Jackson county, not because there was any doubt as to his guilt but with the object of securing from the sheriff in charge definite assurance that the execution would be carried out in as orderly, decent, and private a manner as practicable.

Among the miscellaneous functions of the governor is that of presiding over the state canvassing board which meets to canvass the votes for United States senators, representatives in congress, and in the state legislature and for various state officers. Upon the governor is also laid the ministerial duty of issuing certificates of election and announcing by proclamation the results of the canvass. If the governor, however, fails to perform such duty, he cannot be compelled by mandamus to do

50 Report and Opinions of the Attorney-General, 1914, p. 440-443; Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 38, section 502; People v. Nowasky, 254 Illinois, 146. 51 Laws of 1917, p. 27.

SO. 52

The governor is also ex officio a member of the state primary canvassing board, and of various other boards.

The result of an election for the uniting of counties is also set forth in a proclamation of the governor. Under the seventeenth amendment to the constitution of the United States the governor may cause vacancies in the representation of Illinois in the United States senate to be filled by popular election, or may by law be authorized to fill them by temporary appointments. In the case of vacancies in some state elective offices, such as judges of the state supreme or circuit courts, the governor may cause them to be filled either by issuing writs of election or by making appointments, according to whether the unexpired portion of the term is more or less than one year in length. Other vacancies, such as in the state legislature and in the lower house of congress can be filled only by writ of election issued by the governor.53

Under the charter of the Illinois Central railroad, the governor is made a sort of state railroad commissioner with reference to this company through his power to pass upon the correctness of the accounts of the railroad in order to determine the amount of the seven per cent gross receipts tax. In a special message to the legislature in January, 1907, Governor Deneen attacked the railroad company on the ground that important items of income had not been included in the company's report of gross receipts. At the governor's instigation a suit was started by the attorney-general which resulted in a decision by the supreme court requiring the railroad company to give a proper accounting.54

52 Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 46, section 78; People ex. rel. v. Dunne, 258 Illinois, 441; Opinions of the Attorney-General, 1915, p. 459.

53 Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 46, sections 129, 130, and 131. The governor is also empowered to approve the bonds of certain state officers.

54 Private Laws of 1851, p. 71; State v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 246 Illinois, 188.

XI. STATE OFFICERS, BOARDS, AND COMMIS

SIONS

TATE officers, in general, are those whose duties are coTATE, general, are

STA

extensive with the state, and they are thus distinguished from county and local officers.1 On account of the requirement that appropriations for the pay of members and officers of the general assembly and for the salaries of the officers of the government shall contain no provision on any other subject, it becomes a question of practical importance to distinguish between officers and employees.2 In the language of the constitution, "An office is a public position created by the Constitution or law, continuing during the pleasure of the appointing power, or for a fixed time, with a successor elected or appointed. An employment is an agency, for a temporary purpose, which ceases when that purpose is accomplished." The legislature has equal power to create offices and employments, and to provide for the method of filling them, where this is not prescribed by the constitution. The constitution provides that no person shall be eligible to any lucrative office under the state, who at the same time holds a seat in the general assembly, nor to any office of profit or trust in the state who has been convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crimes or who, as collector or holder of public moneys, has failed to make proper accounting therefor. The general assembly may itself appoint employees, but cannot appoint or elect officers.*

Next in rank to the governor among state officers stands

1 Evans v. People, 247 Illinois, 547; but see City of Chicago v. Wright, 69 Illinois, 318.

2 Constitution, article IV, section 16.

3 Constitution, article v, section 24; see also Fergus v. Russel, 270 Illinois, 304. The distinction made by the court, however, is difficult of practical applica

tion.

4 Constitution, article IV, section 3, 4, article v, section 10,