might be better to require that the governor should secure and avail himself of the advice of the senate, but not to require him to act upon it, so that the whole responsibility for the final decision may rest upon his shoulders.

Any power of supervision over state boards and commissions which the governor's power of appointing their members enabled him to exercise has been seriously impeded by the multiplicity and lack of systematic organization of such agencies. This difficulty, however, has been in large degree remedied by the consolidation act of 1917, organizing most of the agencies into nine executive departments, each under a director appointed by the governor and senate for four-year terms, subject to the power of the governor to remove them for cause. Some of these directors take places previously occupied by boards, and the power of the governor is consequently increased because his power of appointment is no longer subject to the virtual limitation which the rule of gradual renewal of the membership of boards entails. Some administrative and advisory boards are retained in the consolidation act, but the governor's power over them is increased by the absence of any requirement for minority representation on them.

The power of appointment, in and by itself, confers upon the governor no legal power of control over his appointees after they have assumed office. This difficulty, however, is to some extent overcome by provisions conferring upon the governor some power of suspension in office and of removal from office. Thus the officers of the executive departments and of all the public institutions of the state are required to make regular biennial reports to the governor to be transmitted by him to the general assembly. Such officers are also required to make to the governor a semiannual report of all moneys received and disbursed by them. Furthermore, the governor may at any time require from such officers information, in writing and under oath, upon any subject relating to their duties.35 Thus, shortly after his inauguration, Governor Low35 Constitution, article v, sections 20, 21.

den sent a letter to each of the numerous commissions, bureaus, and departments asking for information as to the funds available and the expenditures to be made until the end of the fiscal year.36 In case any such reports should disclose an unsatisfactory condition in the management of a particular office, the governor may attempt to remedy such condition either by admonition and advice to the delinquent officer, or by bringing the full light of publicity to bear upon the facts. An officer who makes a false report of his receipts and disbursements is declared to be guilty of perjury and subject to appropriate penalties.

Aside from his legal powers, the governor may by his personal influence exercise some supervision over the state departments and institutions. Thus, Governor Deneen in 1905 instructed officials of state institutions that the payrolls must be gone over carefully and the pruning knife used so as to reduce expenses and to weed out incompetents and employees whose services in the institutions were not actually required. In the following year, the governor took a personal hand in directing the activities of the state food commission, and by his direct orders the state analyst made a tour for the purpose of studying the pure food laws in operation in other states. 37 In the case, however, of the constitutional elective state officers, the power of the governor to require reports is, in practice, of little value in enabling him to supervise them in the performance of their duties. They are practically equal to, and independent of, the governor, and the necessity under which he rests of remaining on terms of amity with them would ordinarily prevent him from requiring from them any reports other than those which they voluntarily submit.

Finally, in order to improve the conduct of administrative offices, the governor may remove any officer subject to appointment by him for certain specified causes, viz., incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.38 This provision rep36 Chicago Tribune, January 11, 1917. 37 Ibid., March 23, 1905, March 16, 1906. 38 Constitution, article v, section 12.

resents an honest effort on the part of the constitutional convention to render the power of the governor to some extent commensurate with his responsibility and probably has a more important influence than any other single provision toward making the governor the real, instead of merely the nominal, head of the administration. Under the existing method of selecting the heads of the state executive departments and the system of decentralized enforcement of state law, however, the governor cannot fully assume the position of real head of the administration by virtue of his power of removing his appointees. This provision of the constitution should therefore be strengthened at least to the extent of giving the governor power to remove any state executive officer, whether elective or appointive.

The fact, however, that the constitution confers upon the governor the power of removing such officers as he may appoint does not absolutely exclude him from the power of removing elective officers, provided the latter power is specifically conferred upon him by the legislature. Thus, by an act of 1905, the power was conferred upon the governor to declare, by proclamation, the office of any sheriff to be vacant whenever a prisoner is taken from his custody and lynched.39 In 1909 a mob lynched a prisoner which it had taken from the sheriff of Alexander county. In accordance with the statute, the governor issued his proclamation declaring the office vacant. Under the statute the governor might reinstate the sheriff if the latter could show that he had done all in his power to protect his prisoner. In this case, however, the sheriff was unable to show this to the satisfaction of the governor, who accordingly sent a notice of the vacancy to the county board, who thereupon appointed a successor. The deposed sheriff contested the legality of the governor's action, but, when the case was carried to the supreme court, the latter upheld the constitutionality of the statute and the validity of the governor's action under it. 40 It is to be noted, however, that the gov

39 Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 38, section 256x. 40 People v. Nellis, 249 Illinois, 12.

ernor's power of removing the sheriff is narrowly limited so that it can be exercised only under circumstances which seldom arise.

The constitutional power of the governor to remove his appointees is as above indicated, apparently limited to those cases, where such appointees are guilty of "incompetency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." The constitution, however, provides no method whereby the governor shall determine the existence of the specified causes of removal, nor does it declare whether the governor's action in removing an officer shall be final and conclusive or subject to judicial review. These points, however, have been cleared up by the supreme court. The governor undertook to remove the West Chicago park commissioners and to appoint their successors without bringing any charges against the incumbents or giving them a hearing. The supreme court held that the governor's power of removal applied both to officers who were appointed by the governor with the approval of the senate and also to officers, such as the park commissioners, who were appointed by the governor alone. The court also held that, when exercising his power of removal, the governor may adopt such method of ascertaining the existence of the specified causes of removal as he sees fit, and consequently no written charges or formal trial are required by law. Moreover, the court held that the governor's action is final and not subject to review by the courts.41 Although the governor is not, therefore, compelled to give a hearing to the officers whose removal he contemplates, he nevertheless may, and sometimes does, as a matter of courtesy, accord it.

Among the special functions which the governor performs is that of acting as commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the state, except when they are called into the service of the United States. In exercising this power the governor ordinarily acts through the adjutant general, who is appointed by him. Although appointed by the governor, the ad41 Wilcox v. People, 90 Illinois, 186.

jutant general is not subject to removal by him, but only by court-martial. The governor may, by proclamation, require the enrollment of the unorganized, or reserve, militia.42 The purposes for which the militia may be called out are specified in the constitution, viz., "to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasion." These phrases are sufficiently broad to cover practically every sort of emergency which might necessitate the use of the militia. Whether the occasion requires the calling out of the militia is a question of which the governor is practically the sole judge, and he may act entirely on his own initiative and responsibility. In practice, however, he usually waits until he receives a request for assistance from the sheriff, states attorney, mayor, or other law-enforcing officer. The most frequent use of the militia has been to disperse mobs which are attempting to take the law into their own hands, and, within recent years, to maintain order during disturbance incident to strikes and lockouts. In the administrations of both Governors Deneen and Dunne, an urgent public demand arose that the governor should call out the militia to enforce the Sunday closing statute, which was notoriously disregarded in certain cities. The attorney-general in both administrations, however, held that no such duty rested upon the governor, but that the responsibility rested upon the local officers, who, if derelict, should be removed in the manner provided by law. 43

The governor ordinarily carries on such relations as exist between the state and other states or the government of the United States. If, during the recess of the general assembly, an insurrection or other disorder arise in the state which the militia is unable to cope with, it is the duty of the governor to call upon the United States government for assistance to meet the emergency. In 1894, during the Chicago railroad strike, Governor Altgeld declined to call upon the United States gov

42 Constitution, article v, section 14, article XII, section 3; Hurd's Revised Statutes, chapter 129, sections 3, 118.

48 Report of the Attorney-General, 1906, p. 56, 371-372; Opinions of the Attorney-General, 1915, p. 78-81.