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of his subjects. Religion discovers to us a merciful God; a wicked man may embrace religion on this account, for the sake of calming those fears which his vicious practices excite, by ideas of divine mercy. The same may be said of other men. A man cannot conclude then, that he is a believer from his performance of virtuous actions, common to believers and unbelievers. He must have peculiar light into the deep depravity of his own heart; he must be placed, at least in design, in circumstances that distinguish a good from a bad man.

conscience, as St. Paul words it, 2 Tim. ii. 17. We have seen some like Demas, after they had adhered awhile to the truth, forsake it, having loved this present world, as the same apostle speaks, chap. iv. 10. We have seen people, after they have escaped the pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, again entangled therein, and overcome, as St. Peter says, 2 Epist. ii. 20. We have seen Christians, in appearance of the highest order, who, after they had been once enlightened, and had tasted of the heavenly gift, and had tasted the good word of God, and the powers Again when we say a believer can never of the world to come, fall away, Heb. vi. 4. cease to believe, we do not mean to say, a We have seen Judases, who after they had Christian attached to religion only by exterbeen in the sacred college of Jesus Christ, nal performances, and by appearances of pishamefully betray him. While our know-ety, can never cast off his profession. The ledge is so small, and our virtue so feeble, we have great reason to apply these examples, and to tremble for ourselves.

The third argument by which we establish the doctrine of assurance, and which also militates against carnal security, is Christian prerogative. Two propositions are contained in it. First, We may be persuaded that we have true faith Next, We may be sure true faith will be assisted to persevere. These propositions which assure the believer, ought to alarm a nominal Christian.

Here let us develope an ambiguity too common in our churches. For as we affirm, on the one side, that a believer has characters proper to himself; and by which he may determine his state; and as, on the other side, we assert, that they who have these characters, can never cease to be true believers; a nominal Christian may imagine the following sophism: I fast, I pray, I give alms; these are the virtues of a believer; I may then persuade myself, that I am a believer. Now, it seems he who once becomes a true be liever, can never cease to believe; consequently, I who have fasted, prayed, and given alms, can never cease to be a believer. What is still more astonishing, this ridiculous reasoning is often applied to others as well as to ourselves. A loose casuist asks his penitent, Do you repent of your sins? The penitent answers, I do repent. Have you recourse to the divine clemency? The penitent replies, I have recourse to it. Do you embrace the satisfaction of Christ? The penitent says, I do embrace it. On this slight foundation our casuist builds his system. Publications of grace are lavished, sources of mercy pour forth in abundance, and the penitent may, if he please, take his seat in heaven. My God! in what a manner they enter into the spirit of thy gospel! But first. when we affirm, that only the true believer can perform acts of faith, and that the least good work supposes regeneration: we do not affirm, that there are not many actions common to both real and nominal Christians. A nominal Christian may pray, a nominal Christian may fast, a nominal Christian may give alms It may even happen that men may embrace religion on base principles Religion com sands a subject to obey his king; a king may em brace religion on this account, and he inay place his supreme happiness in the obedience

finest appearances of piety, the greatest knowledge, the most liberal alms-deeds, the most profound humiliations, may be succeeded by foul and fatal practices.

Moreover, great knowledge, generous cha rity, profound humiliation, will aggravate the condemnation of those who cease to proceed in virtue, and to purify their motives of action; because the performance of these virtues, and the acquisition of this great knowledge, suppose greater aid, and more resistance. Hear St. Peter: It had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they have known it to turn from the holy commandment,' 2 Epist. ii. 21. The case of those who commit the unpardonable sin, attests the same. Hear these thundering words: If we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful lookingfor of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries,' Heb. x. 26.

Finally,The argument from the testimony of the Spirit of God for the assurance of a true believer, ought to trouble the security of a nominal Christian. In effect, how does the Holy Spirit work in our hearts: Does he operate by magic? Does he present phantoms to our view? Does he inculcate propositions contrary to truth? This is all enthu siasm. The Holy Spirit bears witness in us in a manner conformable to our state and to the nature of things in general. If then the Spirit of God testify in your hearts while you are unregenerate, he will testify that you are unregenerate. If he bear witness while you are nominal Christians, he will bear witness that you are nominal Christians. If he bear witness while your faith is doubtful, he will bear witness to the doubtfulness of your faith Such a testimony may be ascribed to the Spirit of God. But an assurance of salvation, which exceeds your evidences of Christianity, must be a vision, a fancy, a dream: and to suppose the Holy Spirit the author of uch an assurance, is to suppose in the same Spirit testimony against testimony; it is to

ake the Spirit of God · divided against himself, Matt. xii. 26, and so a destroyer of his own kingdom, it is to make his testimony in the heart contradict his testimony in Scripture In Scripture he declares, No man can serve two masters. chap. vi. 24; in your hearts he declares, A man may serve two masters. In

Scripture he attests, There is no concord between Christ and Belial,' 2 Cor. vi. 15; in your hearts he attests, There is concord between Christ and Belial. In Scripture he affirms, 'Neither fornicators, nor covetous, nor revilers, shall inherit the kingdom of God,' 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; in your hearts he affirms, Such shall inherit the kingdom of God. Thus the four arguments, that prove the doctrine of assurance in favour of true believers, destroy the security of a mere nominal Chris

tian.

through all the clouds which Satan uses to conceal heaven from the Christian eye, to lay all the ghosts, that the enemy of souls raises to haunt mankind into terror; a man who rests on that 'word of God, which standeth for ever, even when heaven and earth pass away, may say with St. Paul, I am persuaded;' such a man may assure himself that only glorified spirits enjoy a happiness superior to his; he is arrived at the highest degree of felicity, to which in this valley of

tears men can come.

But to consider religion always on the comhaving obtained the end before we have made use of the means; to stretch the hands to receive the crown of righteousness, before they have been employed to fight the battle; to be content with a false peace, and to use no efforts to obtain the graces, to which true consolation is annexed; this is a dreadful calm, like that which some voyagers describe, and which is a very singular forerunner of a very terrible event. All on a sudden, in the wide ocean, the sea becomes calm, the surface of the water clear as crystal, smooth as glass, the air serene; the unskilled passenger becomes tranquil and happy; but the old mariner trembles. In an instant the waves froth, the winds murmur, the heavens kindle, a thousand gulfs open, a frightful light inflames the air, and every wave threatens sudden death. This is an image of most men's assurance of salvation.

The consolations which arise from the doctrine of assurance, are not then for all Chris-fortable side; to congratulate one's self for tians indifferently. They are only for those who continually study obedience; they are for those only who have seen into a heart deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked, Jer. xvii. 9, and have found even there marks of regeneration; they are for those only, who, by a life entirely devoted to the service of God, have domonstrated that they bear the characters of his children. Is this your condition? The sophisms of sin that we have endeavoured to refute, these portraits of rash confidence, these false titles of virtue and regeneration, these images that we have traced, whence have we taken them? Have we gathered them from books? have we invented them in our closets? have we derived them from the study of theology? have we drawn them from monuments of ancient history? No, no, we have learnt them in the world, in the church, in your families, in your sick beds, where nothing is so cominon as this false peace, nothing so rare as

the true.

Whence the evil comes, I know not: but the fact is certain. Of all the churches in the world, there are none which abuse the doctrine of Christian assurance, and which draw consequences from it directly contrary to those which ought to be drawn, like some of ours. We lull ourselves into a fanciful confidence: we place on imaginary systems an assurance which ought to be found ed only on the rock of ages; we scruple, even while we are engaged in the most criminal habits, to say, we doubt of our salvation; and, as if a persuasion of being saved, dispensed with the necessity of working out our salvation, we consider an assurance of arriving at heavenly felicity as a privilege, that supplies the want of every virtue.

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Certainly nothing is more great and happy than the disposition of a man who courageously expects to enjoy a glory to which he has a just title. A man who knows the misery of sin; a man who groans under the weight of his own depravity, and enters into the sentiment, while he utters the language, of the apostle, O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death Rom. vii. 24; a man, who, after he had experienced the terrible agitations of a conscience distressed on account of sin, has been freed from all his sins at the foot of the cross, has put on the yoke of Christ his Lord; a man, who having seen in himself the true characters of a Christian, and the never failing graces annexed to evangelical mercy, has learned at length to pierce

So then, instead of applying the words of our text to a great number of you, we are obliged to shed tears of compassion over you. Yes, we must lament your misery. You live under an economy in which the most transporting joys are set before you, and you wilfully deprive yourselves of them. Yes, we must adopt the language of a prophet, O that my people had hearkened unto me!' We must say with Jesus Christ, If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! Ps. lxxx. 13; Luke xix. 42.

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What can be happier, amidst the numberless vanities and vexations which accompany worldly pleasures, than to be able to derive from an assurance of our salvation pleasures suitable to intelligent creatures, immortal souls? What can be happier, amidst all the pains, labours, and miseries, with which life abounds, than to enjoy the plentiful consolations, that issue from a well-grounded hope of eternal felicity? Above all, what can be more capable of supporting us against the fear of death? Mortal and dying as we are, in a state, where the smallest alteration in the body reminds us of death, what can we wish for more conformable to our wants than to find, in a firm hope of eternal felicity, a shield to secure us against the enemy, and a sword to destroy him? let us strive, let us pray, let us venture all, my brethren, to arrive at this happy state. And if, after we have believingly and sincerely laboured in this good work, there remain any doubt and suspicion, let us assure ourselves, that even our suspicions and fears shall contribute to our confirmation. They will not be account

340

JUDGMENT.

ed crimes, they will at most be only frailties; the conscience. So be it. To God be hon-
they will be infirmities productive of motives our and glory. Amen.
[SER. XXXVIII.
to go on in virtue, and to establish peace in!

SERMON XXXVIII.

JUDGMENT.

HEBREWS ix. 27.

It is appointed unto men once to die: but after this the judgment.

terror into the first.

THE second proposition in my text conveys hath appointed a day, in the which he will
31. Whatever difference there may seem to
judge the world in righteousness,' Acts. xvii.
be between these two hypotheses, it is easy to
harmonize them.
will be a confirmation and a consummation of
each particular judgment, and we ought to
The general judgment
consider both as different parts of one whole.

makes death terrible. I own, it is natural to
Judgment to come
love life. The Creator, it should seem, has
supplied the want of satisfactory pleasures
in the world, by giving us, I know not what,
attachment to it. But when reason rises out
of nature, when the good and evil of life are
weighed, evil seems to outweigh good, and
we can hardly help exclaiming with the wise
man, 'The day of death is better than the day
of one's birth! I hate life because of the work
that is wrought under the sun!' Eccles. vii.
1, and ii. 17.

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But to go from a bed of infirmity to a tribunal of justice; to look through the languors of a mortal malady to torments that have no end; and, after we have heard this sentence, Return to destruction, ye children of men,' Ps. xc. 3, to hear this other, Give an account of thy stewardship,' Luke xvi. 2, these are just causes for intelligent beings to fear death.

Let us, however, acknowledge, although this fear is just, yet it may be excessive; and, though it be madness to resist the thought, yet it would be weakness to be overwhelmed with it. I would prove this to-day, while in this point of light I endeavour to exhibit to your view the judgment that follows death. We will not divert your attention from the chief design. the proposition in the text is incidental, and We will only hint, that not immediately connected with the principal subject, which the apostle was discussing. His design was to show the pre-eminence of the sacrifice of the cross over all those of the Levitical economy. One article, which argues the superiority of the first, is, that it was offered but once, whereas the Jewish sacrifices were reiterated. does not offer himselfoften, as the high-priest entereth into the holy place every year with Christ the blood of other sacrifices: but once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. For, 'as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment; so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many.'

Nor will we detain you longer by inquiring whether St. Paul speaks here of the particular judgment that each man undergoes immediately after death, or of that general judgment day, of which Scripture says, God

your attention from the principal design of
this discourse. I am going first, not to al-
Once more I repeat it, we will not divert
lege arguments in proof of a judgment to
come, Isuppose them known to you, and that
ing to assist you to carry them farther than
you usually do, and so to guard you against
I am not preaching to novices: but I am go
skepticism and infidelity, the pest of our days,
and the infamy of our age. In a second arti-
cle, we will inquire, what will be the destiny
of this assembly in that great day, in which
God will declare the doom of all mankind.
We discuss this question, not to indulge &
ences, and particularly to moderate the ex-
cessive fear, that an object so very terrible
vain curiosity but to derive practical infer-
produces in some minds, and at the same
time to trouble the extravagant security in
which some sleep, in spite of sounds so proper
to awake them.

The first regards the arguments for judg-
I. We have three directions to give you.
second regards that which is taken from con-
ment taken from the disorders of society. The
science. The third, that which is taken from
revelation.

ment taken from the disorders of society. Do
not confine your attention to those disorders
1. Our first direction regards the arga-
which strike the senses, astonish reason, and
subvert faith itself. Reflect on other irre-
shocking to sense, and seemingly of much
less consequence, are yet no less deserving
gularities, which, although they are less
the attention of the Judge of the whole earth,
and require, no less than the first, a future
judgment.

human laws cannot repress, afford proof of a I grant, those notorious disorders, which gibbet a poor unhappy man, whom the pain of hunger, and the frightful apprehension of future judgment. A tyrant executes on a sudden death, forced to break open a house. Here, if you will, disorder is punished, and society is satisfied. But who shall satisfy

the just vengeance of Society on this mad tyrant? This very tyrant, at the head of a hun dred thousand thieves, ravages the whole world; he pillages on the right and on the left; he violates the most sacred rights, the most solemn treaties; he knows neither religion nor good faith. Go, see, follow his steps, countries desolated, plains covered with the bodies of the dead, palaces reduced to ashes, and people run mad with despair. Inquire for the author of all these miseries. Will you find him, think you, confined in a dark dungeon, or expiring on a wheel? Lo! he sits on a throne, in a superb royal palace; nature and art contribute to his pleasures; a circle of courtiers minister to his passions, and erect altars to him, whose equals in iniquity, yea, if I may be allowed to say so, whose inferiors in vice, have justly suffered the most infamous punishments. And where is divine justice all this time? what is it doing? I answer with my text, After death comes judgment. So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty,' James i. 12.

But, though the argument taken from the disorders of society is full and clear, when it is properly proposed, yet such examples as we have just mentioned do not exhaust it. It may be extended a great deal farther, and we may add thousands of disorders, which every day are seen in society, against which men can make no laws, and which cannot be redressed until the great day of judgment, when God will give clear evidence of all.

Have men made laws against cowards? 1 do not mean cowardice in war; the infamy that follows this crime, is a just punishment of it. I speak of that mean cowardice of soul, which makes a man forsake an oppressed innocent sufferer, and keep a criminal silence in regard to the oppressor. Pursue this train of thought, and you will every where find arguments for a future judgment; because there will every where appear disorders, which establish the necessity of it.

Our second direction regards the argument taken from conscience. Let not your faith be shaken by the examples of those pretended superior geniuses, who boast of having freed themselves from this restraint. Tell them, if they have no conscience, they ought to have; and affirm, the truer their pretensions, the stronger your reason for taxing them with rage and extravagance There is no better mode of destroying an objection than by proving, that he who proposes and admits it is a fool for admitting and propos ing it. If, then, I prove that a man, who, to demonstrate that conscience is a fancy, declares, he is entirely exempt from it; if I prove, that such a man is a fool for proposing and admitting this proposition, shall I not subvert his whole system? Now I think I am able to prove such a man a fool, and you will admit the truth of what I say, if you will give a little attention to the nature of conscience, a little closer attention, I mean, than is usually given to sermons.

What is conscience? It is difficult to include an adequate idea of it in a definition. This appears to me at once the most general and the most exact: Conscience is that faculty of our minds, by which we are able to distinguish right from wrong, and to know whether we neglect our duties, or discharge them.

Have human laws ever been made against hypocrites? see that man artfully covering himself with the veil of religion, that hypocrite, who excels in his art! behold his eyes, what seraphical looks they roll towards heaven! observe his features, made up, if I may venture to s of those of Moses, Ezra, Daniel, and iah! see his vivacity, or his flaming zeat I call it? to maintain There are, I grant, some operations of conthe doctrines of repn, to forge thunder- science, which seem to be rather instinct bolts, and to pour out anathemas against he- and sentiment than cool judgment arising retics! Not one grain of religion, not the from a train of reflections. Yet, we believe, least shadow of piety, in all his whole con- all the operations of conscience proceed from versation. It is a party spirit, or a sordid in- judgment and reflection. But it sometimes terest, or a barbarous disposition to revenge, happens, that the judgment of the mind is so which animates him, and produces all his ready, and its reflections so rapid, that it pretended piety. And yet I hear every body hardly sees what it judges, and reflects on, so exclaim, He is a miracle of religion! he is that it seems to act by instinct and sentiment. a pillar of the church! I see altars every only. Thus when the mind compares two where erecting to this man; panegyrists, I simple numbers together, the comparison is see, are composing his encomium; flowers so easily made, that we think we know the are gathering to be strewed over his tomb. difference by a kind of instinct belonging to And the justice of God, what is it doing? My our nature; whereas when we compare comtext tells you, After death comes judg-plex numbers, we feel, so to speak, that our

ment.'

6

minds inquire, examine, and labour. In like Have human laws ever been made against manner in morality. There are some duties, the ungrateful? While I was in prosperity, I the right of which is so clear and palpable; studied to procure happiness to a man, who and there are some conditions, in which we, seemed entirely devoted to me; I was hap- ourselves, are in regard to these duties which pier in imparting my abundance to him than are so easy to be known, that the mind inin enjoying it myself; during that delightful stantly perceives them without examination period of my life he was faithful to me: but and discussion. But there are some duties, when fortune abandoned me, and adopted him, the right of which is so enveloped in obscu he turned his back on me; now he suffers merity; and there are some stations, which are to languish in poverty; and, far from relieving my wants, he does not deign so much as to examine them. And divine justice, where is it? who shall punish this black crime? 1 answer again,' After death comes judgment.'

so very doubtful, that the mind requires great efforts of meditation before it can determine itself. For example, Ought a subject to obey his lawful sovereign? On this question, the mind instantly takes the affir

mative side, on account of the clearness of the duty, and it seems to act by instinct, and without reflection. But here is another question, Is it lawful for subjects to dethrone a tyrant? Here the mind pauses, and before it determines enters into long discussions, and here we perceive, it acts by judgment and reflection. In both cases reflection and judgment are the ground of its operations. In the first case judgment is more rapid, reflection less slow but it is reflection how ever. We have, then, rightly defined conscience, that faculty of our souls, by which we are capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and of knowing whether we neglect our duties, or discharge them.

But this is too vague, we must go farther. We must examine the principles on which we ground our judgment of ourselves in regard to right and wrong. We must prove, by the nature of these principles, the truth of what we have affirmed; that is, that a man, who calls conscience a fancy, and who boasts of an entire freedom from it, is a fool for admitting and proposing this objection.

The judgment that constitutes the nature of conscience, is founded on three principles, either fully demonstrable or barely probable. First, I am in a state of dependance. Second, There is a supreme law; or what is the same thing, there is something right, and something wrong.

Third, I am either innocent or guilty. On these three principles an intelligent spirit grounds a judgment, whether it deserves to be happy or miserable; it rejoices, if it deserves to be happy; it mourns, if it deserves to be miserable; and this judgment, and this joy, or sorrow, which results from it, constitutes what we call conscience.

But that which deserves particular regard, and in which partly consists the force of our reasoning, is, that it is not necessary to be able to demonstrate these principles, in order to prove, that conscience is not a fancy; if they be probable, it is sufficient. We cannot reasonably free ourselves from conscience, till we have demonstrated the falsehood of these principles, and proved that the consequences drawn from them are chimerical. For, if these principles be only probable; if it be probable I may be happy, I have some reason to rejoice; as I have some reason for uneasiness if my misery be probable. If the enjoyment of a great benefit be probable, I have some reason for great pleasure; and I have some reason for extreme distress, if it be probable, that I shall fall into extreme misery. It is not necessary, therefore, in order to es tablish the empire of conscience, that the principles on which it is founded should be demonstrable; it is sufficient that they are probable. Now I affirm, that every man who maintains the improbability of these principles, and the vanity of the consequences that are drawn from them, is a fool and a madman, whose obstinate attachment to vice has blinded his eyes, and turned his brain. Consequently I affirm, that every man who maintains that conscience is a fancy, and who boasts of having shaken off the restraint of it,

is a fool and a madman.

Take the first principle. I am in a state of dependance. I am subject to a Supreme

Being, to whom I owe my existence, and who holds my destiny in his mighty hands. Do we exceed the truth when we say, a man who ventures to affirm this principle is neither demonstrable nor probable, is a madman and a fool? I told you at the beginning of this discourse, that I intended to speak to you, not as scholars and novices: but as wellinformed Christians, who have made some considerable progress in the knowledge of those truths which equally support natural and revealed religion. But if you have any just notion of these truths, how can you form any other opinion of these men, of whom I am speaking, than that which I have formed? A man who pretends that arguments drawn from the order of seasons, from the arrangements of the various parts of the universe, from the harmony of the members of our bodies, and all the other works of nature, by which we have so often established the doctrine of the being and attributes of God; a man who affirms, that all these demonstrate nothing; what am I saying? a man who affirms that all these prove nothing; what am I saying again? a man who affirms that all these do not afford the least degree of probability in favour of the existence and perfections of a Supreme Being; who for his part is sure, for he has evidence to a demonstration, that all these originated in chance, and were not formed by the intervention of any intelligent cause; such a man, what is he but a madman and a fool? and consequently, is it not madness and folly to deny this first principle, I am in a state of dependance?

Try the second principle, There is a supreme law, or, what comes to the same, there is something just, and something unjust. Whether this just and right be founded in the nature of things, or whether it proceeds from the will of a superior Being, is not needful to examine now; be it as it may, there is a supreme law, there is something right and something wrong. A man who pretends that this proposition is evidently false; a man who affirms, that all arguments brought in favour of this proposition are evidently false; a man who forms such an idea of all arguments drawn from the nature of intelligent beings, from the perfections of a first cause, from the laws that he has given, and which constitute the body of religion; a man who pretends, that all these argnments do not afford the least degree of probability, that a wise man ought to infer nothing from them to direct his life: and that for his part, it is clear to a demonstration to him, that what is called just and unjust, right and wrong, is indifferent in itself, and indifferent to the first cause: that it is perfectly indifferent in itself whether we love a benefactor, or betray him, whether we be faithful to a friend or perfidious, whether we be tender parents or cruel, whether we nourish our children or smother them in the cradle; and that all these things at the most, relate only to a present interest; a man who advances such propositions, what is he but a fool and a madman? Is it necessary to reason to discover the extravagance and madness of these positions. Is it

not sufficient to name them?

Take the third principle. . . . But, it is enough to have pointed out the most proper

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