93. Popular Election of Senators in Oregon

The law of Oregon (1904) made the following provisions for the nomination and election of United States Senators by popular vote. It will be noted that the Constitution then provided that the state legislature should elect; and, to secure the legislative approval of the popular choice, Oregon adopted the plan of permitting the candidates for the state legislature to pledge themselves in advance to vote for the candidate for United States Senator receiving the highest popular vote. This law is now of historical interest chiefly, in view of the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment.

of party

candidates

At all general primary nominating elections next preceding the Nomination election of a senator in Congress by the legislature of Oregon there shall be placed upon the official primary nominating election ballots, by each of the county clerks and clerks of the county court, the names of all candidates for the office of senator in Congress, for whose nominations petitions have been duly made and filed under the provisions of this law, the votes for which candidates shall be counted and certified to by the election judges and clerks in the same manner as the votes for other candidates; and records of the vote for such candidates shall be made out and sworn to by the board of canvassers of each county of the State and returned to the Secretary of State at the same time and in like manner as they shall transmit other records and returns required by this law.

At all general elections next preceding the election of a senator in Congress by the legislature of Oregon there shall be placed upon the official ballot by each of the county clerks and clerks of the county court the names of all candidates for the office of senator in Congress that have been nominated in any of the methods now, or which may hereafter be, provided by law for the nomination of state officers of the State of Oregon; the votes for which candidates shall be counted and certified to by the election judges in the same manner as the votes for other candidates; and records of the vote for such candidates shall be made out and sworn to by the board of canvassers of each county of the State and returned to the

O

Popular vote on the party candidates.

How senatorial politics disturbs state legislatures.

Secretary of State, who shall transmit duplicate copies of such returns to the legislative assembly at its next ensuing session, one of which shall be addressed to the senate and the other to the house of representatives of the State of Oregon, one copy of which shall be delivered by him to the president of the senate and the other to the speaker of the house of representatives, after the organization of such bodies, which officers shall open and lay the same before the separate houses when assembled to elect a senator in Congress as now required by law of Congress; and it shall be the duty of each house to count the votes and announce the candidate for senator having the highest number, and thereupon the house shall proceed to the election of a senator as required by the act of Congress and the constitution of this State.

94. The Question of Popular Election of Senators *

Senator Turpie, in the course of a speech made in the Senate on March 23, 1897, made the following arguments in support of popular election.

There is certainly a very clear incongruity between legislative duties and the office of choosing Senators of the United States. This disagreement has become greater as the country has grown older. It is not now uncommon that the legislature of a State spends the whole time of its session in the effort to elect a United States Senator, and adjourns without succeeding in the ttempt. This results in the total neglect by the members of the general assembly of their functions as lawgivers of the State. Thus the rights and interests local to the people of the State are submerged, overwhelmed, and forgotten in the struggle over the Senatorial election. Besides this, the condition of political parties becomes sometimes so evenly balanced as that a very small number - two or three members of the legislature belonging to some middle or third party in a small minority among the people—is able to determine the choice of Senator, or to prevent one being made. The inability to elect by the legislative body is becoming more and

The people worthy of

trust.

State legislatures losing their elective functions.

Senator the same as they do for the governor, and a count of the vote would decide the election.

The election of Senators by a direct vote of the people of the several States is a reform much needed at this period of our history to bring the whole scheme of government into harmony with its several parts, so that Senators, whether serving at Washington or in the capital of the State, shall be the immediate agents and servants of the people and be personally answerable directly to the people as such. The people in more than a hundred years of our history, in peace and war, in prosperity and adversity, have shown themselves entirely worthy of this trust and confidence.

The era of almost exclusive supremacy formerly enjoyed by the legislatures of the States has passed away. The only remnant of it remaining is the election of United States Senators, a method out of accord with the broad and liberal extension of the franchise now everywhere prevalent. The extension of the elective franchise during the last fifty years has been very great, but the exercise of it in choosing the officers of the government in the several States has been yet greater. The number of voters in the States, by the abolition of restrictions on the franchise, has been very much increased, but the number of officers to be voted for has been even more enlarged. In the early days of this Republic, the legislatures of the States chose the whole body of the executive and judicial officers therein, and often selected them from among their own number. Thomas Jefferson was elected governor of Virginia by the legislature of Virginia. He was elected a Member of Congress under the Articles of Confederation by the legislature of Virginia. Even in my own lifetime I recollect being canvassed as a member of the legislature, because the legislature elected circuit judges and the governor and the State senate appointed supreme judges. All this system has vanished. That era has disappeared. These vast delegations of power have melted away in the presence of the people, and this remnant left alone will dissolve also.

Now, in every one of the forty-five States, but with few exceptions, these officers, from the highest to the lowest, are elected by a

direct vote of the people. The pending amendment does not propose so great a change as this, but it does propose that the Congress, in both branches, shall be chosen by the people in the same manner as the senate and house of the legislatures of the States are now chosen. Thus we may perfect the symmetry of our frame of government, and recognize the immediate sovereignty of the people in its legislative department. . . .

not the

how.

The legislative caucus, which at the capital of a State usually The caucus selects the candidate for a membership of this body, is an assembly legislature peculiarly adapted to the machinations of syndicates and trusts. elects anyThe whole number of such a conference is small. The number necessary to control its choice is yet smaller. The members of it are persons in the exercise of delegated powers, distant from their constituencies, and most liable to temptation. In such an assembly the intrigue and corruption of the trusts are plants of indigenous growth. All this evil, and what is of almost as much moment, the suspicion of evil, is obliterated; it is swept away by the change. which we propose. When each voter of the whole mass of voters in the State is allowed the privilege of personally choosing the Senator, the power of that syndicate, which is always a minority in numbers, is broken. Nor is it any answer to these considerations to assume that a State convention would be as subject to these malignant influences as a legislative caucus; even if this were true, the action of a convention is not final. It must yet abide, under our plan, the scrutiny of a popular vote, while the action of the caucus is final, and may often result in a choice directly adverse to popular rights and interests.

The other side of the question of popular election is thus upheld by Senator Edmunds:

The founders of the republic believed that the liberty and happiness of the people of the several States

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States which they foresaw would finally embrace a continent in their benign sway could only be preserved by such divisions and subdivisions of the sources and methods and exercise of political power as they adopted

It is

claimed

that the

Senate is

unrepre

sentative.