been blamed for not marching directly to Chalons, or Rheims, as foon as he found himself between those cities and Dumourier's army. Those who make this cri ticism do not think of the danger and difficulty of marching with an enemy hanging on the rear, and intercepting the convoys of the advancing army. But without taking farther notice of fuch random cenfures, it is the opinion of many of the military profeffion, that inftead of remaining inactive at his camp at La Lune after the cannonade of the 20th of September, he ought to have attacked Dumourier at St. Menehould. Those who hold this opinion fay, that from the fuperiority of the Pruffians over the raw troops of France, he had a great probability of beating and difperfing them, which would have fpread fuch an alarm that the levies which were marching against the Duke would have joined in the flight; and inftead 5 ftead of enemies, he would have met only friends on his way to Paris; for nothing is fo efficacious as a victory, in converting enemies into friends. I have been affured, that this measure was proposed by the Marechal de Caftries, in a Council of War held at La Lune; and his opinion was fupported by that of M. de Poilly, a General Officer in the French army, who had refided in that province, and had an accurate knowledge of the country; and that this attack of the camp of Menehould was also greatly defired by the whole corps of French Emigrants. Without any pretenfions to military knowledge, it is not difficult to conjecture what may have determined the Duke of Brunswick against risking such a measure. He certainly had entered France with a perfuafion that he would be favoured by a great part of the country who disliked the conftitution: he had reason to believe that the events of the 10th of August, and the third of September, would render the people more averse to the new government, and more favourable to his expedition. The eafy conqueft of Longwy and Verdun tended to confirm him in thofe fentiments. He found no very great difficulty in forcing the Straits of Grand-Pré. Thus far therefore every thing rather had a tendency to encourage the Duke to proceed; but the action of the 20th of September, an the difpofition in which he found the country, muft have had a very different effect on his mind. By the former he had the proofs of a firmnefs in the French army, and a kill in the General which he did not expect; and in the coun try, fo far from any favourable difpofition towards his enterprize, every appearance was hoftile in the highest degree. At his camp at La Lune his convoys were fometimes intercepted; he could obtain no pro visions vifions from the inhabitants, and his army As foon as it was evident that the country was against him, the Duke of Brunfwick's enterprize might have been confidered as having failed. He had nothing VOL. II, H to to think of but to effect a retreat, which he finally conducted with a skill equal to the highest reputation. But he first proposed a truce; during this a conference took place between the chiefs of the oppofite armies. It has been said, that Dumourier agreed to this with a view to promote defertion among the German foldiers, by diftributing the decree of the National Affembly for the encouragement of deferters, and alfo in the hopes of inducing the King of Pruffia to break with the Austrians, at this moment of indignation and disappointment; and it has been afferted that Dumourier proved himself a much better politician than the Duke of Brunswick on this occafion. The reverse of this however feems to be the truth; for if what is mentioned above were really Dumourier's objects in agreeing to the truce, he failed in both. There was no defertion from the Pruffian army, and the |