that the last takes place solely in the mind, and can by no means be discovered from outward circumstances; which would have been the case in the present instance: while the first can become known from the circumstances connected with it; which would not have been the case in the present instance. Either, then, our Lord's words have nothing to do with mental restriction, which we have shown to be undoubtedly the case, or if they have, they go to justify not non-pure, but pure mental restriction, which, however, Liguori declares to be never allowable, and Pope Innocent XI. has condemned.

The other quotations may be, for the present, at least, more summarily dismissed. S. Augustine writes, 'Although every one who tells a lie may wish to conceal what is true, yet not every one who wishes to conceal what is true tells a lie.' Most assuredly; for they either speak the truth against their wishes, or they are silent; they do not employ non-pure mental restriction, whereby they would tell a lie and pass off a juggle on themselves to boot, vainly persuading themselves that in some way or other the self-juggle made amends for the lie. When such a sentence as the above is brought forward for the purpose of inferring from S. Augustine's authority that non-pure mental reservation is justifiable, we cannot be surprised that the following statement of Thomas Aquinas is tortured into being 'favourable' to the same conclusion:- To be silent about the truth, and to express falsehood, are different things.' The doctrine of non-pure mental restriction may be fathered on Augustine and Aquinas in virtue of these quotations with as much truth as they might be attributed to any other writer who has happened to make use of the words truth and falsehood in the same sentence. But our author is not remarkable for the pertinency or accuracy of his quotations. In his 'Glories of Mary' he has made innumerable extracts from early writers, 'not only,' as he says, for use, but also that they may show the high idea that the 'saints had of the power and mercy of Mary, and the great con'fidence they had in her patronage.' A critic is obliged to warn his simpler co-religionists that they must not use the book in controversy, for, to name but one, and that not the chief cause of 'this unfitness, it is only necessary to mention that S. Alphonsus 'did not scruple to make most important additions to the passages ' which he quoted from the Fathers; and this, though perfectly ' allowable in a book of meditations' (Populus vult decipi et decipiatur), of course destroys its value as a work of authority in matters of controversy'-because, we presume, a moderately informed opponent might be inconvenient.

6

What lies at the foundation of the theory of Amphibology is clearly a confusion between moral and material falsehood. The

enunciation of a material truth is an assertion concerning a fact, which assertion is objectively true. For example, if I affirm that the sun stands still, I affirm a material truth; if I assert that it moves, I affirm a material falsehood. These affirmations have, of themselves, and as such, no moral character. If I had no intention to deceive in stating that the sun moved, as in common conversation I frequently do-much more if it was my conviction that it did move, as would have been the case before the discoveries of philosophers-I should not have been guilty of any moral obliquity, or be justly charged with moral falsehood. Moral truthfulness, on the other hand, consists in speaking out the honest convictions of the heart. I am guilty of moral falsehood when I say anything with intent to deceive my neighbour. Thus if I assert either that the sun moves or that the sun stands still, with some ulterior object of my own, and with a purpose of deceiving the person to whom I am speaking, I am equally culpable in a moral point of view. It appears, then, that the material truth or falsehood of the thing asserted has no effect whatever upon the moral truthfulness or want of truthfulness of the person who makes the assertion. The moral character of the act, as of all other acts, depends upon the deliberate purpose of the agent. Wherever there is an attempt to deceive, whether by a material truth or by a material falsehood, there is moral falsehood.

But the theory of Amphibology confounds this vital distinction. Its essence consists in being a moral falsehood conveyed by means of a material truth. Romish theologians would try to persuade us that the latter compensates for the former, whereas we have seen that it does not annihilate or remove one grain of its native deformity. That this is what lies at the bottom of systematized equivocation or amphibology will appear at once from the following instances, which we choose at random from Liguori. In his Homo Apostolicus he puts the case of a man who has spoken ill of his neighbour, which ill is true, but yet which the speaker ought not to have divulged. What is he to do? I am accustomed,' says Liguori, to recommend people 'to equivocate, and say, " I said it out of my own head," for all 'words do come out of the mind, for which the head is taken.' It is a material truth that all words do come out of the mouth, or mind, or head, and therefore Liguori thought that the moral untruth which he puts into the speaker's mouth was annulled. It is difficult for anything to be more grotesque than this, and yet perhaps the other suggestion given in the same case goes beyond it. It is this: S. John, in a place not specified, says

"1

that all sin is deceitfulness and a lie: the speaker has done wrong in saying what he has said: therefore he has committed a sin: therefore he has told a lie: therefore he should say, I made a mistake-I have told a lie. Thus he is taught to say that the truth which he had spoken was a lie, thereby, of course, telling a lie, while at the same time he lays the flattering unction to his soul that he has been guiltless of any kind of falsehood. Again, the nature of the principle of equivocation is illustrated by the case of a servant saying Not at home. Cardenas says that he must put his foot upon a stone, and say that his master is not here, i.e. on the stone. Liguori, however, prefers his saying He is not here,' meaning at the door, or in the window, or in sight.' Everybody knows that conventional sayings, such as that under discussion, bear conventional meanings, and are known to bear conventional meanings, and therefore involve no deceit and no moral falsehood. Liguori thinks that because the phrase Not at home is materially false, the person who uses it is guilty of a moral falsehood. To escape this evil he suggests an equivocation, which makes the expression materially true, but implies an attempt at deceiving, and involves moral falsehood. So pitiably confused is this modelinstructor of confessors and directors on this vital point.

The principle of non-pure mental restriction is the same. In illustration of this we will give an instance, not indeed found in Liguori, but accepted by Roman controversialists as a faithful exponent of their views, and justified as such. As S. Francis of Assisi was one day walking, he was passed by a person whom he recognised. Hardly was this person out of sight, when there came by others in search of him, and asked S. Francis if he had passed by. The saint did not wish to say Yes. His conscience forbade him to say No. What was he to do? He threw his arms into the air, brought his hands together, and in so doing pointed with his finger down his sleeve. Then he answered with a safe conscience, He has not passed this way.' It was quite true: he had not passed down the saint's sleeve. But was S. Francis therefore guiltless of a moral falsehood because he had contrived to convey that moral falsehood by means of a material truth? Yes, say Rome's casuists, because he used non-pure mental reservation. Had he not pointed down his sleeve, it would have been a case of pure mental reservation: but the adroit movement of the finger altogether withdrew the act from this class of sins, and placed it among justifiable and right acts. S. Francis' soul would, according to their system, have become 'spiritually dead,' had it not been for

1 Theol. Moral. 4. 2. 165.

the finger: he would have been 'deprived of God's grace,' had it not been for the finger: he would have earned eternal punishment,' had it not been for the finger. But the finger was a talisman. It is a matter of doubt, however, whether it was his sleeve or his ear into which he pointed. 'So it is recorded ' of S. Frauncis,' says the Treatise of Equivocation, 'that beyng ' asked of one who was sought for to death, whether he came 'not that way, he aunswered, putting his hand into his sleeve, or, as some say, into his eare, "He came not this waye."'1 We believe we have now sufficiently illustrated the principles of Equivocation and Mental Restriction, and shall proceed to their application, under the guidance of S. Alfonso. We have already said that they would subvert all confidence and security in dealing between man and man, and cause utter distrust of all pledges. We will now ask a few questions, to which Liguori shall give the answers, or at least the proofs of the answers. What confidence can we put in assertions? in oaths? in vows? in evidence? Can promises be trusted? Can secrets be secure? In short, can we be justified in believing that acts and words will be in accordance with each other? We will begin with the question relating to assertions.

A man who has come from a place falsely thought infected, may say that he has not come from it, namely, (aside) as being pestilential, because that is the meaning of those who guard. Nay, Toletus, Lessius, and a great number of others, quoted by Sporer, allow that he may say that he has not come from it, even though he has passed through an infected place, provided that he is sure that he has contracted no pestilence, because it may be understood (aside) that he has not come in such a way as that danger is to be feared from him. But in this last statement I do not altogether acquiesce.-4. 2. 159.

The doctrine of probability has shown that Toletus, Lessius, or Sporer are quite sufficient authorities for a person to act with safety upon their opinion. In the Treatise of Equivocation a similar example is given, and there the assertion is represented as confirmed by oath :

'A man cometh unto Coventry in tyme of a suspition of plague. At the gates the officers meete hym, and on his oath examine hym whether he come from London or no, where they thincke, certainly, the plague to be. This man, knowing for certain the plague not to be in London, or, at least, knowing for certain that the air is not there infectious, and that he only ridd through some secure place of London, not staying there, may safely swear that he came not from London, answering to their final intention in their demaund, that is, whether he came so from London that he may endanger their cittye of the plague, although their immediate intention was

Treatise of Equivocation, p. 50. A marginal reference is given to Simeon Metaphrastes apud Surium, tom. iii. Parsons refers to the same story in his Treatise tending towards Mitigation.

to know whether he came from London or no. of nature would clear from perjury.'-P. 30.

This man, the very light

Three ways are assigned by doctors whereby a man may restore another's character when he has made public a crime of his which he has committed.... The third is, for the speaker to assert "that he had said what was false, that he had made a mistake, that he was deceived, or that he had lied." And though Soto, Cajetan, Bannez, and Sylvius, say that this way must not be used, thinking that these are real lies, yet "probably" Lugo, Sanchez, Wigandt, Lessius, Roncaglia, Mazzotta, with the "common" opinion, as he says, and the Salamanca doctors, with Villalobos, Trulenchius, Ledesma, Serra, Tapia, Prado, Sayrus, Navarrus, think that the aforesaid words are not lies but real amphibologies; for, as S. Thomas says, sins are called in Scripture falsehoods and lies, as in the fourth Psalm, Why do ye love vanity and seek after a lie?' And there is the same in Jeremiah viii. 10, From the prophet to the priest they all perform a lie,' i.e. sins. In like manner, then, a man who has sinned, [or done wrong, which the individual in question has, by divulging a truth when he ought not to have divulged it,] can well say that he has told a lie,' or made a mistake."" So in the case which we have put, we may well, nay, if there is need, we are bound, to make use of such ambiguous words.'-Theol. Mor.

4. 6. 992.

"Some

We are not bound, says Cardenas, with Lessius, to answer to the meaning of the man who asks the question, if there is good reason.'— 4. 2. 165.

'If a man has received a loan, and afterwards repaid it, he may say that he has not received the loan, understanding aside, so as to have to pay it.' - 4. 2. 159.

'Whenever a man is bound to hide another man's disgrace, he may lawfully say, I do not know, namely, (aside) I have no knowledge which is of use for answering: or, I do not know it as a thing which I can declare.' -4. 2. 153.

'If a guest is asked if his dinner is good when really it is bad, he may answer that it is good, namely, (aside) for mortification.-4. 2. 160.

Utinam his nugis!-We call attention to the following case, and the reasoning upon which it is founded:

'May an unfaithful wife declare to her husband that she has not committed adultery, meaning (aside) so as to have to tell him? She may equivocally assert that she has not broken the marriage, for it still exists, And if she has sacramentally confessed her adultery, she may answer, "I am innocent of this crime;" because it has already been taken away by confession. So Cardenas, who remarks, however, that she may not make that affirmation with an oath, because, for asserting anything, probability of the fact is sufficient, but for swearing, certainty is required. But it is replied that moral certainty is enough for swearing, as we said above with the Salamanca doctors, Lessius, Suarez, Sanchez, and the common opinion. And this moral certainty of the remission of the sin can be had whenever a person has received the sacrament of penance in a good moral disposition. But for the question in hand, the Salamanca doctors say, with Soto, that a woman cannot deny her adultery, because it would be pure mental restriction. Cardenas, however, admits that in danger of death it is allowable for her to use a metaphor which is common in Scripture, where adultery is taken for idolatry, as in Ezek. xxiii. 37, "That they have committed adultery... and with their idols have they committed adultery." Nay, if the crime is really hidden, "probably," with Busembaum, Lessius, Trulenchius, Sanchez, Soto, Sayrus, and Peter of