127. Vacancy. 3. In case of a vancancy during a recess of the senate in the office of any justice of the peace in the city of Chicago, the governor, upon the recommendation of said judges, shall make a temporary appointment until the next meeting of the senate, when he shall nominate some person recommended by said judges to fill such vacancy; and any person so nominated and confirmed by the senate shall hold his office during the remainder of the term, and until his successor shall be appointed and qualified. If the senate are not in session when the first appointments are made under this act, the persons so appointed shall hold their offices as herein provided in case of vacancy.

128. Removal from office. 4. Upon complaint made by any person, under oath, against any justice of the peace appointed as aforesaid, for extortion or other malfeasance in office, such complaint setting forth particularly the facts in the case, and filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit or superior court of Cook county, the clerk of said court shall issue a summons, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, against such justice of the peace, returnable according to law; and such justice of the peace may appear and answer such complaint under oath, and if found guilty of extortion or other malfeasance in office, upon trial of the issue by the court or a jury, such justice of the peace shall be removed from his office, and the office be declared vacant by said court. Such complaint shall be signed by the State's attorney of Cook county, and it is hereby made the duty of said State's attorney to prosecute all actions commenced under this act.

129. Emergency. § 5. This act shall take effect from and after its passage.

WHO MAY PRACTICE BEFORE JUSTICES.

AN ACT to repeal an act entitled "An Act to restrain persons not attorneys to practice before justices of the peace," approved May 23d, 1877, in force July 1st, 1877. [Approved May 31, 1879. In force July 1, 1879. L. 1879, P. 57.

*130. Repeal. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That an act entitled "An Act to restrain persons not attorneys to practice before justices of the peace," approved May 23d, 1877, in force July 1st, 1877, be and the same is hereby repealed.

AN ACT to revise the law in relation to landlord and tenant. [Approved May 1, 1873. In force July 1, 1873.]

1. When rent may be recovered. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That the owner of lands, his executors or administrators, may sue for and recover rent therefor, or a fair and reasonable satisfaction for the use and occupation thereof, by action of debt or assumpsit, in any court of competent jurisdiction, in any of the following cases:

[Crosby v. Loop, 13 Ill. 625; Green v. Massie, 13 Ill. 364; Sherman v. Dutch, 16 I. 283; Foltz v. Prouse, 17 Ill. 493; Creel v. Kirkham, 47 Ill. 346; Crotty v. Col lins, 13 Ill. 567; Simpkins v. Rogers, 15 Ill. 397; Dooley v. Crist, 25 Ill. 551; McKinney v. Peck, 28 Ill. 174; Grover v. Bulkley, 48 Ill. 192; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 Ill. 96; Eachus v. Trustees, etc., 17 Ill. 535; Blue v. Leathers, 15 Ill. 32: Alwoods v Ruckman, 21 Ill. 200; Parker v. Fergus, 43 Ill. 437; Casselberry v. Forquer, 27 III. 172; St. John v. Quitzow, 72 Ill. 334; Carter v. Marshall, 72 Ill. 609; Talbot v. Hill, 68 I. 106; Chapin v. Foss, 75 Ill. 280; Warner v. Hale, 65 Ill. 396; Dills v. Stobie, 81 ill. 202; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 412; Leitch v. Boyington, 84 Ill. 179; Gittings v. Nelson, 86 Ill. 591; Clapp v. Noble, 84 Ill. 62.

First-When rent is due and in arrear on a lease for life or lives. Second-When lands are held and occupied by any person without any special agreement for rent.

[Voigt v. Resor, 80 Ill. 331; Oakes v. Oakes, 16 Ill. 106; King .v. Mason, 42 Ill.

223.

Third-When possession is obtained under an agreement, written or verbal, for the purchase of the premises, and before deed given the right to possession is terminated by forfeiture or non-compliance with the agreement, and possession is wrongfully refused or neglected to be given upon demand, made in writing, by the party entitled thereto : Provided, that all payments made by the vendee, or his representatives or assigns, may be set off against such rent.

[Creighton v. Sanders, 89 Ill. 543; Hadley v. Morrison, 39 Ill. 399; Tilghman v. Little, 13 Ill. 241; Wilburn v. Haines, 53 Ill. 207; Monsen y. Stevens, 56 Ill. 335.

Fourth-When land has been sold upon a judgment or a decree of court, when the party to such judgment or decree, or person holding under him, wrongfully refuses or neglects to surrender possession of the same, after demand, in writing, by the person entitled to the possession.

[Grub v. Crane, 4 Scam. 156; Hayes v. Bernard, 38 Ill. 301; Goodman v. Warner, 28 Ill. 81; Leindecker v. Waldron, 52 Ill. 283; Brush v. Fowler, 36 Ill. 53; Lyman v. Russell, 45 Ill. 281; Jackson v. Warren, 32 Ill. 332; Johnson v. Baker, 38 Ill. 99; Johnson v. Bantock, 38 Ill. 111.

Fifth-When the lands have been sold upon a mortgage or trust deed, and the mortgagor or grantor, or person holding under him, wrongfully refuses or neglects to surrender possession of the same, after demand, in writing, by the person entitled to the possession.

[R. S. 1845, P. 333; Bloom v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Ill. 503; Carroll v. Ballance, 9; Jackson v. Warren, 32 Ill. 332; Hayes v. Lawver, 83 Ill. 182.

26 Ill.

2. Willfully holding over — double rent. 2. If any tenant or tenants for life, lives, or for a year, or any longer or shorter time, or any person or persons who are or shall come into possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by, from or under or by collusion with such tenant or tenants, shall willfully hold over any lands, tenements or hereditaments, after the expiration of such term or terms, and after demand made, in writing for the possession thereof, by his or their landlord or lessor, or the person to whom the remainder [*658] or reversion of such lands, tenements or hereditaments shall belong, such person or persons so holding over, shall, for the time such landlord or rightful owner be so kept out of possession, pay to the person so kept out of possession, or his legal representatives, at the rate of double the yearly value of the lands, tenements or hereditaments so detained, to be recovered by action of debt or otherwise, in any court having cognizance of the same.

[R. S. 1845, P. 333, § 2; Fabri v. Bryan, 8o Ill. 182; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 411; Chapman v. Wright, 20 lll. 126; Montayne v. Wallhan, 84 Ill. 355; Clapp v. Noble, 84 I. 62.

3. Holding over after notice by tenant - double rent. 3. If any tenant shall give notice of his intention to quit the premises by him holden, at the time mentioned in such notice, at which the tenant would have a right to quit by the lease, and shall not accordingly deliver up possession thereof, such tenant shall pay to the landlord or lessor double the rent or sum which would otherwise have been due, to be col

lected in the same manner as the rent otherwise due should have been collected.

[R. S. 1845, P. 334, § 3; Warner v. Hale, 65 Ill. 396.

4. One-half year's rent in arrear- re-entry, etc. $ 4. In all cases between landlord and tenant, where one-half year's rent shall be in arrear and unpaid, and the landlord or lessor to whom such rent is due has right by law to re-enter for non-payment thereof, such landlord or lessor may, without any formal demand or re-entry, commence an action of ejectment for the recovery of the demised premises. And in case judgment be given for the plaintiff in such action of ejectment, and the writ of possession be executed thereon, before the rent in arrear and costs of suit be paid, then the lease of such lands shall cease and be determined, unless such lessee shall, by writ of error, reverse the said judgment, or shall by bill, filed in chancery, within six months after the rendition of such judgment, obtain relief from the same: Provided, that any such tenant may, at any time before final judgment on said ejectment, pay or tender to the landlord or lessor of the premises the amount of rent in arrear, and costs of suit, and the proceedings on such ejectment shall thereupon be discontinued.

[R. S. 1845, P. 334, § 3; Herrell v. Sizeland, 81 Ill. 457.

5. Notice to terminate tenancy from year to year. § 5. In all cases of tenancy from year to year, sixty days' notice, in writing, shall be sufficient to terminate the tenancy at the end of the year. The notice may be given at any time within four months preceding the last sixty days of the year.

[L. 1861, p. 136, §1; Murphy v. Williamson, 85 Ill. 149; Herrell v. Sizeland, 81 Ill. 457; Walker v. Ellis, 12 Ill. 470; Secor v. Pestana, 37 III. 525; Hunt v. Morton, 18 Ill. 75; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 Ill. 96; Dunn v. Trustees, etc., 39 III. 578; Seem v. McLees, 24 Ill. 192; Doran v. Gillespie, 54 Ill. 367; Ball v. Peck, 43 Ill, 482; Eldridge v. Holway, 18 Ill. 445.

6. Notice to terminate tenancy by the month, etc. $6. In all cases of tenancy by the month, or for any other term less than one year, where the tenant holds over without special agreement, the landlord shall have the right to terminate the tenancy by thirty days' notice, in writing, and to maintain an action for forcible detainer or ejectment.

[L. 1861, p. 137, § 2; Seem v. McLees, 24 Ill. 192; Prickett v. Ritter, 15 Ill. 96; Murphy v. Williamson, 85 Ill. 149.

7. No further demand necessary. § 7. Where a tenancy is terminated by notice, under either of the two preceding sections, no further demand shall be necessary before bringing a suit under the statute in relation to forcible detainer or ejectment. [L. 1861, p. 137. $3.

8. Demand of rent-suit for possession. § 8. The landlord or his agent may, at any time after rent is due, demand payment thereof, and notify the tenant, in writing, that unless payment is made within a time mentioned in such notice, not less than five days after the service thereof, the lease will be terminated. If the tenant shall not, within the time mentioned in such notice, pay the rent due, the landlord

may consider the lease ended, and sue for the possession under the stat ute in relation to forcible entry and detainer, or maintain ejectment without further notice or demand.

[Burt v. French, 70 Ill. 254; Woodward v. Cone, 73 Ill. 242.

9. Notice to quit. 9. When default is made in any of the terms of a lease, it shall not be necessary to give more than ten days' notice to quit, or of the termination of such tenancy, and the same may be terminated on giving such notice to quit at any time after such default in any of the terms of such lease, which notice may be substantially in the following form, viz. :

To A. B. You are hereby notified that in consequence of your default in (here insert the character of the default) of the premises now occupied by you, being, etc., (here describe the premises) I have elected to determine your lease, and [*659] you are hereby notified to quit and deliver up possession of the same to me within ten days of this date, (dated, etc.)

To be signed by the lessor or his agent; and no other notice or demand of possession or termination of such tenancy shall be necessary.

[L. 1865, p. 107, § 2; Cone v. Woodward, 65 Ill. 477; Chadwick v. Parker, 44 Ill. 326; Fisher v. Smith, 48 Ill. 185; Palmer v. Ford, 70 Ill. 369; Ball v. Peck, 43 Ill. 486; Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211.

10. Service of demand or notice. § 10. Any demand may be made or notice served by delivering a written or printed, or partly written and printed, copy thereof to the tenant, or by leaving the same with some person above the age of twelve years, residing on or in possession of said premises; and in case no one is in the actual possession of said premises, then by posting the same on the premises.

[L. 1865, p. 108, § 3; Vennum v. Vennum, 56 Ill. 430; Chadwick v. Parker, 44 III. 327; Doran y. Gillespie, 54 Ill. 367; Pricket v. Ritter, 16 Ill. 98; Chapman v. Wright, 20 Ill. 120.

11. Evidence of service. II. When any such demand is made or notice served by an officer authorized to serve process, his return shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and if such demand is made or notice served by any person not an officer, the return may be sworn to by the person serving the same, and shall then be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. [L. 1865, p. 108, $3.

12. When term expires notice to quit not required. 12. When the tenancy is for a certain period, and the term expires by the terms of the lease, the tenant is then bound to surrender possession, and no notice to quit or demand of possession is necessary.

[L. 1865, p. 109. §7; C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co, 82 Ill. 233; Knecht v. Mitchell, 67 Ill. 86; Ball v. Peck, 43 Ill. 487; Secor v. Pestana, 371ll. 525

13. "Lease" defined. § 13. The term "lease," as used in this act, shall include every letting, whether by verbal or written agreement. [L. 1867, p 157, § 1; Sargent v. Courrier, 66 Ill. 245; Ely v. Ely, 80 Ill. 532; Frame v. Badger, 79 Ill. 441; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 412.

14. Remedies extended in favor of grantee, etc. 14. The grantees of any demised lands, tenements, rents or other hereditaments, or of the reversion thereof, the assignees of the lessor of any