company, now pending, in which four successive trials have resulted in disagreement.

A similar result in a criminal case would be a matter of greatly aggravated seriousness. Suppose that in the trial of the Cronin murderers, recently held in Chicago, the one juror, instead of forcing the others to a compromise, had held out for acquittal, and the jury had been discharged on account of their disagreement; this would have necessitated a new trial. How many men in Cook County, nay, how many men in the State of Illinois, would be competent for jury service in such new trial? With the exception of illiterates, I do not believe that one out of a thousand men can be found who did not eagerly scan the daily papers throughout the trial for the report of the evidence, and who had not formed a decided opinion as to the guilt of the accused, based upon reports of sworn testimony. All these men would be legally incompetent. It might take years and cost a million dollars to procure a jury; the fear of being kept in practical imprisonment for so long a time would prompt men, even if perchance competent, to disqualify themselves by untruthful answers; and if one hundred competent men could possibly be discovered in Cook County during a search of years, the defendants could peremptorily challenge every one of them. In other words, a disagreement of the jury in the Cronin trial would have meant the eventual escape from all punishment of the perpetrators of a brutal murder.

But the escape of criminals in itself is not the most serious consequence of such a failure of justice. Another result more to be dreaded, more to be deplored, is its demoralizing effect on the community. It tends to destroy the faith of the people in the power of the arm of justice, and in the efficiency of the safeguards provided for the security of the citizens—that faith which is the very foundation of free government. It tends to embolden the criminal classes, to breed contempt for the law, and to encourage the preachers of anarchism.

Just observe the inconsistency of our system. We exact unanimity in juries; but appellate tribunals, which often have to pass on controverted questions of fact, are allowed to decide by simple majorities. Suppose that an appellate court of seven judges affirms a conviction of a lower court, but that three judges dissent for the avowed reason that the evidence fails to convince them of the guilt of the accused, still the judgment of the bare majority rules.

Legislative measures, involving the welfare and happiness of the people at large, the adoption or rejection of the most vital constitutional amendments, questions of peace or war affecting the lives and prosperity of millions of people, are determined by bare majorities. Unaminity is not required in grand juries, though upon their decision depends whether men's lives shall be put in jeopardy.

And it occurs to me at this moment that not a mere majority, but a mere plurality, decides whether in this great, magnificent city, we shall have economic and honest government, or whether Chicago shall be the home of thieves, cutthroats and gamblers.

Unanimity is not required to impeach the President of the United

States. In a trial before the English House of Lords a majority is sufficient, provided it consists of at least twelve. A person tried by that tribunal may be sentenced to death by an assembly consisting of twenty-three peers, twelve of whom upon their honor declare him guilty, while eleven declare him not guilty under a like sanction.

In spite of all these analogies we continue to place it in the power of one corrupt or foolish man to polute the fountain of justice, to defeat the ends for which courts are organized, to upset the judgment of eleven honest and intelligent men, and to make jury trials a mockery.

The rule of decision that we should adopt, when we have once abolished the principle of unanimity, is a matter with which our legislators will have to concern themselves when the way is once paved by constitutional amendments. I, for one, after giving the question considerable thought, influenced partly by the successful working of majority rules in European countries, am in favor of a two-thirds majority verdict. In criminal cases, unless at least two-thirds of the jury agree upon a verdict of guilty, the defendant should be acquitted, and in capital cases I should favor a proviso that the death penalty should not be inflicted unless the jury should unanimously agree upon a verdict of guilty. These, of course, are simply suggestions. My main purpose has been to point out the general principle of reform. Some change must certainly be made, otherwise the entire institution of trial by jury may eventually fall into disrepute, and possibly into desuetude.

OUR JURY SYSTEM; HOW CAN IT BE

IMPROVED?

BY GEN. I. N. STILES.

I wish very much a question of reform might be discussed more at length than at a dinner table, at one dollar and a half a plate, or, as is more usually the case, seven or eight dollars a plate. I do not understand that the principles of this club make it necessary that one speaker, following another, should feel himself under any obligation to antagonize the position taken by his predecessor. I certainly shall not attempt it. So much has been said by the gentleman who has just taken his seat, evidencing such careful thought and reflection, that I should despair entirely, if such were my disposition, to antagonize his position in the main.

That reform is necessary in our jury system I deem beyond question. It is tacitly admitted that, to a great extent, our present system is a failure, and that the object sought, the attainment of truth, is not achieved. But it has come down to us through a long period, and there seems to attach to it a sort of reverential feeling, to such an extent, indeed, that in nearly all our States the constitution provides that the right of trial by jury shall not be abridged. The time will not permit, nor the occasion, to go back to the origin of trial by jury. Unquestionably in its beginning it was a crying need, and the Jury System has at various times been the instrument of a vast amount of good.

It should be borne in mind that the Jury System, as it exists in Illinois, has never been anywhere near enforced so far as Chicago is concerned, according to the spirit of the law. The theory of the law is that jury service should fall equally on all our citizens who can understand and speak the English language, under sixty years of age, of sound judgment, and a few more qualifications. That is the theory of the law. But in practice that duty falls upon a very limited number of our citizens, and that limited number made up, for the most part, of the comparatively unintelligent portion.

Gentlemen, what is needed in this reform, as in all other reforms, is

to impress the people at large with the idea that it is the duty of us all, of men who have met with a share of success in life, to devote some portion of their time and ability to the public good. And there are very few positions in which a man can better prove his devotion to the public good than by serving at the proper time as a juryman. During a careful examination into the matter made by me some years ago, I discovered, among other things, that if the Jury System was administered according to the law, and a juryman having served once during the year should be excused from further service during that year, so that the burden should fall equally on all our citizens, no man would be called upon to serve as a juror oftener than once in eight years. It seems a shame that men should be excused from jury service on the plea of pressure of business. According to the rules now obtaining in our courts, a juror is not requested to serve, at least in civil matters, more than about two weeks at a time, and then that panel is discharged and a new one is called. Is it too much to ask of a citizen that once in eight years he shall devote two weeks of his time to serving the public as a juror?

I quite agree with the gentleman whom you have already heard that there should be with as little delay as possible a change in our laws by which the verdict of less than the whole twelve could be received in any case, civil or criminal. It is a strange sort of thing that only in our juries is there required to be a unanimous concurrence of opinion on the part of a tribunal consisting of more than two. In all our courts, in all our boards of arbitration, in all legislative bodies, the conclusion reached by the majority is conclusive. In the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest tribunal in the land, the opinion of the majority of the court becomes binding. And lawyers who have watched the matter closely will be able to call to mind a very great number of cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States by a bare majority of one, and, as has been suggested by Mr. Zeisler, while in the trial of a case by a jury the verdict is required to be unanimous, yet on the appeal of that same case a bare majority of the Appellate Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, is sufficient to decide the question. It seems to me that that proposition is too clear to require additional argument.

Again, it is an important question whether at the proper time we could not afford to dispense with the Jury System altogether. There are a great many objections to it. Jurors, even when selected from the best classes of our citizens, are often from education and training, and experience in life, very much less fitted to pass upon even questions of fact than are the judges, whose training in life particularly fits them for that position. But let me say this in behalf of the Jury System. There are cases which have occurred to every lawyer of experience, where it was certain, to his mind at least, that the conclusion reached by the jury was the just conclusion, and the conclusion reached by the court greatly the other way. Let me give an illustration from my own experience. A case was tried before a court and jury here against a gambling firm. These gamblers have firms, you know, gentlemen. If they are not stopped pretty soon they will have a trust. A confidential employe of an insurance firm, both bookkeeper and treasurer,

acquired the habit of gambling, and as most of us know, without being gamblers, that increased upon him. He visited the various open gambling saloons which are now in this city, wide open too, at both ends. He went so far that not only did he gamble away his own money, but that of his employers also. The time came when he was either discovered or made a disclosure himself, I don't know which. He was put upon his trial in the Criminal Court, and the surroundings and circumstances were such that the judge felt inclined to suspend the sentence with the hope that the man might be reformed and a wife and little children protected. His employers sought to recover the money that had been gambled away. They brought a civil suit for that purpose. The young man appeared as a witness. He was forced to admit on cross examination that he was, in the language of the astute counsel on the other side, a self-convicted thief. Well, he told his story, and in such a way that it appeared to the jury and to many others to bear upon it the evidence of absolute truth, how he had acquired the unfortunate habit and had gambled away some fifteen hundred dollars of his employer's money. On the other side the testimony of a string of gamblers was produced, which consisted in their stating that they had frequently seen the young man at the house of A. B., that he was a very "high roller,' and that so far as they observed he always went away winner. That was the testimony of six or eight, or ten witnesses against the one young man. The jury, not containing amongst its members any Jack that could be turned from the bottom, and who tried to determine the real truth of the matter, reached the conclusion that the story told by the young man was true, and that the story of the gamblers was, in the main, false; and they found a verdict for the plaintiff of $1,500, which was collected with costs. Now, what are the probabilities as to what that upright judge, now dead, would have done (as conscientious a man as ever sat upon the bench, and averaging fairly with other judges that we have had before and since in his legal acquirements). What is it probable that he would have done? He would have reasoned thus, according to the rules which obtain in the legal profession: This case must be governed by the rules of law in reaching a conclusion upon the facts. It must be decided by the preponderance of the evidence. It is true that this man has told a story which seems to be probable on its face, and in accordance with the surroundings. His manner impressed me as that of a truthful man; but here are eight witnesses who have sworn against him. How can this court, sitting here as a judge, say that they have sworn to a lie? And the probability is great that if that case had been submitted to the judge justice would have been defrauded of her due.

It is easy to criticise jurors, but gentlemen, our judges need criticism. A great deal has been said of the time consumed in certain cases in empaneling juries. Our judges should be taught to abridge the claimed privileges of counsel to go all over creation in their inquiries of jurors to determine their fitness for that position. We need more backbone on the part of our judges. I know of no way in which their backbone can be strengthened except by the force of public sentiment. Nor do I know of a more powerful influence for reform than united public sentiment.