Wallace v. Cravens. The instructions given by the court are as follows, all of which were excepted to by the appellant. "1. It is conceded in this case that George W. Cochran was the owner of the lot in fee simple. The plaintiff is claiming title through him. He claims that Cochran sold the property to the defendant, and executed a title-bond to him for the same, conditioned for its conveyance upon the payment of purchase-money; that defendant assigned this titlebond to him and, pursuant to such assignment, the property was conveyed to him by Cochran. "2. The defendant claims that this deed from Cochran to the plaintiff is void for champerty. He insists that at the time it was executed his wife was in possession of the premises, under a contract of purchase with Cochran. But if the evidence has proved that she had made such a contract, and that at the time of the conveyance to the plaintiff that contract was still executory, this deed of Cochran to the plaintiff would not be void for that reason, but would be a valid deed, and would convey to the plaintiff the legal title to the premises. "3. The defendant is not claiming that he has the legal title, and if the plaintiff has shown a valid deed to this lot, he has made a prima facie case, showing that he is entitled to the possession of it. "4. If at the commencement of this suit, the defendant was in possession of the premises, and before it was commenced the plaintiff demanded possession, the proof of these facts would, in the absence of proof of a paramount right to possession, entitle the plaintiff to recover in this suit. "5. You will bear in mind that in this suit no equities of the wife of defendant in this property, as between her and Cochran or the plaintiff, can be adjusted or settled. If she has any equities in this property by reason of having paid purchase-money out of her own separate estate, such equities are not affected by this action. As before said, it is a question as between plaintiff and defendant, and if the plaintiff has proved that he was the holder of the legal title to this Vancleve, Administrator, v. Boler. lot, that defendant was in possession when the suit was commenced, or that he demanded possession before he brought his suit, he would be entitled to recover, in the absence of any evidence by the defendant that his possession was lawful. "6. If after the suit was commenced, the plaintiff leased the lot to defendant, and the latter agreed, by this lease, to deliver up the possession on a particular day, if he failed on that day to deliver up the possession, the defendant would be entitled to recover upon the original demand made by him before the suit was brought." We are of the opinion that these instructions, taken together with reference to the evidence, were not erroneous; but, however this may be, the evidence is so clearly and conclusively with the plaintiff below, that they could not have done, and did not do, any injury to the defendant below. The jury found as they were bound to do from the evidence. The judgment is affirmed, at the costs of appellant. W. D. Ward, F. O. Cravens, and F. R. Troxell, for appellee. VANCLEVE, Administrator, v. BOLER. Supreme Court.—Assignment of Errors.-Names of Parties.-Rule of Court. Where on appeal to the Supreme Court, the assignment of errors does not state the names of the parties, the appeal will be dismissed. APPEAL from the Blackford Circuit Court. WORDEN, J.-The assignment of errors in this cause does not state the name of either of the parties. In short, there is no assignment of errors in this cause. The rule requiring the assignment of errors to state the names of all the parties has been long in force. Here there is no statement Sanford v. Sinton and Another. whatever of the names of the parties or either of them. The The appeal is dismissed, at the costs of the appellant. J. Brownlee and H. Brownlee, for appellee. SANFORD V. SINTON and Another. SUPREME COURT.-Transcript.-Clerk's Certificate.-Where, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the certificate and seal of the clerk of the court below are wanting to the transcript, the appeal will be dismissed. APPEAL from the Elkhart Circuit Court. PETTIT, C. J.-This case is dismissed for want of the certificate and seal of the clerk of said court. 2 G. & H, 273, sec. 558; Vanliew v. The State, 10 Ind. 384; Hinton v. Brown, I Blackf. 429. Dismissed, at the costs of the appellant. WORDEN, J., having been of counsel, was absent. F. Bradley, W. A. Woods, and J. D. Arnold, for appellant. F. L. Worden, F. Morris, A. Ellison, A. S. Blake, and R. M. Johnson, for appellees. 34 539 154 48 Mullen v. The State. MULLEN V. The State. CRIMINAL COURTS.-Constitutional Law.-Section 7 of the act creating the twenty-fourth judicial circuit (Acts 1869, Reg. Sess. 14) and section 6 of the act creating the twenty-seventh judicial circuit (Acts 1869, Spec. Sess. 48) are invalid, the subject-matter thereof not being expressed in the titles of the acts of which they are parts. SAME.-Of Jefferson County.-Act Abolishing.-The act of 1871 abolishing the Jefferson Criminal Circuit Court is valid; and said court had no power, after the taking effect of said act, to rule upon a motion in arrest of judgment, or to render judgment in a cause pending before it. APPEAL from the Jefferson Criminal Circuit Court. DOWNEY, J.-This was a prosecution against the appellant, in the criminal court, on appeal from a justice of the peace, for provoking an assault and battery. There was a trial by the court without a jury, and the defendant was found guilty. Motion for a new trial overruled, on the 16th of February, 1871, and motion in arrest of judgment. A bill of exceptions copied into the record, signed by the judge, says, that on the 2d day of March, 1871, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant appeared in said court, and the defendant objected to the court proceeding in the cause, for the reason that the law had been repealed by which the court had been organized and held, which objection the court overruled; that the defendant then moved for his discharge, which motion was also overruled by the court. The prosecuting attorney then moved to take up the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, to which the defendant objected, which objection was also overruled. The defendant then objected to the rendition of judgment against him, which objection was disregarded, and judgment rendered against him. To all of these rulings of the court the defendant excepted separately and specifically as the rulings were made. Prior to the 2d of March, 1871, the act entitled "an act to abolish the twenty-ninth judicial circuit, Jefferson Criminal Circuit Court, and to transfer its business to the circuit court, Mullen v. The State. to provide for the jurisdiction of the circuit and common pleas courts of Jefferson county in cases of felony and misdemeanor and matters connected therewith," had taken effect, if it ever did take effect. That act was filed in the office of the Secretary of State on the 18th day of February, 1871, without the approval of the Governor. We are thus required to pass upon the validity of that act, and to say whether it is, or is not, constitutional. If it is valid, then the Jefferson Criminal Circuit Court was abolished before the action of the court above referred to took place; but if it is not valid, then the judgment of the court should be affirmed. It is not necessary that we should set out the act in question, as its title sufficiently indicates what it is. The first and principal question with reference to the validity of the law is whether it is local or special. It is claimed that the criminal circuit courts are organized under a general law, and that to repeal it as to Jefferson county only, is to repeal the law as to all such courts, by destroying the uniformity of the act; or if this is not the case, that then the law in question is unconstitutional because it is local or special. The first act referred to is the following clause of section 5 of the act of December 20th, 1865, Acts 1865, Spec. Sess. 151. "And the criminal circuit court shall be organized and held in all counties having ten thousand voters or more therein, which fact is to be ascertained by the Governor, and certified by him to the clerks of such counties. And in all counties in which the criminal circuit court is organized, the civil circuit court shall have no criminal jurisdiction, but shal! have only the jurisdiction of the circuit court in civil cases." This act was amended by the act of March 8th, 1867, section 1, Acts of 1867, p. 78, by reducing the required population from ten to seven thousand. In the act of March 1st, 1869, entitled "an act creating the twenty-fourth judicial circuit, providing for the election of a judge thereof, and providing compensation therefor, declaring the jurisdiction of said courts, and providing for the |