to entertain. England began this war with the purpose of interposing some limit or barrier to Russian aggression; and Englishmen will have reason to complain, truly, if the results of all their sacrifices should be that they have procured security against Russia for other European Powers, while for themselves they have not merely obtained no fresh guarantees in the East, but have actually and very considerably weakened those obstacles which did absolutely until now act as at least indirect impediments to Russia in that quarter. sweet in the mouth, will be bitter in the bellythe apple of discord flung to the Western Powers in the heat of their pursuit of the Northern Cacus... "All sudden conversions are to be suspected; of Russia from the obstinate refusal of terms to and what can be more abrupt than this change the ready concession? The French have a good ing a quarrel: now this quarrel with Russia is phrase for settling differences-literally, emptynot emptied, and the dregs of bitterness remain in the cup. . Already the working of the Russian game is perceptible in the tone of the French press, which has a dash of asperity towards England. . . . . . . . It is the forecast Ishadow of the coming Russian peace." From The Spectator, 2 Feb. THE PROMISED PEACE. It is, then, a Russian peace, a peace full PEACE is promised to Europe, once more, of" sharping, tricking, and circumventing," and at once the third year of campaigning with sinister ends to compass, by hook or is dispensed with, and we are to have an by crook." Why, this, it would appear, is accommodation upon conditions which com- a peace with the characteristics of war, in prise the avowed objects of the war from the its bad blood and risk. It is not we who beginning. Yet the announcement is re- say that our Government consents to accept ceived with something like dismay. It is not it: the character of the peace into which we for the reason which our French neighbors are drifting is advanced as a reason why we ascribe to us, that we wish to have more war should require our present efficient Ministry only for the sake of military renown. For, to guide us through its shoals, its treacheralthough we shall give up the contest at this ous currents and white squalls, even more exact point with some mortification, in re- than the same guidance has carried us flecting how the lead was taken from us in through war. The extension of the war to the East, while the sea itself has enabled us the rest of Europe has been dreaded; but to record only negative achievements, the how formidable the extension of such a people of this country is not naturally bent peace! The prospect held out to us by an upon military exploits. It is not that we undoubted friend of the Government which yield to suspicions of any tendency in the presents to Parliament the preliminaries of mind of Imperial France to give way under this peace, is really of an alarmist kind. the flatteries of a Russian submission; but The immediate dangers adumbrated in the it is because the circumstances under which peace is to be concluded the immediate antecedents of the submission-the past experience of Russian evasiveness, and the recorded certainty that the Czar now acquiesces with reluctance-raise a doubt whether the peace will be a true reconciliation, or only a truce with the weapons of offence and the treacheries of war, masked by the "amicable relations" of diplomacy. We are told on excellent authority that the peace is to be of a very peculiar nature. The Examiner, wishing to show through what troublous circumstances Lord Palmerston has led us to peace, and how the cessation of war would not enable us to dispense with his valuable services, observes: "The peace which we shall see after this war will be like no other peace that the world has ever witnessed. It will be like the scene of a prize-ring after a fight, when sharping, tricking, and circumventing have their turn. How many different games there will be to play! How many sinister ends yet to compass, by hook or by crook! "The peace we have to look forward to, if journal from which we have extracted are sufficiently clear. In the first place, "the apple of discord is thrown out between the Western Powers; and Russia is trying to entice away Napoleon the Third from the English alliance. We are therefore to anticipate, as the consequence of the concluding peace at the present moment in lieu of continuing the war, that we shall have against us, under the cover of a new European settlement, the French as well as the Russian Emperor. We must next assume that the Northern Cacus" will suspend his practices only for the sake of appearances, to resume them after his fashion on opportunity. By the premises, the license of Prussia is confirmed. Sardinia will be easily disposed of, den of thieves. What is to become of " the like an honest man who has strayed into a independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire" we do not know; but Friend Bright seems really to have hit upon the probable solution of the peace which is promised to us. Sweden, who allied herself with England in 1808, just in time to provoke the overwhelming wrath of Russia, has again allied herself, just in time to expose her broken alliance to the great protector of the North. Such a peace has indeed its formidable responsibilities. tempting to extend, by constant encroachments and conquests, a territory already too large to be easily or well governed; and he intimated that the future policy of Russia It does not follow that the danger to us would rather be to be content with the will be proportioned to the treacherous char- abundant territory she already possesses, to acter of the period, since we are on our develop its resources, and to extend its guard. We have had our lesson; we have wealth, power, and civilization, by the conaccustomed ourselves to a new course of struction of railways and other means of public conduct. Nothing can be more con- intercourse. This new language was naturtrasted in act and feeling with the England ally enough regarded with the suspicion with of 1851 than the England of 1856, - possess-which all sudden conversions are looked ing a powerful army, an immense fleet, a upon; and statesmen asked, is this a blind popular willingness for war, and a national to cover a deceit? The same language is feeling that has been strong enough to over- now, however, held so generally by those ride the separate interests and intrigues of who are supposed to be in the confidence of party. We have been fairly awakened from Russian authorities, and we are bound to our dream of delusion about Russia; we say that the conduct of the Russian Governhave learned to estimate the reliance placed ment has up to this point been so unhesitat upon friendly states. We have compelled ing in giving effect to the terms which she great improvements in our military organiza-adopted at the hands of Austria, that we are tion; but if peace of the kind described be concluded now, certainly we should not suffer our improvements to stop at the point to which they have attained. No longer compelled to watch over organization and supplies in the Crimea and the Baltic, we should look at home with a resolve that our organization should be maintained and rendered as perfect as possible. Undistracted by external charter large quantities of British shipping disturbances for the time, we should employ the interval between the war now closing and the next, in removing those defects that still enfeeble the organization of our army. We should no longer admit the parrying excuses of the responsible Military Minister, nor for a moment admit the whispered hint that he is debarred from executing his duty to the nation by the displeasure of the Horse Guards or of Windsor Castle. With a guarded peace to be carried on, we should employ our awakened attention to such matters in seeing that in all respects our means for keeping guard with the necessary warlike implements should be rendered in every part genuine and sterling. From The Economist, 2 Feb. PROGRESS OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. more than ever confirmed in the opinion that Russia has determined to accept the terms of peace which will be offered to her at the Congress of Paris. That such is the opinion of the most influential and best informed merchants in St. Petersburg, is best shown by the significant fact that they have already instructed their agents in this country to to proceed to the Russian ports in the Baltic on the opening of the navigation for cargoes. All this is true, and happily holds out a fair and rational prospect of a perfect success to the negotiations at Paris. In the mean time, however, both England and France feel that the most likely means to endanger their success would be to relax those mighty preparations which are being completed for another campaign, and the very knowledge of which has contributed more to the decision at which Russia has happily arrived, even than the past successes of the arms of the Allies. The Ministers, through the gracious speech of the Queen from the throne, give us the best assurances that such an error will not be committed. It is expected that the Congress will as semble in Paris about a fortnight hencethat is, about the 16th inst.—and there is every reason to hope that the negotiations may be finally concluded within such a moderate and reasonable period as may be fixed upon for the duration of the armistice. ALL that has come to our notice through private and public channels during the week has strongly tended to confirm the opinion we expressed last week, that Russia is really bona-fide in her desire for peace. When THE Paris correspondent of the Daily Russia first accepted the terms offered by Austria, Nesselrode wrote a carefully prepared paper in which he professed to mark out the policy of the present Emperor as compared with that of his father. In that document he hinted at the great mistake which Russia had made in the past, in at News tells a story to account for the reluc tant assent given by the English Govern ment to the Austrian propositions. He tells it with "all due reserve," because it has reached him from a better source than mere common rumor," and because it seems to throw a light on the complicated situation. PERFECT SINCERITY. I am willing to believe that Russia is perfectly sincere. . . . On the part of her Majesty's Government I wish to give the most emphatic denial to the assertion that in undertaking the negotiations for peace they have been influenced by any other feelings than those of perfect sincerity. Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords, Thursday, Jan. 31. My Lords, we have boggled and blundered, Shifted round as the current was shifting, Feel one doubt of our "perfect sincerity." "It is said, then, that, so long ago as the end | ment, seeing the drift of the French interrogaof last autumn, Austria was pressing the Allies tories, shrunk from taking upon itself the reto consent to a peace upon terms very much the sponsibility of entering into an engagement to same as those recently accepted at St. Peters-support France in an encroachment upon Prusburg. A draught of these terms was sent to sian territory. Instead, therefore, of giving any Paris, and was there so far favorably received direct answer to the insinuations contained in that the French Government undertoook to for- the French despatch, the answer sent from Lonward them to London for consideration. The don was, that upon reflection' the English answer from England was a peremptory negative. Gevernment would accept the Austrian propoLord Palmerston's Government then thought sitions." that these terms fell far short of what the Allies ought to demand, both as the legitimate result of the success of their arms and with a view to security from future aggressions of Russia. On the receipt of this answer, the Emperor Napoleon's Minister for Foreign Affairs forwarded a despatch which may be shortly translated as What next? and next?' No attempt was made to controvert the English arguments as to the insufficiency of the Austrian suggestions. The language used in reply was full of courtesy, friendliness, and even deference. But, it was pointedly obsarved, if these Austrian propositions be not accepted, ce sera la guerre a l'outrance; the war will assume proportions not contemplated at first; a new understanding must be come to; and the original stipulation that neither France nor England was to gain any private advantage as the result of the war must be reconsidered. England, it was either said or insinuated, may think the destruction of a rival naval power in the Baltic a sufficient compensation for her sacrifices; but France has no interest in such a consummation, and indeed many Frenchmen think her interest lies the other way. The sum of this communication, as I hear it described, was that France by no means refused to go on with the war on the scale which would be necessary for the next campaign, but that at this point of the discussion she would be glad to know what she was to get by it, and how far she might calculate upon the support of England in asserting her legitimate claims to consideration whenever peace should be made. The English Cabinet cannot have been very much surprised at this diplomatic sortie on the part of France, because they must have known that the extension of the French frontier to the Rhine has long been the favorite topic of conversation in every barrack in France, and that the French Emperor could not be expected to go to war with Prussia without looking for such a result; without dwelling on the dynastic reasons which may naturally be supposed to impel his thoughts in that direction, he would have much ground to insist that he could not sufficiently calculate on the support of his people for a tremendous war unless some tangible result were to be obtained by it. It is certain that a war to regain the old boundaries on the Rhine would be popular in France, and equally certain that the people, while pleased at the "glory" which the army has gained in the Crimea, take very little interest indeed about the particular reason for fighting in that remote region. However, it appears, and it is certainly not to be wondered at, that the English Govern A faker, a prig, and a huffler. New Treaty of Peace and prosperity, If we bullied, it was but for show meant; If we quailed, 'twas when matters looked blackly; If we bragged, 'twas the heat of the mo- When we failed, 'twas the fault of the system; The Press. From The Spectator, 26 Jan. doning any sovereign rights in terms, our THE CENTRAL AMERICAN QUESTION. Minister claims to exercise a protectorate IN multitude of councillors there is wis over the Mosquito Indians -a few thousands dom; and since so many are advising our in number-who have no fixed territorial Government and the American on the sub- rights, and whose recognition, in fact, vioject of Central America, it seems possible lates all precedent and analogy, and stultithat both the Governments may be able to fies all territorial claims on the part of any retreat from the false position which they European race on both American continents. have made for themselves. Some of the Further, since the Bulwer-Clayton treaty advisers are unusually liberal; for each prohibits any encroachment upon territorial councillor, not content with advising one possession or sovereign power, our Minister course apiece, proposes several and contra- tells the United States Government to look dictory propositions, -a liberality which to its own citizens, who are committing the offers to the advised a great freedom of most flagrant trespass under Colonel Walker. choice, and throws the whole question wide Let us suppose the parallel to this position open. The same leading journalist who in Europe. Imagine England extending her hinted at warlike proceedings to coerce our settlement of Gibraltar across the intervenally under the Bulwer Clayton treaty into ing part of Spain and over a portion of an acceptance of our interpretation, now Portugal; claiming to protect a tribe of threatens that same ally with the frightful gipsies resident in Cintra, Oporto, and the alternative that we may give up the question intervening coast; at the same time stipaaltogether and simply withdraw from the lating not to occupy any part of Spain or contest. The Ministerial Globe, after assist- Portugal, but justifying the whole position ing the President of the American Republic because some vagabonds from Algeria, callto maintain his popularity by advising him ing themselves Frenchmen, were making a to enforce a little more control over the revolutionary invasion of Portugal notwithFillibustering wanderers that enjoy the citi-standing the proclamations and the represzenship of the States, turns round upon our sive exertions of the Emperor Napoleon. Government and advises it not to build walls This would be the exact parallel to our posiin order to keep sparrows from cherry-trees. This, then, is the ultimatum offered on our side, à la Dogberry-America may either submit to receive chastisement from the power of England, or she must submit to see our claim abandoned! Between these two extremes, both of which receive so high a sanction, it does seem possible to strike out a course which shall be at once moderate and reasonable. Now, the best course will be that which is dictated by a clear conception of the case as it stands, and of the mode in which we got into the difficulty. It is curious that both parties to the question, the United Kingdom and the United States, pursue their litigation upon ground which confessedly belongs to neither. We are quarrelling, as it were, for rights to land which is not even a "no-man's land," but belongs to the States of Central America. Our own Minister, avowedly, gives up many sovereign rights over the territory, but stands by claims based upon our former encroachments, upon the BulwerClayton treaty, and upon the wrongdoing of the Americans. We claim to occupy the island of Ruatan and other territories as our settlements, because we obtained the right of usufructuary occupation in a limited portion of the state of Honduras while it belonged to Spain; and we have succeeded, in encroaching both upon the territories and the sovereign rights of the feeble states that have inherited Spanish authority. Aban in tion. If, at the same time, the Emperor treaty, and for each side to fall back upon the status quo and begin afresh. So far we have anticipated those results that are apprehended as the very worst from The object of the compact was, to secure the withdrawal of Great Britain; but is it the neutrality for commercial transit from so clear that we need leave the result to such the Atlantic to the Pacific; and we have to a contingency? We desire concessions on see how that object could be secured if the the other side; we are in a position to make treaty were cancelled. The worst apprehen- concessions; we are very jealous of American sion in this country would be, that the citi- encroachments; we have been far ahead of zens of the Union would repeat in Central our rivals in establishing encroachments of America the operation which they effected in our own. The tenure of these encroachTexas; that they would first invade the ter- ments, technically as well as morally, pracritory, as they are now doing under Colonel tically as well as logically, is extremely Walker; settle it, forcibly or otherwise, doubtful; and yet so extremely anxious does with Yankees, until they had secured a resi- the other side show itself to obtain a redent majority of their own race; then estab-moval of the encroachments, that something lish their independence, and as an inde- would unquestionably be obtained as the pendent State ask admission into the Union. purchase-money for a concession. The pres This is about the worst that could happen if ent value to this country of any rights of England were to leave the region alone. It protectorate that we possess in Mosquito, of may be very wicked of Yankees to encroach upon alien territories; but if we were to protect all foreign states that cannot protect themselves, we should have to maintain a force for half the countries of the world. There are some reasons to suppose that the annexation of Central America would be less easy than that of Texas. It is contrary to the spirit of the United States to annex a distant province, or one peopled by a foreign race. It is the inextinguishably alien character of the Mexican population that forbids the annexation of Mexico; and Mexico intervenes between Central America and the Union. If we do not rely upon these obstacles, but suppose the annexation complete, still it does not follow that ultimately the objects of the Bulwer-Clayton treaty would be less effectually realized; perhaps the reverse. If Central America were to become one of the States of the Union, peopled by Anglo-Saxon citizens, we should have one material guarantee for the facility of transit from ocean to ocean. It would be the interest of a resident population, alive to commercial objects, to furnish that transit; quite as much the interest of the resident population as it is of the citizens to encourage the transit from the Canadian lakes by river or railway across the Union, in competition with the commerce down the St. Lawrence; and we know how the desire to obtain such a trade assisted the Earl of Elgin in his reciprocity with the United States. It seems more than probable, therefore, that if the Spanish races and Mosquito Indians were replaced by an AngloSaxon population-Republican as it might be we should have a better security for the transit than we can obtain while all arrangements are complicated and impeded by the presence and the interests of semi-barbarous states, that tempt invasion and cannot protect themselves. settlement in Ruatan, or of encroachment on |