tainment of every object of real importance | Conservative sentiment; and we say distinctthat could justify the War, be brought to a ly now, that the value of our language at close with signal honor to the Allies, and that time cannot be justly estimated but by with salutary restraint but no unnecessary collation with the opinions which had the humiliation to Russia. Were we to remain widest currency and were received with the hypocritically silent, were we to join in a most favor. Russia was to be destroyed, as mischievous cry, -or were we, relying on the anchor to which all the despotisms of the the good sense and ultimate justice of our Continent clung in their hour of trial. Italy countrymen, to speak to them with frank- was to be regenerated by the action of the ness and tell them the truth? When the Foreign Enlistment Bill; Poland was to be storm swelled highest against us, we appealed roused to arms and independence by the emfrom the passions of the moment to a not bodiment of the unfortunate refugees who distant future. It has come upon us sooner have grown gray by their daily begging than we expected. We are in its presence through the streets of London. And all the this hour, and we submit what we have writ- time that these fictions were being propaten for months past to its enlightened judg-gated by the creatures of our Government, ment. Later we announced that Propositions of Peace had been drawn up, and were actually under the consideration of the allied Governments. Our statement was vehemently denied; it was characterized as a " canard," and some Paris journals could only account for its appearance in our columns on the supposition that we were actuated by sentiments of hostility to Lord Palmerston. Whether the negotiation was undertaken by the Vienna Cabinet, independent of any hint or suggestion from Russia, our readers may decide for themselves. It is enough to know that the Propositions are of a nature. which Russia has found little difficulty in accepting. The fact that negotiations were in progress oozed painfully out from the Ministerial journals, weeks after it had been authoritatively published in The Press. Last week, in noticing the proposals borne by Count Stackelberg, we stated decisively, and from the highest information, that "the prospects of Peace were favorable," yet up to the very hour on Thursday when it was all but announced by the French Government that Peace was established, we were treated to harangues on the certainty of war, and favored by one of our contemporaries with a lecture on the extreme impropriety of our conduct in taking any other view of affairs. They will probably be wise after the event. They certainly were not so before it. We spoke from the first in the interest of our Government was in secret conference with the Cabinet of Vienna, imploring its aid, or soliciting its mediation. Had the Conservative party joined in the popular clamor for a war of extremity, the fortunes of England and the world might have taken a different direction from that which they have happily done. There are persons in the elevated position of statesmen whose chief skill consists in watching the signs of the times, and adapting themselves to existing circumstances. Had the Conservative sentiment of England been dead or perverted, these men might have found it their cue to play the revolutionary game. They found it vigilant and sound; they knew that it must eventually triumph; and, still adapting themselves to circumstances, they bowed to it, and will meet Parliament with that great card, on which The Press had staked largely, and which it has in no mean degree been influential in turning up-A CONSERVATIVE PEACE. From The Press, 19 Jan. THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE acceptance by Russia of the Allied Propositions has greatly simplified the political situation. It is the strongest evidence of her sincerity she could give, and of her desire to bring the negotiation to a prompt and satisfactory close. Had her object been merely to engage in a profitless discussionto play with ideas of Peace, and to gain a character for moderation without committing herself to terms-other ways were open to her than the frank course she has chosen. The departure of Count Esterhazy from St. Petersburg would not necessarily have broken off the negotiation, though it might have caused difficulty and delay. The proposals sent by Count Stackelberg would most probably still have been taken into consideration by the Allied Governments. Those proposals were correctly character❘ized in our last issue as "frank and concili not disposed to throw any obstacle in the way of a definitive treaty. When principles of pacification are settled, that Power shows the greatest wisdom which cedes points of no essential importance, and smooths the way for general agreement. The greatest moderation may then be the highest magnanimity. atory." They were conceived in a spirit not | except as it affected her interests. This was of hostility to those of the Allies, but of the weak point in the Allied Propositions; concord and agreement with them. The it was, moreover, a new point, and, by yieldsame objects were proposed, and Russia sub-ing it, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has mitted what she believed might prove a more supplied a strong presumption that she is clear and satisfactory method of attaining them. It was admitted by the Times, on Thursday last, that Russia had conceded "the neutralization of the Black Sea; the abolition of the Protectorate in Moldavia and Wallachia; and of all right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Porte." Further, said our contemporary,-"The There is no longer any substantial obstacle language of the Emperor is mild and con- to the speedy establishment of peace, though ciliatory. He seems to have appreciated the much may yet depend on the spirit in which moderation of the terms proposed to him by the belligerent Powers meet to discuss the the Allies, and to have been willing to meet precise terms to be adopted. The Proposithem in a corresponding spirit." This is so tions accepted by Russia are drawn with true, that we have every reason to believe sufficient looseness to admit of plausible difthat the Russian modification of these terms ferences, if discussed in a jealous or hostile was considered satisfactory by the Govern- spirit. The last article, in particular, is so ments of Austria and France. But Austria extremely indefinite as to admit of any kind had engaged with the Allies that the Pro- of interpretation that the Allies may choose posals should really be an ultimatum; that to put upon it. Nothing can be made of a she would listen to no discussion on it; that Proposition which reserves to the Allies the she would receive no counter-proposals; and right of introducing any conditions they that she would withdraw her Ambassador may think proper. As a mere formality it unless Russia signified her acceptance within would be utterly unimportant; but if, as is a prescribed time. She remained true to her generally understood, it is intended to refer engagement, and Count Esterhazy would to a condition that no fortifications should undoubtedly have left St. Petersburg on the again be raised on the Aland Islands, it 18th, had not Russia previously notified her would have been better to have had the conacceptance (pure et simple) of the Proposi-dition distinctly expressed. tions with which he was charged. But the Against all apprehensions on this ground negotiation would probably have been taken we have to set the fact that Count Esterhazy up at the point where Austria had dropped held confidential communication with the it, as the belligerent Powers would have felt | Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that he extreme difficulty in justifying the continu- probably gave frank explanations of those ance of a mighty European war for any such parts of the propositions which were open to narrow-and, so far as they were personally doubt. We learn by the telegraph, that concerned, unimportant-object as the rec-on Thursday, "Count Nesselrode and Estertification of the Russian frontier on the side of the Danubian Provinces; more especially as it was understood that Russia was willing to withdraw from the mouths of the Danube, and from all interference with the navigation of that great watercourse. hazy signed at St. Petersburg a Protocol containing the conditions proposed by the Allies, as the formulation of the preliminaries of peace. Nothing but treacherous design (of which there is no suspicion) or extreme wrong-headedness can now prevent the speedy conclusion of a treaty which, whatever objections may be urged to it in detail, must tend in its general scope to the security of Europe, and to the firmer establishment and wider extension of those principles of international equity which restrain the rage of conquest, and compel the mightiest nations to guide their foreign policy by plain rules of fairness and honesty. As it is, we are saved from that period of doubt and perplexity which would have ensued had Russia abided by her counterproposals. Had she wished to place the Allies in a false position, and to embroil rather than clear the question, she might have done so by resisting the full extent of that cession of territory which was required from her. Neither in England nor in France would the war have been popular for an object which could not in any way appeal to lost in adjusting and signing preliminaries the sympathies or affect the interests of the of Peace." Until this be done, hostilities people, and which assuredly was not essen- must proceed, the preparations for war must tial to the integrity of the Turkish territory. continue, profuse expenditure must go on, The new frontier line was suggested by Aus- blood may be needlessly shed, the interests tria, and was of no European importance of commerce must be impaired, and the It is desirable that no time should now be public mind of Europe be kept in a state of feverish suspense. Even as matter of finance, each day of doubt must cost this country two hundred thousand pounds. The time has arrived when the belligerent Powers must place confidence in each other's professions. There can be no other security for the maintenance of treaties; and, in this case, there is the less reason for mistrust, as neither party can hope to gain any advantage by deception. The pledge of Russia, frankly given to-day, must be as valid as if given three or six months hence. We should have to trust to her good faith then, - why not trust to it now? As regards material guarantees, the Allies hold sufficient in their hands, and they will only be given up when Peace is formally, as it is already, we do not hesitate to say, virtually assured. -PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. Let the tricksy game begin Talk but while the tricksters chatter, If, while Freedom's sword is flashing, PUNCH. From The Press, 19 Jan. WE are in possession of some authentic details, not yet placed before the public, connected with the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian proposals. The journey of Baron Seebach, the Minister of Saxony at the Court of Paris, to St. Petersburg, has excited much speculation. On his return to Paris, M. Seebach brought back from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg an unqualified acceptance of the Allied Propositions, on condition that France and England would treat From The Examiner, 19 Jan. directly with Russia, and not through AusPRESIDENT PIERCE'S MESSAGE. tria. This proposition was favorably regarded by the French Government. The A STATE of war at least enables countries Cabinet Council on Wednesday last was held to discriminate their friends from their eneto deliberate upon it, when we have reason mies. During a period of prolonged peace to believe Lords Palmerston and Clarendon grave mistakes in this respect may be made. insisted, against the opinions of the majority A great State may imagine that it commands of the Cabinet, on the Seebach proposition the world, and such shall be the tone of being rejected, as in their opinion another adulation adopted by habit towards it, that campaign was desirable. The astonishment as long as peace lasts its ignorance cannot of these statesmen at the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian propositions, after their rejection of the Seebach overture, may be imagined. but endure. War alone reveals the truth, and what it may safely count upon. Russia has lately had good reason to know this, and the Allies have not been without some startling illustrations of it. Who would have believed a very few years since that in a great war England should be destined to find nothing but sympathies in France, and little but antipathies in Germany? And not in Germany only: we have found such antipathies rampant among men of our own race, and speaking our own language. All of us at first made sure that American support must follow us in a contest with Russia, reasoning from the unmistakable fervency with which the popular feeling of America had shown itself when Hungary struggled for freedom and was so mercilessly put down. We were mistaken, however. All that was intelligent in America may have wished well to our cause, but their voices have been overpowered by the and bearing throughout his mission were louder democratic voices throughout the studiously calculated to remove prejudice, to Union. weaken every ground of hostility, and to place the relations of the two countries on the one true and permanent basis of showing that England has not a single interest inimical to America, or one opinion really adverse to her people. How eminently successful he was in these endeavors, all acquainted with America can attest; and happily circumstances arose to favor his efforts for the settlement of one very difficult question. In the project of a ship-canal through Central America, England and the United States might meet upon a common ground. They had a joint interest in its It being thus matter of doubt how the States were really disposed to us, the Message of the President was naturally looked for with more than usual anxiety. It has arrived, and will probably leave its readers in the same condition of doubt as before. But it makes one thing manifest. The state of relations with Great Britain is now the principal, if not the exclusive, subject of interest in American policy. Trivial as are the points of difference existing between the two countries, in themselves really not worth more than a couple of sentences in ordinary times, in the present state of the world they being completed and secured from the exacmonopolize almost the whole of the Presidential Message. The great slavery question alone disputes with them a share of public attention. tion of the people of those states, as well as from the monopoly of each other. On this basis Sir Henry Bulwer (pace the Quarterly Review, one of the ablest of modern diplomatists) went to work, and succeeded in accomplishing a treaty by which Britain waived For the rest, the terms of the Message must be considered in connection with the position of its author. With a Presidential its sovereignty over the Musquito shore, the election or re-election before him, it must be taken less as an expression of General Pierce's opinion or policy, than as an appeal to the particular sentiments which he believes to be at this time most prevalent throughout the Union. Just as fearful to offend the more sensible citizens of the Union by a tone of acrimony to England, as to alienate the "groundlings" by seeming to make concessions to us, you may trace exactly the drift of almost each particular sentence. While the points of difference are exaggerated for one class of hearers, another class is propitiated by representing these as unlikely to lead to any serious or immediate results. In regard to both causes of quarrel General Pierce would appear to be equally desirous to avoid any present breach, and to render impossible any complete accommodation. That the head of a great commercial republic should thus desire to keep the prospect of a quarrel in posse over the heads of two great countries, would be inexplicable under any other system of government than that which prevails in America. But the statesmen of the Union are too often in the position of the physician whose interest it is not to heal the sore, or cure the malady, the continuation of which gives profit and importance to himself. The Nicaraguan dispute, which forms the first great section of the Presidential Message, we must really characterize as a not creditable piece of diplomatic pettifogging, If ever man devoted himself with zeal and good faith to remove the chief causes of contention between the United States and England, it was Sir Henry Bulwer, when Minister at Washington. His whole conduct territories and states through which the canal was to pass being neutralized and established under the joint protection of the two Powers. Any history of the mode in which the functionaries of the United States have acted upon this treaty would be foreign to our present purpose. We should have but to recall the bombardment of Grey-Town if we wished to show how far the Americans themselves have kept to the letter and spirit of the treaty. But certainly we must think it unfortunate that because unwarranted and unexpected pretensions were put forth by others, we should have thought it right or prudent to resume some old ones of our own. And so the difference continues. In justice it should be added that the people and the rulers of those barbarous republics are hardly to be kept to even their own stipulations without the employment of language that will be always apt to savor of dictation. Gentle and forbearant conduct producing little but insults and contempt, abstinence and non-interference become difficult in such a region; and unless, therefore, the representatives of England and America are on their parts actuated by a sincere desire to agree, to be just, and to give no occasion for strife, disputes must be interminable. Of the recruital grievance it does not seem that President Pierce can make much, though he does his best. The American envoy in London being understood to have generally approved the scheme as likely to increase the bonds of amity between the countries, it can hardly now be said that it was pursued with views of hostility or offence. It was unfortunate, was abandoned, was withdrawn. General Pierce knows that nothing more can come of it, and that he would injure Let us hope that the wisdom and candor himself even with his own party by adopting of our brethren across the Atlantic may the language of his Attorney-General; still speedily find some better representative of there are those who must be flattered by their genuine and honest sentiments, as well shows and signs of possible hostility to Eng- in regard to this country as to their own land, and to them the President affects to terrible blot of domestic slavery. persist in holding out a demand of reparation from this country, as if further reparation were conceivable or possible. It is surely much to be deplored that any great country should be so represented that the chief of its Government, instead of frankly expressing the sentiments and the will of its people, should prefer to adopt the ambiguous, captious, electioneering tone of a man to whom the permanent interests of the nation are nothing, and his own temporary views everything. We are bound to add that, great as have been the temptations to this course in former Presidents of the great republic, we remember no such flagrant example as this before us. Even the addresses of Mr. Tyler had a personal dignity about them to which General Pierce's message lays no pretension. It contains little else throughout than language of shabbiness and pusillanimity alternated by menaces and bravado. The financial and domestic concerns of the Union are but briefly touched upon in it, so briefly indeed as to have already challenged for it the contemptuous designation of the Stump Message. It treats at some length, however, of the great question of whether slavery is to be controlled or left to complete expansion in new States. For his own part General Pierce declares that State rights, in the maintenance and development of slavery, not only cannot be controlled, but that all past and of course all future legislation for the purpose of so controlling them are ipso facto void. As far as slavery is concerned, according to General Pierce, the Union and the Central Government do not exist. This is taking wide ground. It would go so far as to establish that the States could come to no agreement respecting slavery, unless by negotiations as independent sovereignties, which would be neither more nor less than a dissolution of the Union. If such questions must be settled, not by a majority in Congress but by negotiations of independent States, it would follow that such independent States, failing to agree, might have recourse to war. Civil war thus becomes the ultima ratio of General Pierce's political rule for the treatment of slavery. THE message of President Pierce to the Congress of the United States, characteristic of the present state of politics in America, is not favorable either to its author or to the Model Republic. It intends to make the most of the situation" for all purposes, and to expose the President to a minimum of risk in any direction. Nationally, he desires to be considered "firm" in presence of all who have controversies with the Union; abroad, he desires to be thought "conciliatory." Thus, he still looks to diplomacy for settlement of the Central American question, though he labors to show that the BulwerClayton treaty has been infringed by England, against every sense of the words, of justice, and good faith. He rakes up the settled recruitment question, in order to exhibit himself as the champion of "neutrality "; while he sinks the same championship, of which he might have boasted in stopping the New Orleans recruits for Walker's army, in a small and almost apologetical paragraph. He boasts the compensation that he has wrung from Spain for the Black Warrior and other grievances in Cuba, compensation surrendered without breaking the friendly relations of the Spanish Government; while the President's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling, glances over the past and future of the Re public, and discovers delights for his heart in annexations of all kinds-from Florida and Louisiana to Missouri and Texas; for why should Texas, he asks, have "remained a lone star?"—the phrase, it will be remembered, applied by Annexationists to Cuba. A surplus revenue makes the treasury rich; but the President, as jealous as the most "hard cider" demagogue, cannot tolerate an increased surplus, and he desires to keep it down by lowering the import duties. In sum, President Pierce, whose term of office is about to expire, is seeking to curry favor with every section, every minority, that, put together, could make up a majority for his continuance in office. Such being the unconcealable motive of the message, it neoessarily follows that its spirit must be ungenerous, its views inconsistent, and its tone undignified. Spectator, 19 Jan. |