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VIII. RELATIONS OF THE

LEGISLATIVE DEPART

MENT TO OTHER PARTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION.

Special sessions of the General Assembly. The constitution provides in Article V, section 8, that "the Governor may on extraordinary occasions convene the General Assembly by proclamation stating therein the purpose for which they are convened, and the General Assembly shall enter upon no business except that for which they were called together." Under this constitutional provision, if the governor convenes a special session of the General Assembly, and other matters arise after his proclamation for this purpose, the only method of obtaining consideration of such other matters is by convening another special session. Of course, it is possible to issue a proclamation convening another special session, even though the General Assembly is already in special session, but this is a cumbersome means of accomplishing the desired purpose. A much better plan is to provide that the governor may convene a special session, indicating in his proclamation the matters to which the special session is to be limited, but with authority to specify at a later time further matters that may be considered in such session.

In case of disagreement between the two houses with respect to the time of adjournment, the governor may on such disagreement being certified to him by the house first moving the adjournment "adjourn the General Assembly to such time as he thinks proper, not beyond the first day of the next regular session." This power in the governor to adjourn the two houses is one which will, of course, be used infrequently, and it has not been employed since the adoption of the constitution of 1870.

Veto power. Under the first state constitutions in this country little or no power over legislation was vested in the governor. The distrust of the legislature which developed rather promptly after the framing of the first state constitutions led, however, to the conferring of a veto power upon the governor, and there has been a definite tendency toward an increase of this power. Under the constitution of 1818, a veto power was vested in a Council of Revision composed of the governor and the judges of the State Supreme Court, but their power was subject to be overcome by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses. The Council of Revision disappeared in 1848, and a 1 For Governor Yates' use of this authority in 1863. see the case of People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 (1863).

veto power was vested in the governor acting alone, but the governor's veto in this constitution could also be overcome by a mere majority vote of the members elected to each of the two houses. By the constitution of 1870 the governor's veto power was made more effective by the provision that it could be overcome only by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two houses. The governor's authority was still further extended in 1884 by the adoption of a constitutional amendment conferring upon him the power to veto items of appropriation bills.

The veto power in this state has been effectively exercised, and a full discussion of the cases in which it has been employed will be found in a study by N. H. Debel on The Veto Power of the Governor of Illinois. 2

In the development of the governor's veto power, Illinois parallels the development in substantially all of the other states of the country. Ohio in 1903 and Rhode Island in 1909 first vested a veto power in the governors of those states, leaving North Carolina as the only state which now does not grant such a power to its chief executive. The development of the governor's veto power over items of appropriation has been a rapid one in this country. Since 1900 the states of Virginia, Ohio, Oklahoma, Michigan, Kansas, Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon and Massachusetts have vested such an authority in their governors, and such power now exists in three-fourths of the states.

There has been a tendency in some states to extend still further the governor's veto power. The Washington constitution of 1889 and the South Carolina constitution of 1895 confer upon the governor the power to veto any section or sections of a bill presented to him. Ohio in 1903 conferred a similar power upon its governor to veto sections in bills other than appropriation bills, but this authority was withdrawn in Ohio by constitutional amendment in 1912.

The Alabama constitution of 1901 permits the governor to propose an amendment to remedy any feature of a bill which he does not approve, and if his proposed amendment is not adopted by the two houses, the bill, in order to become a law, must be passed over the executive veto. The Virginia constitution of 1902 also gives the governor power to recommend the amendment of a bill if he approves its general purpose but disapproves any part thereof, and in this state the bill, if amended by the two houses or if they fail to amend it in accordance with the governor's recommendation, is again returned to the governor for his approval or disapproval.

A Massachusetts constitutional amendment adopted in 1918 provides that: "The Governor within five days after any bill or resolve shall have been laid before him, shall have the right to return it to the branch of the general court in which it originated with the recomendation that any amendment or amendments specified by him be made. therein. Such bill or resolve shall thereupon be before the general court and subject to amendment and reenactment. If such bill or resolve is re-enacted in any form it shall again be laid before the Governor

(1917).

University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2

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for his action, but he shall have no right to return the same a second time with a recommendation to amend." A somewhat similar provision is made by an Act of 1905 with respect to the power of the mayor of the City of Chicago. Under this law, the mayor in returning an ordinance to the council without approval may submit with his objections thereto a substitute ordinance, and such substitute ordinance may be considered at once after the action upon the mayor's disapproval of the original ordinance.

With respect to appropriations, there has been in recent years a tendency to increase very materially the governor's control. Under the Maryland budget amendment of 1916, which is commented upon in the pamphlet dealing with state and local finance, the governor submits the general state budget to the two houses of the legislature, and the legislative bodies have no authority to increase the items in the budget so proposed. However, in view of the fact that the governor prepares the budget which the legislature cannot increase, the governor's veto power over this matter was withdrawn in Maryland. Under a Massachusetts budget amendment of 1918 the governor also submits a proposed budget, but the general court of that state retains power to increase or otherwise change the items of the budget. However, the governor is at the same time vested with power to veto items of the budget or parts of items or to reduce items.

In the various ways just indicated above, the governor's control over legislation has been materially increased. In the main, however, the control over legislation vested by state constitutions in the governor is a negative control. Aside from the few cases which have just been commented upon, the governor's veto power in Illinois and other states is a power of preventing action and not one of positive share in the legislative action to be taken. The veto power as such has become in the state of Illinois an almost purely negative influence, because of the fact that most bills sent to the governor are passed in the last days of the session. After passing a great number of bills toward the end of its session, the General Assembly in recent years has taken a recess in order to give the governor time to act upon the bills which come to him. The General Assembly then convenes after the recess to hear the governor's veto messages, but a quorum is practically never present at such meeting, and there is therefore no power either of overcoming the governor's veto or of taking advantage of any suggestions which the governor may have made for the improvement of legislation. The governor's power through the exercise of the veto is for this reason almost purely negative in this state, both with respect to appropriations and with respect to general legislation; although an affirmative influence is exercised by the veto power with respect to the rather small number of bills which may come to the governor well before the end of the legislative session.

The constitution of 1870 provides that the governor shall at the commencement of each session and at the close of his term of office give to the General Assembly information by message of the condition of the state and shall recommend such measures as he shall deem expedient.

Hurd's Revised Statutes, Chap. 24, Sec. 193a.

It also requires that he shall account to the Generai Assembly and accompany his message with a statement of all moneys received and paid out by him from any funds subject to his order, with vouchers, and at the commencement of each regular session, present estimates of the amount of money required to be raised by taxation for all purposes.

The governor has, of course, always sent messages to the General Assembly recommending the measures which he thinks should be enacted. Under the Civil Administrative Code of 1917, the governor at the session of 1919 prepared a budget which was submitted to the two houses of the General Assembly as the recommendation of the governor. This budget was substantially enacted by the two houses, in so far as the matters covered by it affected the offices immediately dependent upon the governor.

The governor's greatest influence in legislation is exercised in a manner not covered by the text of the constitution or by the terms of legislation. If the governor and the majority of the two houses of the General Assembly belong to the same political party, the governor may exercise a large influence over the actual character and quality of legislation. Such influence depends, of course, primarily upon the personality of the governor and upon the effectiveness with which he is able to co-operate with the two houses, even when they belong to the same party. In some cases in Illinois and in other states there has during certain periods been a very close and effective relationship between the governor and the General Assembly in the actual working out of legislative policies. However, this close relationship is oftentimes interfered with, by virtue of the fact that one or the other or both houses may have majorities which are politically antagonistic to the governor. Although there have been in recent years few cases in Illinois in which there has been a definite partisan division in the General Assembly with respect to matters of legislation, party influences will prevent close co-operation between the governor and legislative houses controlled by the party in political opposition to him.

General Assembly as a canvassing body. By section 4, article V of the constitution, the speaker of the house of representatives opens and publishes the returns of elections for state officers, “in the presence of a majority of each house of the general assembly." In case of a tie, the general assembly chooses one of the highest candidates. Contested elections are determined by joint ballot "in such manner as may be prescribed by law." These functions have made difficulty in some cases because delays have taken place in the organization of the house of representatives. In case of a close election the constitutional provisions vest an important political power in the general assembly.

Legislative appointments. Under the constitution of 1818 a large power of appointment was vested in the General Assembly.

This power of appointment was not satisfactorily exercised, and by the constitution of 1848 it was explicitly provided that no officer should be appointed or elected by the General Assembly. This provision is repeated in the constitution of 1870.*

One of the most disturbing influences with respect to the function of legislation before 1913 was the duty imposed upon the state legislatures to elect United States Senators. Since the adoption of the federal constitutional amendment for the popular election of United States Senators, this distinctly political function has disappeared, and its disappearance has been of advantage in avoiding the choice of legislators for other than legislative purposes.

The non-legislative functions of the Illinois General Assembly have since 1818 steadily tended to decrease. The function of making appointments disappeared in 1848, and that of electing United States Senators in 1913. These non-legislative functions are now relatively unimportant, although they do deserve attention in the framing of a new constitution or the amendment of the existing constitution.

Functions in connection with appointment and removal of officers. The constitution of Illinois contains several provisions with respect to the matter here dealt with. In the case of officers whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided by law, the governor nominates, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints. This power of senate confirmation is one which is quite common in the American states and is also, of course, established by the constitution of the United States. This senatorial control over executive appointments dates from the period in earlier American history when it was deemed necessary to set up an executive council or to have the senate act as such a council for the control of executive functions. It is a remnant of the early distrust of executive power, which has now largely disappeared. The exercise of the power of Senate confirmation has occasioned some difficulty in Illinois, but has probably not proved of very great use.

The constitution provides in Article VI, section 30, that the General Assembly may for cause entered on the journals upon due notice and opportunity of defense remove from office any judge upon the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members elected to each house. The more common provision with respect to removal by the two houses is that removal may be made by address of the legislature or by two-thirds of the members elected to each house. Only in a very clear case would this power be exercised in any state, and in Illinois the requirement of a vote of three-fourths of the members elected to each house is likely to make the power of removal practically incapable of exercise even in the cases where its use may be desired.

For a discussion of legislative appointments, see Reinsch, F. S., American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, p. 222.

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