VII. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE.

A number of matters with respect to legislative procedure are dealt with by the constitution of Illinois. The constitution prescribes the quorum of the two houses, requires that the doors of each house shall be kept open, makes provision regarding the expulsion of members, and regarding the punishment of contempts. It also contains provisions regarding adjournments and a requirement that a journal be kept and published. The constitution also prescribes the enacting clause, and requires that on final passage of all bills "the vote shall be by yeas and nays upon each bill separately and shall be entered upon the journal, and no bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each house." The provisions here referred to, which are contained in Article IV, Sections 9 to 12, have made no difficulty.

Some comment should be made regarding the journals of the two houses. Constitutional provisions in certain cases expressly require that certain action be taken and that it be entered upon the journals of the two houses; and in such cases the Supreme Court has properly held that such entries are necessary to the validity of legislation. In other cases the constitution expressly requires that certain action be taken (as that bills and all amendments thereto shall be printed before final passage), but does not require that the journals indicate that such action was taken. The court in 1912 took the view that the journals must affirmatively show compliance with these latter requirements (even though the constitution does not expressly require this), but the court has to some extent modified this view, and said that "where the cons tution does not expressly require a fact to be recorded on the journals, and it can be inferred from a recital in the journals that such fact existed or such step was taken, then the presumption will be indulged that such fact did exist or such step was taken”.1

More important with respect to the procedure upon bills is Article IV, Section 13. This section makes a number of specific requirements with respect to the enactment of laws and these requirements need to be dealt with in greater detail.

Reading at large on three different days. The requirement that bills be read at large on three different days in each house is

1 Neiberger v. McCullough, 253 Ill. 312 (1912). Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co.. 269 I11. 478 (1915).

one which has obtained a place in state constitutions of this country largely as a result of the copying of English parliamentary procedure. This requirement was first adopted to meet conditions which have long ceased to exist. The requirement in the main was first insisted upon as a basis for giving information to members of a legislative body upon a measure before they were to vote upon it, and reading was the method employed at a period when printing was either non-existent or difficult, and the ability to read was not general. At the present time every bill introduced into either house of the Illinois general assembly is at once printed and copies are placed upon the desks of members on the next legislative day. The need for three readings at large in order to inform members of the contents of bills has therefore disappeared.

As a matter of fact, neither in the Illinois general assembly nor in other legislative bodies where such a requirement exists, is it complied with. To have the reading of every bill in full upon three separate days in each house of the Illinois general assembly would occupy a great deal of time and would serve no useful purpose, because no one would listen to the reading. It would be much easier for each member to read the bill independently himself. As a matter of fact, therefore, in Illinois as well as in other states the practice has developed of entering upon the journal a statement that the bill has been read at large on three separate days, when in fact this has not been done. In either house of the Illinois general assembly, for a member to insist that a bill be read in full is to employ obstructive tactics in connection with the conduct of legislative business.

The requirement of consideration of a bill by each house on three separate days is desirable, as a means of obtaining deliberation and of preventing the enactment of legislation by surprise. However, the useful purpose of this constitutional provision may be accomplished without linking such purpose with a requirement which has long proven useless and which has probably been retained in the constitution largely because it has been possible to disregard it.

In one state at least the Supreme Court has taken the view that a requirement of reading on three different days means that the bill with all of the essential features finally placed in it must be read on three separate days, so that if a bill has inserted into it by amendment important additions or changes, it is necessary in that state to start the three readings all over again.'

Printing of bills. The constitution requires that "the bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed before the vote is taken on its final passage." The constitution does not expressly require a journal entry to the effect that such printing has taken

2 State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Base Ball Club. 127 Tenn. 292. But see People v. La Salle Street Trust and Savings Bank, 279 Ill. 518 (1915).

place, but the court in the case of Neiberger v. McCullough, (253 Ill. 312) took the view that compliance with this requirement must affirmatively appear upon the journals. This view has been somewhat modified. As a matter of fact, printing is ordinarily had, but an effort is made to see that proper journal entries are made, for an act may otherwise be attacked for technical non-compliance with the requirement if there is no such entry even where there was printing, whereas the act cannot be so attacked if the journal entries are proper even though the requirement itself may have been disregarded.

Subject matter and title. The constitution provides that no act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title. This constitutional provision has been construed liberally. The court has always taken the view which permits related subject matters to be brought together under a proper title, and the rule as laid down by the court with respect to titles is not difficult to observe. Perhaps, however, attention should be called to the fact that occasionally the Supreme Court has been somewhat technical in these matters,' although a technical view has not been generally taken and the rules. laid down are desirable in connection with the enactment of laws.

Amendment by reference. The constitution provides that "no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length. in the new act." This provision was introduced into the constitution of Illinois for the purpose of preventing the amendment of previous laws by reference, in such a manner that by reading the later act it was impossible to tell what was sought to be accomplished thereby. For example, before 1870 acts were passed in substantially the following form "Be it enacted, etc., that Section 1 of an Act entitled, etc., is amended by inserting the words 'county' before the word 'State." " In the case of such a bill, of the act if it were passed, it was impossible to know what was being accomplished, and legislation of this type was often passed through the two houses of the general assembly without a knowledge of what was being done. Such an amendatory act was of course unintelligible unless compared with the section amended. The purpose of the constitutional provision was to require amending acts to set forth at length the section or sections amended.

or

From 1870 to 1900 the court applied the constitutional rules so laid down to acts which were expressly amendatory in form. Beginning with the case of People v. Knopf the court laid down.

Milne v. People. 224 Ill. 125 (1906).

People ex rel. Stuckart v. Knopf. 183 Ill. 410 (1900).

the rule that if an act independent in form amends or adds new provisions to the existing law, then such act is amendatory of previous legislation, and the provisions of the law so amended. must be set forth in the new act. That is, before 1900 the Supreme Court took the view that the constitutional provision regarding amendment by reference laid down a definite rule as to an act which expressly amended an earlier act. Since 1900 the court has taken the view that a new act entirely independent in form may be held unconstitutional if in the view of the court the new act so alters previous legislation that the two acts must be read together in order to find the law upon the subject. Theoretically, the later rule is a desirable one in that it seems to require a close coordination of new legislation with old legislation. Actually, however, the new principle as laid down by the court merely results in leaving to the discretion of the court in each case the determination as to whether an act is sufficiently independent to be upheld as an independent act, and the court, in passing upon this question with respect to a large number of acts independent in form since 1900, has not laid down any definite rule as to when an act will be held not amendatory of previous legislation and when it will be so held. With the large mass of statutes in force at any given time, it is possible to hold that practically any new piece of legislation is amendatory of earlier legislation, and with no definite principles laid down for the guidance of the general assembly in its determination as to what acts shall be independent in form and what acts shall be amendatory in form, the present rule practically sets up a guessing contest between the general assembly and the Supreme Court, in which the Supreme Court has the last guess. This situation has been an inevitable one, after the step was once taken of applying the constitutional rule to statutes independent in form, and the only way out of the present situation is probably to change the constitution so as to limit the provision to what appears to have been its original intent and to the interpretation given it by the Supreme Court before 1900. The clause as now interpreted occasions difficulties which greatly outweigh its advantages. For a further discussion of this subject see a chapter in the pamphlet entitled "Constitutional Conventions in Illinois," and the note to this clause in the Annotated Constitution.

Time when laws take effect. One of the important problems to come before the constitutional convention is that as to the time when laws shall become effective. The constitution now provides that "no act of the general assembly shall take effect until the first day of July next after its passage, unless, in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act), the general assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, otherwise direct". This provision was placed in the constitution upon the assumption that the general assembly would ordinarily

continue in session for only about three months, and that an interval of substantially three months would elapse after the adjournment of the general assembly before the laws come into effect.5

For a number of years it has been customary for the regular session of the general assembly to sit until close to the first day of July. The ordinary practice is for the general assembly to take a recess at least ten days before the first of July so as to permit the governor to act upon bills, then returning to hear the governor's veto messages. With substantially all legislation passed at the end of the session, the bulk of legislation therefore comes into effect almost immediately after it is enacted. In view of the large mass of legislation passed at the end of the session it is impossible to issue promptly the official text of the laws, and a period of from two to three months always elapses between the time when laws come into operation and the time when the full official text of such laws is available to the public generally.

To some extent the Secretary of State meets this situation by the immediate issue in pamphlet form of some of the more important laws, and an effort to give public information at least as to what laws have been enacted is made by the Legislative Reference Bureau through the publication immediately upon the adjournment of the general assembly of a digest of laws enacted. However, the present situation is a thoroughly unsatisfactory one, and in order to meet it some constitutional provision is necessary.

It will probably be suggested that a plan be adopted under which all laws shall come into effect within a certain period (say sixty or ninety days) after the adjournment of the general assembly. If the present legislative practices continue, such a provision would be satisfactory from the standpoint of general legislation, although there is value in having a definite date for this purpose which does not shift each two years. However, appropriations for the conduct of the state government present a different problem. If all laws were made to come into effect within a certain period after adjournment, the appropriation period would be a variable one each two years, and such an arrangement would be highly undesirable from the standpoint of an appropriation policy. In any plan, therefore, as to the time when laws are to come into effect, the problems of appropriation may have to receive separate consideration.

The present constitutional provision presents several difficulties in addition to the one bringing laws into effect when their texts cannot be known generally for a period of some three months. One of the difficulties presents itself with respect to special sessions. The constitution says that laws shall not take effect until the first day of July next after their passage, unless an emergency is declared and the vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house is obtained. In a special session called to meet a particular emergency, it may be that legislation is immediately necessary, and that a distinct majority will enact the legislation, but that a two-thirds vote to declare it in effect before the first day of the succeeding July will be impossible. Such a situation would be met by a constitutional provision bringing

Debates and Proceedings, Constitutional Convention, 1870, page 540.