But the grant of municipal home rule is to crective, the detailed provisions of some of the constitutional provisions indicate the danger of too minute regulation in the constitution, which may have the effect of substituting a more drastic and rigid constitutional control for a more flexible system of legislative control. Requirements as to specific officials, specific financial limitations, and even detailed regulations as to charter procedure are matters outside the field of constitutional principles. Such provisions are necessarily subject to change, and are likely to hamper future development, even if the practice of some states of adopting numerous amendments to the constitution at every election is introduced. Proposed New York Constitution: In the New York Constitutional Convention of 1915, there was an extended discussion of municipal home rule both in committee and in the convention. The proposed constitution contained complicated provisions, which attempted to define the spheres of municipal and state authority more definitely than in other home rule constitutions. There was a general grant of power to cities, followed by an illustrative enumeration of specific powers and by provisions for legislative control in matters of state concern. The general grant read: Article XV. "Sec. 3. Every city shall have exclusive power to manage, regulate and control its property, affairs and municipal government, subject to the provisions of this constitution, and subject further to the general laws of the state, of laws applying to all the cities of the state without classification or distinction, and of laws applying to a county not wholly included within a city establishing or affecting the relation between such a county and a city therein." Enumerated powers granted to cities were those relating to mu nicipal organization, to city officers and employees (including police and health officers and non-judicial officers attached to courts not of record), the revision of charters and the amendment of charters and of special or local laws relating to municipal government. State authority was reserved by providing that revised charters and amendments affecting "the framework of government" should be subject to legislative veto: by the power of the legislature to regulate "matters of state concern", either by general laws applicable to all cities, or by special city laws subject to a suspensive local veto; and by the power of the legislature to restrict the powers of taxation and assessment, and to regulate labor conditions of employees of municipalities or municipal contractors. These provisions were accepted in the convention as a substantial measure of home rule by a large majority (120 to 17). But some of those voting in the affirmative objected to the restrictions and limitations; and most of those voting in the negative (including the present Governor of New York State) did so because they considered the provisions inadequate. One negative vote (that of William Barnes of Albany) was in opposition to the principle of municipal home rule. The amendment proposed in Utah in 1919 follows in some respects the provisions of the National Municipal League; but with more restrictions on municipal powers, especially a specific limitation as to public utility regulation. The proposed Wisconsin amendment of 1919 is very brief, and leaves the whole question of procedure to the legislature; but authorizes a larger borrowing power to municipalities for acquiring public service properties. National Municipal League Proposal: Proposed constitutional provisions for municipal home rule have been prepared and recommended by the Committee on Municipal Program of the National Municipal League. This committee, with representatives from New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, Texas and Indiana, was appointed in 1913; and after a series of meetings its recommendations were submitted in December, 1915. These provide for the incorporation of cities and villages by a general law; for a general law for the organization and government of cities and villages which do not adopt laws or charters under other sections; for other optional laws; and for the framing and adoption of city charters by any city. The procedure for charter-making and for amendments thereto is prescribed. Each city is to be granted authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs; but this is not to restrict the power of the legislature, in matters relating to state affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of the state. Specific powers of cities. are also enumerated, including taxation and borrowing (within limits to be prescribed by general law), special assessments, public utilities, local public improvements, with power of excess condemnation, the issue of bonds secured by public utilities or excess property, and (subject to general laws) public schools and libraries, and local police, sanitary and other similar regulations. Provision is made for general laws requiring financial reports and for the examination of municipal accounts. It is also provided that any city of over 100,000 population may be organized as a distinct county; and may provide for the consolidation of county, city and all other local authorities in one system of municipal government. Consolidation of local districts: The problem of municipal home rule is further complicated by the existence of overlapping local districts, which are probably more numerous in Illinois than in other states. In most states, cities are the principal local districts smaller than counties, and often combine all of the functions of local government within their limits except those of the county. Thus in most states with town or township government, cities absorb the functions of town government. In some cases the local school organization is also part of the city government; though more often the school authorities constitute a distinct municipal corporation. Special districts and corporate authorities for other purposes, such as parks and drainage, are less frequent in other states than in Illinois. As a result, the grant of home rule powers to cities in other states enables them to deal with most of the problems of local organization and government. But in Illinois home rule for cities alone will not be sufficient to deal with the local problems of towns, parks and drainage districts which embrace cities within their limits. In the case of large cities the relations between cities and counties become important. In a number of cases in other states the local government of large cities and counties has been consolidated. to some extent. New York City includes five counties; Philadelphia City and County are identical in area; Baltimore and St. Louis combine city and county functions; and Boston includes most of Suffolk county. In all of these cases, the city government includes some of the county functions and county officers. In Virginia all cities are excluded from the counties, and the city government provides for county functions. Several state constitutions have provisions authorizing larger cities to be organized as separate counties. In Minnesota, cities of over 20,000 may be so organized; and in Michigan, cities of over 100,000. In Missouri, city and county government may be consolidated in counties having a city of over 100,000. The California constitution contains a general provision authorizing the consolidation of city and county governments and special provisions for San Francisco and for certain other counties. In Colorado the home rule provisions specifically authorize a consolidated government for the city and county of Denver. 11 As already noted, in the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1869-70, a provision was at one time adopted authorizing any city with a population of 200,000 to be organized into a separate county but this was later reconsidered and stricken out, at the request of Cook County members. 12 The general assembly of 1903 submitted. a constitutional amendment, which was ratified in 1904 as Section 34 of Article IV, authorizing the consolidation of local governments within the city of Chicago. The original resolution as introduced in the general assembly provided also for the consolidation of city and county government in Chicago; but the clauses relating to county government were omitted from the proposed amendment as submitted and adopted. 18 While this amendment was pending in the general assembly a resolution was introduced by Senator Humphrey of Cook County, 11 See Pamphlet on Chicago and Cook County. proposing the following amendment to the constitution so as to authorize generally the consolidation of local governments within cities: "Section 34. The General Assembly may, by general law, provide for the abolishment within cities (with the consent of a majority of the legal voters of the city voting upon the question) of township government, park and school boards, and any or all other local municipal corporations within the city, and devolve the functions upon the city authorities, and may authorize such city to assume the indebtedness of the local corporation so abolished and may in like manner, provide for the abolishment of the offices of the justice of the peace and police magistrates, in cities of 150,000 population and upwards, with like consent of the legal voters thereof; and establish one or more district courts therein, with such original civil and criminal jurisdiction as may also be prescribed by general law; and may also, by general law, allow any city with the consent of a majority of the legal voters voting upon the question, to become indebted in any amount including all existing indebtedness, except the indebtedness assumed as aforesaid, not exceeding 7 per centum, on the value of taxable property within such city, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes prior to the incurring of such indebtedness. 14" General Comparison of home rule provisions: The constitutional provisions in Michigan and Ohio and those proposed by the National Municipal League present the best basis for establishing an adequate system of municipal home rule. Of these, the Michigan provisions are the most compact as they omit details of charter procedure. The Ohio and National Municipal League provisions are more definite and more satisfactory in dealing with the scope of municipal powers, but are longer than is necessary by including detailed provisions on procedure. Of the constitutional provisions in other states, most of them deal mainly with charter procedure and make no adequate or definite grant of municipal powers. The Oregon and Texas provisions are the shortest, but contain neither procedural provisions nor a clear statement of municipal powers. The Colorado and California provisions include provisions on procedure, and also detailed statements of specific powers, and special provisions for particular communities. In some respects, the enumerated powers in these two states go further than may be desirable; while the amount of detail, especially in the California constitution, goes clearly beyond what is suitable for a state constitution. The provisions of the proposed New York constitution, while attempting to meet difficulties raised in other states, are both too complicated and detailed, and at the same time are inadequate in the grant of municipal powers. 14 Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, 1903, V. COMMENTS AND PROBLEMS. Criticism of Existing Conditions: The defects and evils arising from the present methods of legislation on municipal affairs may be summarized as follows: (a) Much of the time of the state legislature is given to local measures, on which only part of the members can be expected to be familiar, and all of which are outside the field of general state legislation which is the main business of the legislature. This means, at best, a waste of legislative time, and has a demoralizing effect on the work of the legislature. It interferes with the independent action of the legislators on measures of state-wide importance, since they are often under pressure to subordinate their views on such matters in order to avoid opposition to measures general in form but of special application to their districts. This difficulty is now less serious in Illinois than in the days of unlimited special legislation. But a large part of each legislative session is still taken up with legislation really local in character and the amount of such legislation is steadily increasing, and encroaching more and more on the time of the legislature. One result of this situation is to make local problems a factor in the election of members of the general assembly. (b) From the point of view of the local communities, the main difficulty is the lack of adequate power to deal promptly and effectively with local problems. Every new question, outside of the established range of specified powers, and often slight modifications in the methods of exercising established powers require additional legislation. At best, even if there is no opposition in the legislature, this means delay in dealing with such problems or in carrying out needed local projects. More often opposition leads to a compromise measure, with inadequate authority or mandatory provisions as to methods. Not infrequently there is prolonged delay for years, and perhaps definitive denial of the legislation asked; and at times. compulsory legislation is enacted against the active opposition of the communities concerned. (c) Another feature of existing methods is the lack of responsibility for acting on local problems, and the inefficiency which inevitably results from this diffusion of responsibility. Local officials blame the legislature; and legislators criticise the local authorities; and no one is clearly responsible or can be held to account for mistakes and errors either of omission or commission. (d) Existing legislation on municipal government is so voluminous and so scattered in numerous laws as to make a clear un |