to the little pains that have been taken in early life to awaken the perceptions. Never shall we find reason to conclude that the allwise Creator has formed the human mind on so limited a plan, as to render it necessary to annihilate one faculty, in order to make room for the operation of another !'-pp. 81---83.

In chapters 3, 4, and 5, of this Essay, Miss Hamilton proceeds to shew, by a variety of familiar facts, the efficacy of attention, in producing facility of conception, accuracy of judgement, and strength in the reasoning powers; and maintains her principle, if not with the vivacity, and in the day-light of genius, yet with that justness of observation and inference, which instructs and convinces. This, as well as every other part of her work, will be read with care by those, upon whom the early excitement and direction of attention devolves. Many, as they peruse these sensible pages, will feel that, from ignorance of the science of mind, they have but partially discharged parental duties, at what expence, or even with what solicitude soever their children may have been reared: and many, we trust, who are but now beginning the arduous process, will be led to consider the real objects of education, and the rational means to be employed in order to accomplish it, before early mistake or negligence, shall render an alteration of system of no avail.

Not much less important, when applied to practical uses, will be deemed the third essay, which traces the effects resulting from a peculiar direction of the attention on the power of the imagination, and in producing the emotions of taste.'

Imagination,' says our author, is not a simple faculty, but a complex power, in which all the faculties of the mind occasionally operate. The operation of these faculties upon the power of imagination, bears an exact proportion to the degree in which the objects of these faculties have been objects of attention; or, in other words, to the degree in which these several faculties have been previously cultivated. There can be no doubt, that the imagination of the person in whom they have all been cultivated will be rich and vigorous. pp. 157, 158.

In the mind of the person whose primary faculties have been no farther cultivated, than as impelled by necessity, or excited by some selfish impulse, the imagination may be equally active as in minds of a superior order: but, when the attention has never been directed towards subjects of an intellectual nature, we may easily con ceive how little its utmost activity can produce.' pp. 159, 160.

'But in minds destitute of cultivation, the combinations of imagination are frequently worse than useless; they are positively pernicious. They debase the mind, by rendering it familiar with low and grovelling objects, and even while the conduct remains without reproach, deprave the character by polluting the purity of the heart.' pp. 173, 174.

Few persons, perhaps, are sufficiently watchful to restrict the imaginations of their children from a certain kind of useless, agreeable roving, and to call in the truant faculty before its excursions defy control. Even when the channel in which their reveries delight to flow, is unpolluted, the effect of these romantic wanderings is pernicious to a degree little suspected by many who sit by and observe, occasionally, the look of abstraction, or attend, with misjudging interest, to narrations of what. the little vagrant has beheld during the wild, excursive range. The mind, if the indulgence is frequent, is fatigued by these pleasing exercises, and enervated to a state of alarming imbecility external objects lose all hold of the perceptions; active duties are forgotten, or neglected from sore distaste; and the whole being occupies an ideal world, indebted to the present for little more than the simple elements of which it is composed. When habits of this kind have been confirmed by time, the diffificulty of awakening the mind to passing things, and of exciting it either to real diligence in acquiring knowledge, or to regular energy in employing it, is great indeed nor is it probable that the habit will be effectually broken, till some impressive call in the dispensations of Providence arrest the attention, and constrain it to meet the realities of life; and even then, the waste of mind which it has occasioned, can never be repaired!

In proceeding, throughout the remainder of this essay, to consider the emotions of taste, cur author subscribes, without reserve, (though, of course, with the saving clause that the subject is not yet exhausted,) to the system already before the public, in the elegant work of Mr. Alison. This circumstance, together with the greater importance of topics that are afterwards treated of much more at length, induces us to make here but little comment. These emotions, of which the investigation has occasioned an undue warmth of dispute, are represented by Miss Hamilton, as springing from an harmonious exercise of all the faculties of the understanding, and all the sympathies of the heart, excited by habitual and appropriate attention to corresponding objects in producing them, intellect and affection are of course equally necessary, equally and conjointly operative.

In order to experience the emotions of taste, both of these must necessarily be cultivated; and there is no other way in which they can be cultivated but by attention to their proper objects.

• When it is the mental faculties only that have been improved by habitual exercise, the eye will perceive, and the ear will hear, and the judgment will determine, with accuracy; but if the affections be, in the mean time, dormant or obtuse, nothing that is seen, heard, or understood, will produce an emotion of taste. If, on the other hand, the affections have been cultivated by attention to the proper objects

of affection, the heart will certainly be rendered susceptible of vene. ration, love, joy, pity, admiration, gratitude, &c. and have all its tender sympathies called forth when the objects of these affections are presented to the sight, or to the memory; but if the intellectual faculties be in the same mind feeble, or only capable of partial and limited exertion, there will, in this instance likewise, be an utter incapability of experiencing the emotions of taste. Nor will these be experienced by him who has had both his heart and his understanding cultivated in the highest degree possible, unless he has habitually directed his attention to the discovery of such qualities in external objects, as by analogies or resemblance, are calculated to excite, through the medium of the imagination, the same affections as are inspired by the proper objects of his love, pity, admiration, &c. It is on the discovery of these analogies, that the emotions of taste depend, and only a peculiar exercise of attention that they can be discovered.'-pp. 190-192.

But we pass on to what must be deemed the centric interest of the work.

The greater part of the first volume being occupied by this examination of the agency of attention in improving the faculties, and in facilitating the operations of mind, the remainder, together with the whole of the second, is devoted to a subject, which, if not new in itself, is placed by Miss Hamilton in a point of view, in some respects, different from any in which it has hitherto been contemplated. The fourth essay commences with 'observations on the necessity of taking all the principles of the mind into consideration, in studying them with a view to self-improvement;' the active equally with the intellectual, and the intellectual equally with the active. From these preliminary remarks, our author proceeds to define and illustrate one subtle principle, which appears to her to be the most operative and prevailing of any by which the character is influenced; one, in subservience to which, every other principle and passion developes itself. It is thus introduced to the notice of her readers.

Being wholly ignorant of any term by which it might with propriety be designated, I take the liberty of describing it from its operations, as a propensity to magnify the idea of self; thus distinguishing it from selfishness, and self-love, with one or the other of which it has been usually, though, as I conceive, improperly confounded.

In order to give a clear view of the notions I have formed of the appropriate meaning of those several terms, it is necessary to state, that I consider self love as implying simply the desire of happiness; a desire which we may observe to be regulated and controlled by the intellectual powers, and, consequently, as to the nature of its operations, dependant on the direction given to the power of attention. In the minds of those whose attention has been exclusively occupied by mean, or trifling, or unworthy objects, the desire of happiness will

impel to gratifications of the same description; where nobler objects have engaged the attention, the same principle of self-love will, to the mind thus enlightened, prove a powerful incentive to the steady acquisition of knowledge, and the practice of virtue.

Selfishness, on the other hand, I consider as an inordinate desire of self-gratification, not dependant on the operation of the intellectual faculties for the character it assumes, but originating in associa tions that connect the idea of happiness with appropriating the ob jects that appear desirable to the heart, and thus obtaining cnjoyments in which none can participate, and in which none can sympathize. But, according to this definition, selfishness appears in some measure dependant on attention: the association above described being evidently formed by habitual attention to our own feelings and sensations, and habitual inattention to the feelings and sensations of others. this it is radically different from the propensity to enlarge the idea of self, which depends not on any peculiar direction of attention for its development, and this is the characteristic by which I consider it to be manifestly distinguished from all the desires and affections of the human mind.'-pp. 272–274.

In

Whatever be the tendency of the disposition, whatever be the frame of temper, it renders the passion that predominates subservient to its gratification, and--In whatever direction the propensity to expand the idea of self operates, whatever opposes or thwarts its operation, whatever tends to repress or diminish that notion of self, which the principle in question prompts us to endeavour to enlarge, tends immediately to produce in us one or other of the malevolent affections.'- Indeed, so intimately are they connected with this propensity, that I believe they might, without impropriety be termed its offspring.' pp. 275–278.

The principle thus defined to be a propensity to magnify the idea of self, appears to be sufficiently distinguishable from others with which it has usually been confounded, to merit a neater name; but we shall not prefer any claim to the honour of conferring it. The difficulty, both of defining and of explaining it, was evidently felt by Miss Hamilton; and even if ideas were distinctly formed in her own mind, she has not always been happy in her endeavours to elicit them. Labour and diffuseness characterize this part of her work. The importance of the subject induced her to make every possible effort to explain it to her readers; and not only does the style appear fatigued by the exercise, but the illustrations are so numerous, that to minds less deeply interested, they will, at times, seem superfluous. In some of them, the ideas which she thus labours to distinguish, appear too nearly confounded to the reader's eye.

In the second chapter of this essay, a variety of familiar examples is adduced, of the prevalence of this amusing propensity: amusing to him, at least, who contemplates the weaknesses of human nature without mourning its humiliation, without recurring to fac-similes inscribed upon his own character, and

with only the sarcastic glance of ridicule, from disgust-educing pleasure.' Many of them, among which are the following, are well adapted to confirm her idea.

Hence the disposition so observable in the vain, of making them. selves the heroes of their own stories. It is not sufficient simply to state a fact, or to relate an event with all its circumstances: for with every fact, and every event they mention, it is to them necessary to be some way or other identified. Rather than lose an opportunity of thus extending the idea of self, a vain man will claim affinity with persons who have derived notoriety from infamy; and acknowledge his having been privy to transactions which reflected disgrace on all concerned.' pp. 281, 282.

، A lady of fashion-though so helpless as to be incapable of putting on her clothes without assistance, instead of being humbled by the consciousness of her own weakness, attaches the idea of self to the strength and abilities of those she hires to attend her, and the more she can multiply these attendants, the more does the idea of self expand. Her personal weakness, so far from begetting sentiments of humility, is her boast, for she is strong in the strength of others, and whatever strength she can afford to purchase, constitutes in her mind a part of the complex idea of self, and by every contrivance of luxury is this idea enlarged.' p. 291.

In these instances, the propensity to magnify the idea of self, and to attach it, with all its interesting importance, to every thing to which it bears any relation, is sufficiently obvious; but in those which follow, the theory appears to us to be a little caricatured.

It is impossible to increase, in any considerable degree, the weight or size of the corporeal frame: but many are the contriv ances devised by the selfish principle to increase the idea of its weight and dimensions. It is this which raises the lofty cieling to three times the height of the human figure, and enlarges the spacious apartments so much beyond all proportion to the number and size of the inhabitants. The idea of increased weight keeps pace with that of increased dimensions. One horse cannot be supposed capable of drawing so immense a load. It requires the strength of a pair, or of four, or of six, according as the fortune or rank of the individual, which is to be displayed by this indication of an increase of person, renders it convenient.' pp. 291, 293.

In these examples, our author appears to mistake, not the principle, but the object upon which it expands; since when reduced to their simplest elements, the feelings here described, could not, we think, be resolved into an endeavour to augment, even in idea, the actual bulk. The vain man feels to live to the utmost dimensions of his spacious mansion, and extends the idea of his magnificence throughout the train of animals that precedes his carriage; it is not, however, the idea of personal bulk, but of general consequence which he aims thereby to mag