received the endorsement of a majority of 109. That in the district which contains so many elements of disorder, matters should not have settled down entirely, is not to be wondered at; but comparing the position of affairs now with what existed in 1880-81, matters have at the present time a more hopeful look. Passing now to India, here again do we find the policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government justified by its results. Their predecessors had tried to establish British ascendency in Afghanistan, thus creating in the minds of the fierce inhabitants of that country a bitter animosity to ourselves, and assisting Russia in its gigantic schemes of aggression by throwing the Afghans into their hands. Now what has been the result of Mr. Gladstone's policy? We have a friendly Afghanistan, its ruler our ally. We have too a loyal India, its people recognizing in the various measures adopted by the Government a determination to deal fairly with them irrespective of creed or colour. The silly nonsense that is sometimes talked about the only way of governing India, namely, by the sword, finds no echo in the policy enunciated by Mr. Gladstone, though that policy is quite consistent with a firm determination at once to rule India for the Indians, and to maintain the ascendency of British rule there. The controversy about the Ilbert Bill, and the virulent attacks made by the Anglo-Indian community upon Lord Ripon, prove that much remains to be done towards eradicating the mistaken notions of superiority entertained by some of these gentlemen; but it is satisfactory to feel that they have found no support from the ruling powers in this country. It is of course open to argument whether it would be better for India that Afghanistan should continue a sort of buffer-state between us and Russia in Central Asia, or whether it should be absorbed into our Indian possessions, so as to make them at once conterminous with those of Russia. But under existing circumstances we stand in a far better position than we did when the Government took office. The government have been accused most wrongfully, of indifference to the interests of India, and to the gradual advance made by Russia towards Afghanistan. It is difficult to see what more they could have done, unless they wished to precipitate a war with that great European Power. Situated as Russia is in Central Asia she is often forced, we will not say unwillingly, gradually to extend her borders, as we did in India; but until that extension brings her actually to the point of threatening our territory, no case is made for our taking active operations. No fair-minded reader of the recent diplomatic correspondence can fail to allow that the Govern

ment have striven successfully to keep themselves in the right, and that if war had broken out, or even if it now break out, it will be due to the fact that Russia has failed to maintain her most solemn and oft-repeated pledges, as well in the spirit as in the letter.

One of the feats of which the supporters of the late Ministry used to boast was the purchase of the shares which the late Khedive, Ismail Pasha, held in the Suez Canal. It is far from clear, even at the present time, what advantage it was anticipated this nation would derive from the transaction. It gave us no political rights, but simply made us partners in a commercial undertaking of considerable importance. It had, however, about it an appearance of statesmanlike acuteness which dazzled the imaginations of many, even of some who were not warm admirers of Lord Beaconsfield. If, however, no great gain attached to the purchase, so far at least as this country was concerned, no very serious evil has accrued to us in consequence. The same cannot be said of a subsequent transaction. In 1878 the sudden dismissal by Ismail Pasha of the English and French Finance Commissioners led to his deposition by those Powers and the bestowal of the Khedivate on his son Tewfik, a young man of twentyfive. Part of the arrangement was the establishment of a Joint or Dual Control by England and France of the financial affairs of Egypt, and that was one of the legacies left by the late Government. For awhile matters worked smoothly, but there was always the fear that, sooner or later, the time would come when a divergence of interests between the two countries, or a difference of policy, would lead to misunderstanding, seriously crippling the action of one or other of them. That time came in 1882, when vigorous action was required in order to crush in its very commencement a military rebellion led by Arabi Bey, prompted, it is believed, by the Porte. England and France had bound themselves to support the authority of the Khedive, but when the time of action came France hung back, and England felt for some time compelled to follow in the footsteps of, or, at any rate, not to outstrip, her partner, the consequence being that a rebellion which might have been nipped in the bud was allowed to develop to a serious extent. At last England, whose interests in the well-being of Egypt were far in excess of those of France, was constrained to interfere, and as a result the forts of Alexandria were bombarded. The refusal of France to join in this might very fairly have justified this country in at once terminating the Joint Control, but blame can scarcely be attached to Mr.

Gladstone for desiring not to offend the susceptibilities of our French allies. Nor can he be blamed for being anxious to avoid casting upon this country the obligation of permanently governing Egypt, a course which no responsible politician has ever advised. At the same time England could not view with indifference the state of affairs in that country. Not only is a very large portion of the traffic through the Suez Canal British, but the establishment of a possibly hostile power would seriously affect our position in India. To us therefore it was a matter of almost vital importance to put down the rebellion as we did, but there was no call upon us to supersede the reigning power so long as that remained friendly. Nor were we justified in doing more than we did in seeking to aid the Khedive by advice, or in insisting upon our advice being taken, so long as our own interests were not jeopardized. True, it is said that after the destruction of the Egyptian army at Tel-el-Kebir the English became the virtual rulers of the country and ought to have so acted, but that would have been contrary to the whole policy of the Government, and a breach of undertakings given to several of the Continental Powers. These critics conveniently ignore the fact that such a course would have formed a splendid pretext for, and would have effectually silenced our protests against, annexation on the part of other European Powers.

That is the real answer to those who maintain that the Government ought to have acted earlier in connection with affairs in the Soudan. No doubt they believed that the retention of that large district was a source of distress and mischief to Egypt; no doubt they strongly advised that it should be restored to the Soudanese, and thus terminate the rebellion which had begun in the year 1881. But that rebellion had not assumed serious proportions, and the Khedive and his native advisers were able to point to the fact that in several instances the rebels had been defeated; so the Government, adhering to their policy of abstaining as much as was possible, having regard to our own interests, from interference with the internal affairs of Egypt, did not insist, as they might have done, upon the Egyptian Government at once coming to terms with the Soudanese. The destruction of Hicks Pasha, and his army, and the subsequent defeat of Baker Pasha, however, completely changed the complexion of affairs. The prospect of an uprising which should extend to Egypt Proper and to the Red Sea littoral, was a matter our Government could not neglect. At the same time, in so far as the Soudanese were struggling for their own liberty, their movement commanded

our respect; it was only when that struggle assumed an aggressive aspect that it became serious to us. The Egyptian Government were unable, owing to the state of the finances and the inefficiency of the army, to put down the rebellion; so, under the circumstances, the best thing to be done was to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons, and offer to restore the Soudan to the Soudanese. But these were not a civilized people, and what might have been an easy matter with any other nations or peoples proved to be a very difficult one with them. In this state of affairs the Government determined to send out the one man who alone, it was believed, could carry out their wishes and intentions-General Gordon. Of his career it is not our intention here to speak; suffice it to say, that the step thus taken by the Government not only met with nearly universal approval, but was almost forced upon them by public opinion. But it was always intended, and with Gordon's entire acquiescence, that his mission should be a peaceful one; he was to proclaim the Soudan free from Egyptian rule, and endeavour to secure the safe return of the garrisons. He went accompanied only by a single companion, and in a comparatively short space of time reached Khartoum in safety. Received at first with acclaim by the people, he soon found himself face to face with a very different set of circumstances from those under which he had previously acquired immense influence with the Soudanese. The Mahdi was not simply a patriot anxious to free his country from the yoke of the Egyptian Government, he aimed at being a religious leader with a mission extending far beyond the confines of the Soudan. He rejected Gordon's offers with scorn, and the latter, at first making light of the extent of the Mahdi's influence, sought to subdue it by force. In this he was unsuccessful, and in turn found himself besieged in Khartoum by the Mahdi. There can be little doubt that, had he chosen to do so, Gordon could have escaped, but under a sense of duty, which we think mistaken, he elected to defend the place. Against their will the Government were therefore compelled to send out a relief expedition under Lord Wolseley, which unfortunately arrived too late to prevent the taking of Khartoum, through treachery, and the death of Gordon. During the uncertainty that prevailed as to the actual death of Gordon and what effect that would have on the intentions and position of the Mahdi, the Government announced their intention of pursuing the policy of sending a British force to Khartoum ; but the subsequent knowledge they have gained as to the former, and the paralysis which seems to have over

taken the Mahdi, have induced them, most wisely, to abandon their intention. The contemporaneous operations in the neighbourhood of Souakim having also crippled the power of the Mahdi's lieutenant, Osman Digna, there is no longer any need for their continuance, and the Soudan campaign has therefore been closed. It was not a glorious one, but glory was not our aim; it failed in rescuing Gordon, but it succeeded in crushing a movement likely to have proved dangerous to civilization.

Into all these complications the Government were, as we maintain, dragged most unwillingly. An aggressive policy was not of their seeking, and in this respect their actions stand on a wholly different plane from those of their predecessors. They have been charged with a vacillating and inconsistent policy. We deny this entirely, Their policy has, in our opinion, been clear and consistent throughout. They have desired to protect English interests, to avoid extending the serious responsibilities which annexation would involve, to try and make Egypt self-governing, and to restore the Soudan to its native tribes, and thus destroy one of the main sources of Egyptian misfortune. And no contrary policy has been propounded by any responsible opponent of the Government. If the captain of a sailing vessel seeks to go from one port to another, contrary winds may make him go out of the direct course is he to be charged with vacillation and inconsistency because he tacks instead of facing the weather? The Government have been in a similar position. Their policy, their ultimate design has never been departed from, but they have been forced by the stress of unforeseen circumstances to adopt plans which apparently are in opposition to that design, but in reality are a mode of carrying it out. In so far as English interests are concerned they have been protected, annexation has not taken place, the Soudan is restored to the natives, and the rebellion, in so far as it was likely to prove a source of danger to Egypt itself and to our interests, has been crushed. It is also charged against the Government that had they in the first instance adopted a bolder and more assertive policy much that has happened would not have come to pass. It is of course possible that those who make the charge are right, but we do not ourselves feel assured of it. Is it quite clear that a vigorous policy would not have involved us in complications with European Powers far more serious than those that have occurred in Egypt? The story of what has been resisted and avoided cannot yet be told to the world; when it is we feel