585. REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION.-The reasons for making the distinction between invasion and insurrection are obvious. Invasion is not only the more imminent peril, but it is also a direct challenge of the National authority. On the other hand, it is the duty of any government, State or other, to enforce its own laws. A government that cannot, as a rule, enforce its own laws, but must rely upon another government to do so, is no government at all. The coercive element is essential to the very existence of government. Besides, a State government would naturally resent all offers of unnecessary protection as an interference in its affairs, which would be a confession of weakness. Again, the frequent employment of the National forces by the President for such purposes would tend to centralize power and perhaps establish a military despotism. Hence the National government's power to interfere is limited by a formal application for protection. The preference of the legislature to the governor in making the application, also arises from the fear of centralized power.

586. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.-The Constitution assumes, and so indirectly ordains, various features of the State governments. Moreover, by assuming the existence of these features, and by devolving upon legislatures, governors, and judges certain definite duties, the Constitution makes them, de facto, a part of the machinery of the National government, and so declares, by implication, that they shall continue. No State, therefore, could abolish its legislature, governor, or courts of law. To do so would bring it into collision with the National authority. And this also is a pledge that the government of every State must be republican.

CHAPTER XXVII.

AMENDMENTS.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first Article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

587. NEED OF the Power of Amendment.-Changes in the general condition of a people, which are especially rapid in young and growing states, necessitate changes in the constitution as well as in the laws. At the same time, frequent changes are undesirable. They keep the country in turmoil, and beget contempt for the constitution itself. Writers on constitutional law teach, and experience confirms the teaching, that fundamental laws should be drawn in broad and comprehensive terms, and not be capable of easy change. The Articles of Confederation were practically incapable of amendment, and this fact hastened the decline of the Confederation, and so made way for the present government. The framers of the Constitution guarded well both points of danger.

It is not easy to amend it, but it is possible. During the century that has passed since it went into operation, but nineteen amendments have been proposed, and but fifteen have been ratified.

588. THE FORM OF AN AMENDMENT.-When the first amendments were under discussion in the House of Representatives in 1789, there sprang up a difference of opinion as to the form which they should take. It was first proposed to insert them in the body of the Constitution in the natural places, but it was finally decided to add them as supplements. The form of proposal then adopted has since been followed, viz.: "Resolved, .... That the following Articles be proposed as amendments to the Constitution, and when ratified by three-fourths of the State legislatures shall become valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the same."

589. STEPS IN MAKING AN AMENDMENT.-These are two in number, proposing and ratifying the Amendment. They are the same steps that were taken when the Constitution itself was made. But the Constitution provides alternative modes both of proposal and of ratification.

(1) Congress may propose amendments by the vote of two-thirds of each House; or, secondly, whenever the legislatures of two-thirds of the States make such an application, Congress shall call a National convention for that purpose. Evidently the first is much the more direct and simple mode, and it might seem that it is sufficient. But as Congress might refuse to propose amendments that were demanded by the popular will, the alternative mode was provided. This renders it possible to propose amendments to which both Houses are opposed, and offers a means of escape from this danger, but it has never been found necessary to call a convention for this purpose.

(2) An amendment duly proposed must be ratified by the legislatures, or by the conventions of three-fourths of the States before it becomes binding. The Constitution itself was

submitted to State conventions, because it was essential that the immediate representatives of the people, chosen for that sole purpose, should pass upon it, but in the case of amendments that is not necessary. In the resolution proposing an amendment, Congress has always designated that the ratifications shall be by the legislatures of the States.

590. LIMITATIONS OF THE POWER OF AMENDMENT.-No amendment should be made previous to 1808 changing the conclusions that the Convention had reached, with so much difficulty, in relation to the slave trade and in relation to the imposition of direct taxes. The other limitation was far more important. No State, without its consent, can be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. Apparently, this limitation puts this feature of the National system beyond possible change.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE SUPREMACY OF THE UNION.

ARTICLE VI.

Clause 1.-All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation.

591.

THE VALIDITY OF THE PUBLIC DEBT.In the prosecution of the war against England, the Confederation had contracted a large public debt, partly domestic and partly foreign. This debt would be as binding in morals and in international law against the new government as against the old one, since the change in no way affected the identity of the American people or the continuity of the National life, But, at the same time, a formal assertion of the validity of the debt in the organic law could not fail to give confidence in the new government, particularly in those countries where the foreign debt was held.

592. THE WEAK POINT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM.-This is the relation of the local governments to the general government. It is the problem of securing at once both local freedom and independence and national union and strength. If the system is efficient and permanent, the national jurisdiction must be paramount. The states are equal in rank; but if the national authority stands on the same level, the union exists only in name. This point the Constitution protects by the following clauses:

Clause 2.-This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the