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statutes of this state which have been declared unconstitutional in whole or in part. There are over one hundred and thirty such statutes scattered through the statute books. (2) A table of all California citations to either of the California Constitutions. This will permit a hasty examination of all decisions citing any particular section of the Constitution. (3) A table of parallel sections in the Constitutions of 1849 and 1879, which will also prove a useful feature. (4) Reference to all citations in the decisions of the federal courts regarding the Constitution of California. (5) The present text of the Constitution printed separately for ready reference. (6) References to decisions of the Railroad Commission of the state of California dealing with constitutional questions.
Annotations.-As to the form of the annotations, the aim has been to present in the most condensed form the principles of the decisions, rather than any statement of the facts of the cases. In other words, we have attempted something more than a mere digest, or syllabi of the decisions.
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION.—California was admitted into the Union of states September 9, 1850. The first Constitution was adopted in convention October 10, 1849, ratified by the people November 13, 1849, proclaimed December 20, 1849. This Constitution was amended in 1857 and 1871, and the article on the judicial department was revised in 1862.
The present Constitution was adopted in convention March 3, 1879, ratified by the people May 7, 1879, and went into effect July 4, 1879, so far as it related to election of officers, etc., and January 1, 1880, for all other purposes. Various amendments have been made to it from time to time, but no systematic revision of it has been effected.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION.—The Constitution of this state, unlike the federal Constitution, is not to he considered as a grant of power, but rather as a limitation upon the powers of the legislature. (People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46, 60 Am. Dec. 581; People v. Jewett, 6 Cal. 291; State v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 159; People v. Twelfth District Court, 17 Cal. 517; Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161; Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395.)
It is, however, to be considered as a grant of power to the other branches of the government. (People v. Jewett, 6 Cal. 291.)
Words and phrases. Where a word, having a technical, as well as a popular, meaning, is used in the Constitution, the courts will accord to it its popular meaning, unless the nature of the subject indicates, or the context suggests, that it is used in its technical sense. (Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111; Oakland Pav. Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3; Oakland Pav. Co. v. Tompkins, 72 Cal. 5, 1 Am. St. Rep. 17, 12 Pac. 801; Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 1 Am. St. Rep. 67, 14 Pac. 27; People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 331, 13 Am. Rep. 143.)
Prospective construction.-Provisions of the Constitution are to be considered prospective and not retrospective unless a contrary intention clearly appears. (Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88.)
Reasonable construction. A construction should be adopted which tends to certainty, security, and substantial justice, in preference to that which involves uncertainty, insecurity, and inevitable injustice. (San Gabriel Land etc. Co. v. Witmer Bros. Co., 96 Cal. 623, 18 L. R. A. 465, 29 Pac. 500, 31 Pac. 588.)
But where a provision is plain and unambiguous, it cannot be changed by the courts to avoid what may seem to be an absurdity or injustice. (Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 519, 21 Pac. 958.)
All the provisions of the Constitution must be read together, and effect given to all of them. They must receive a practical common sense construction, and be considered with reference to the prior state of the law, and the mischief intended to be remedied. (People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518.)
Construction of inconsistent provisions or amendments of Con.
stitution. See note, 18 Ann. Cas. 725.
MEANS OF CONSTRUCTION_Debates of the convention.—The debates of the constitutional convention may be referred to for the purpose of construing the provisions of the Constitution. (People v. Chapman, 61 Cal. 262; People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209; Isola v. Weber, 13 Misc. Rep. 100, 34 N. Y. Supp. 77; Higgins v. Prater, 91 Ky. 6, 14 S. W. 910; State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399; Bank of Woodland v. Pierce, 144 Cal. 434, 77 Pac. 1012.)
Proceedings of constitutional convention as aid in construing Con
stitution. See notes, 10 Ann. Cas. 1146; 6 R. C. L., $ 65, p. 67.
Judicial decisions.- Where a provision of the former Constitution, which has received a judicial construction, is copied into the new Constitution, it will be presumed that it was adopted in view of that construction. (Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 7 Pac. 456, 635, 8 Pac. 709; Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465, 11 Pac. 20; Lord v. Dunster, 79 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 865; People v. Freeman, 80 Cal. 233, 13 Am. St. Rep. 122, 22 Pac. 173; People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 Pac. 45; Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 474, 50 Pac. 644; Ex parte Ahern, 103 Cal. 412, 37 Pac. 390; People v. Edwards, 93 Cal. 153, 28 Pac. 831; Palache v. Hunt, 64 Cal. 473, 2 Pac. 245.)
The mere fact that a change is made in the phraseology of such provision by subsequent revision will not be deemed a change in the law, unless such phraseology evidently purports an intention to make a change. (Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353.)
The same rule applies to provisions of the Constitution borrowed from the Constitutions of other states, and where such provisions have received judicial construction in such states, they are to be deemed to have been adopted in view of such construction. (People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46, 60 Am. Dec. 581 ; People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467; Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 Pac. 251.)
The exposition of the Constitution by the highest court in existence under it, with regard to laws passed while it was in force, should be accepted by all succeeding courts, without regard to their own views as to the correctness of the doctrine. (Staude v. Board of Election Commrs., 61 Cal. 313; Emery v. Reed, 65 Cal. 351, 4 Pac. 200; Davis v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 581. See, also, Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175.)
Legislative construction.—Legislative construction of a constitutional provision is a method of interpretation. (Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159, 21 Pac. 547; San Luis Obispo County v. Darke, 76 Cal. 92, 18 Pac. 118; Lord v. Dunster, 79 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 865; Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Bank of Woodland v. Pierce, 144 Cal. 434, 77 Pac. 1012.)
But this does not mean that the hasty and inconsiderate legislation of three winters shall be conclusive of the constitutionality of such legislation. (People v. Wells, 2 Cal. 198, 208.)
The fact that ever since the adoption of the Constitution all executive officers other than the governor and lieutenant-governor have been installed in office on the first Monday after the first day of January is entitled to great weight in the construction of the meaning of the Constitution. (People v. Nye, 9 Cal. App. 148, 98 Pac. 241.)
Universal practice of assessors may be looked to in aid of the construction of provisions of the Constitution relating to taxation. (Bank of Woodland v. Pierce, 144 Cal. 434, 77 Pac. 1012.)
POWER TO DECLARE STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-A government with no limits but its own discretion is not a constitutional government, in the true sense of the term. (Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1.)
The Constitution is a law, and must be construed by someone, and the judiciary possesses the power to construe it in all cases not expressly, or by necessary implication, reserved to the other departments. (Nougues v.
v Douglass, 7 Cal. 65; People v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11.)
But where the right to determine the extent and effect of a restriction in the Constitution is expressly or by necessary implication confided to the legislature, the judiciary has no right to interfere with the legislative construction. (Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65.)
In declaring a statute unconstitutional, the court cannot interfere with the exercise of the political power of the legislature. (Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65.)
The courts can declare a statute unconstitutional only when the question arises as a pure matter of law unmixed with matters of fact. (Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 619, 25 Am. St. Rep. 230, 14 L. R. A. 459, 27 Pac. 1089.)
Therefore, the constitutionality of a statute can be determined only from the facts appearing upon the face of the law, taken in connection with matters of which the court can take judicial notice. (Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 27 Am. St. Rep. 203, 15 L. R. A. 431, 28 Pac. 951; Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649, 25 Am. St. Rep. 230, 14 L. R. A. 459, 27 Pac. 1089; Conlin v. Board of Supervisors, 99 Cal. 17, 37 Am. St. Rep. 17, 21 L. R. A. 474, 33 Pac. 753; Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165.)
But, while the courts may declare statutes unconstitutional, they have no power to avoid the effects of nonaction on the part of the legislature. (Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341.)
Power to declare statutes void. See 6 R. C. L., $$ 67-76,
pp. 70–78. Extrinsic evidence to impeach statutes. See notes, 13 Am. Rep.
648; 51 Am. Rep. 616.
Presumption of constitutionality.-An act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional. (In re Madera Irr.
( Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 14 L. R. A. 755, 28 Pac. 272, 675; People v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, 17 Am. St. Rep. 217, 7 L. R. A. 348, 23 Pac. 1; In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 81 Pac. 1041; In re Bunkers, 1 Cal. App. 61, 81 Pac. 748; Title etc. Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 682, 88 Pac. 356; In re Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 117 Am. St. Rep. 137, 9 Ann. Cas. 1105, 86