I send you the copy. I can send you a fac-simile of the letter. Ever yours most sincerely, [Enclosure.] (Dépot Général de la Guerre.) W. Extrait du 2o Volume de la Correspondance relative à la Guerre d'Allemagne en 1674. MONSIEUR, Paris, le 29 Mars, 1674. Celle:cy vous sera rendüe par Monsieur Churchill que je presentay hyer a Sa Mte. Tres Chrestienne de la part du Roy de la Grande Bretagne, avec priere de luy vouloir accorder une Comission de Colonel d'Infanterie dans son service. J'eus le bien d'entretenir aussi hyer Monsieur de Pompone des affaires du Regiment de Cavalerie de Monsieur le Duc de Monmouth, qui est a Treves, & supplie V. Exce. de considerer les memoires conjonts, touchant l'une et l'autre affaire, & de souffrir que Monsieur de Littleton, Lieutenant Colonel dudit Regiment de Cavalerie, puisse avoir l'honneur de vous aller entretenir des Interests de ce Regiment, en attendant que j'aye celuy de le pouvoir faire moy mesme, & de vous remercier en mesme tems de toutes les Civilites par lesquelles il vous a plû obliger Monsieur, de V. Exce. Le tres humble & tres WILL. LOCKHART. THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON ON THE 1842. IN the autumn of 1842 Lord Francis Egerton (afterwards the first Earl of Ellesmere) drew up an able commentary on the Russian campaign of 1812, which he embodied in a letter to the Right Hon. Charles Arbuthnot. He endeavoured to show that in their first retreat the Russians had committed some errors of strategy, being misled by the successful precedent of the British army to the lines of Torres Vedras. The Duke was greatly pleased with this paper, and wrote upon it the following Memorandum, which (I being then at Walmer with him) he had the goodness to show me. He also allowed me to take a copy. S. Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington. Walmer Castle, October, 1842. I have been much interested in the perusal of this letter. When I go to London, I will look for the papers which I wrote on the campaign in Russia, of which I gave a copy to Walter Scott, which he used in his 'History of the Life of Napoleon.' Lord Francis is right. The Russians nearly lost themselves by an ill-applied imitation of our operations which saved Portugal; and they would have been lost, if Napoleon had not always, and particularly at that time, found himself under the necessity of seeking to fight a general battle. With this view he quitted the basis of his operations, up to that moment successful, adopted a new line, which, after all, he never completely established, and ultimately abandoned. That which the Russians did well was their dogged refusal to treat. Napoleon having fought his battle and obtained possession of the ancient and real capital of the country, intended to record his triumph as usual in a Treaty of Peace, by one of the articles of which he would have obtained a sum of money to replenish his coffers, according to his usual practice; and he would then have made a peaceable and triumphant retreat from Russia across Poland and Germany, supported by the resources of the Russian Government as long as his armies should have remained in the Russian territory. In the mean time he had made no preparations for the Military Retreat which he would have to make, if his Diplomatic efforts should fail, which they did. We see that he was distressed for want of communications even before he thought of retreat; his hospitals were not supplied, nor even taken care of, and were at last carried off; and when he commenced to make a G 3 106 WELLINGTON ON THE MOSCOW RETREAT. 1842. real movement of retreat, he was involved in difficulties without number. The first basis of his operations was lost; the new one not established; and he was not strong enough to force his way to the only one which could have been practicable, and by the use of which he might have saved his army,-by the sacrifice, however, of all those corps which were in the northern line of operations: I mean the line from Kalouga through the southern countries. But, instead of that, he was forced to take his retreat by the line of the river Beresina, which was exhausted, and upon which he had made no preparations whatever. This is in few words the history of that disaster. It is my opinion that the loss of the French army would have been accelerated, more disastrous and disgraceful, if the season had been wet instead of having been frosty. In truth, the army could not in that case have moved at all in the state to which all its animals were reduced at that time. WELLINGTON. LINES BY PRINCE CHARLES STUART, (OF “THE '45.") (From the Stuart Papers at Windsor.) Hated by fools and fools to hate— I hate all Kings and the thrones they sit on, To my poor Country Do all what you can, De Rome, France et Espagne les infamies- *Note to the Second Edition.—| These two couplets are, I find, only transcripts made by Prince Charles for his own use; the first being the close of an epistle from Dr. Swift to Dr. Delany, and the second, though slightly altered, part of a poem by Lord Rochester.-S. |