the Spaniards or the Portuguese. But, on the other hand, I think I had most difficulties at home. He was all in all with the administration; but I supported the Government much more than they supported me.'

On Sept. 17, 1836, I sent this passage in MS. to the Duke, telling him that I would insert it only if that insertion met with his entire approbation. "But if not," I added, "have the goodness to strike your pen through the page, and there shall be an end of it."

In reply, the Duke drew up and sent me the enclosed Memorandum. I accordingly omitted the passage in question from my History.

S.

Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington.

Sept. 18, 1836.

It is very true that I have often said that I considered Napoleon's presence in the field to be equal to 40,000 men in the balance.

This is a very loose way of talking; but the idea is a very different one from that of his presence at a battle being equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men.

I'll explain my meaning.

1. Napoleon was a grand homme de guerre, possibly the greatest that ever appeared at the head of a French army.

2. He was the Sovereign of the country as well as the Military Chief of the army. That country was constituted

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upon a military basis. All its institutions were framed for the purpose of forming and maintaining its armies with a view to conquest. All the offices and rewards of the State were reserved in the first instance exclusively for the army. An officer, even a private soldier, of the army might look to the sovereignty of a kingdom as the reward for his services. It is obvious that the presence of the Sovereign with an army so constituted must greatly excite their exertions.

3. It was quite certain that all the resources of the French State, civil, political, financial, as well as military, were turned towards the seat of the operations which Napoleon himself should direct.

4. Every Sovereign in command of an army enjoys advantages against him who exercises only a delegated power, and who acts under orders and responsibilities. But Napoleon enjoyed more advantages of this description than any other Sovereign that ever appeared. His presence, as stated by me more than once, was likely not only to give to the French army all the advantages above detailed, but to put an end to all the jealousies of the French Marshals and their counter-action of each other, whether founded upon bad principles and passions, or their fair differences of opinion. The French army thus had a unity of action.

These four considerations induced me to say generally that his presence ought to be considered as 40,000 men in the scale. But the idea is obviously very loose, as must be seen by a moment's reflection.

If the two armies opposed to each other were 40,000 men on each side, his presence could not be equal to a

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reinforcement of 40,000 men on the side of the French army, nor even if they were 60,000 men on each side, or possibly even 80,000 men on each side.

It is clear, however, that wherever he went he carried with him an obvious advantage. I don't think that I ought to be quoted as calling that advantage as equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men under all possible circumstances.

I quite agree that the Duke of Marlborough is the greatest man that ever appeared at the head of a British army.

He had greater difficulties to contend with in respect to his operations and the command of his troops in the field than I had. I had no Dutch Deputies to control my movements or intentions, whether to fight or otherwise. But, on the other hand, I had armies to co-operate with me, upon whose operations I could not reckon, owing to the defective state of their discipline and their equipments, and their deficiencies of all kinds. I could not rely upon ten thousand of them doing what five hundred ought to do, or upon their doing anything, much less upon their doing what ten thousand ought to do. The Duke of Marlborough did not labour under this inconvenience.

Then the Duke of Marlborough carried on his operations in countries fully peopled in proportion to their extent. He never experienced any inconveniences from the want of supplies of provisions. It was impossible to move at all in the Peninsula without previously concerted arrangements for the supply of the troops with provisions, means of transport, &c.

The Duke of Marlborough's difficulties were greater than mine in relation to his own operations; mine were greater than his in every other respect.

But this is not all.

The Duke of Marlborough generally, if not always, commanded an army superior to his enemy in the field. The army commanded by me was always inferior, not only in reference to the description of troops, but even in numbers, to the enemy.

But that which I particularly object to is the last paragraph.

I have always, in public as well as in private, declared my obligations to the Government for the encouragement and support which they gave me, and the confidence with which they treated me.

I was not the Government, as the Duke of Marlborough was; nor were all the resources of this nation at my command to carry on the war which I was conducting, as the resources of Great Britain, in the time of Queen Anne-military, naval, political, and financial—were at the command of the Duke of Marlborough. The nation at that time were heart-in-hand, bent upon carrying on that war. France was not then so powerful as she was from 1808 to 1814; England was not threatened with invasion; it was not necessary to protect Sicily by an army of 20,000 men of the best troops. The United States had not been formed, and it was not necessary to defend our vital interests on the Continent of America against their attack. The resources of the country then, instead of being exclusively devoted to

carry on the war which I conducted, were unavoidably devoted to other objects.

Besides all this, there was a formidable opposition to the Government in Parliament, which opposed itself particularly to the operations of the war in the Peninsula.

It would not be fair to compare the conduct of the Government of the Regency in relation to the war which I conducted with the conduct of the Government in the reign of Queen Anne. I cannot and never have complained of them; and I should not like to say that I supported the Government more than they supported me."

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In one sense it is true.

It is quite certain that my opinion alone was the cause of the continuance of the war in the Peninsula. My letters show that I encouraged, nay forced, the Government to persevere in it. The successes of the operations of the army supported them in power. But it is not true that they did not, in every way in their power, as individuals, as Ministers, and as a Government, support me.

WELLINGTON.

Duke of Wellington to Lord Mahon.

MY DEAR LORD MAHON,

Strathfieldsaye, February 19, 1837.

Did you ever know that application was made

to Louis XIV. to make Lord Marlborough a Colonel in his service?