to our most commendable Paffions or Affections; which are all of them fo many different movements only of our bodily Organs in conjunction with the Soul; or by infinite Regulation of like Paffions with ours. I fay, the ad ding Infinity to these, or to any other Terms which exprefs Perfections of ours, natural or moral, in their Literal Sence; or the multiplying or Enlarging of those Perfections of ours in number, or Degree only to the utmost stretch of our Capacity and Understanding, and the attributing them So enlarged to God; is in truth and strictnefs no more than raifing up to our felves an immenfe and Unwieldly Idol of our own Imagination, which has no Foundation in Reafon or the Nature of Things. NOTHING is more evident, than that we have no Idea of God, as he is in himself; and it is for want of fuch an Idea, that we frame to our felves the moft excellent Conception of him we can, by putting together into one, the greatest Perfections we obferve in the Creatures, and particularly in our own reafonable Nature, to ftand for his Perfections. Not moft grofly arguing and inferring, that God is (in Effect and Confequence) fuch an one as our felves, only infinitely enlarged and Improved in all our natural Powers and Faculties; but concluding, That our greatest Excellencies are the beft, and apteft, and moft correfpondent Reprefentations only of his incomprehenfible Per G 3 fections; fections; which infinitely tranfcend the most exalted of what are in any Created Beings, and are far above out of the reach of all human Imagination. I HAD not been fo exprefs and particular upon this head, were it not for the mischievous confequences of that vain affectation both to Religion and Learning in general, of confining all our Knowledge to Direct and Immediate Ideas only. For the Men of this strain ever lay it down for a fure Principle they never recede from, That we can have no Knowledge without Ideas, which is certainly true; and even without Ideas of Senfation, which are indeed the groundwork and rough materials of all the most refin'd and abftracted Knowledge we are capable of. But then the Inference they make from hence at every turn, when they venture to fpeak plain is, That therefore we can have no Knowledge of any thing BEYOND them; or that we have no Knowledge of any thing But what we have an Immediate and Proper Idea of; and fince we can have no immediate and proper Idea but of fenfible Objects, that Consequence of theirs is directly deftructive of all Religion as well Natural as Reveal'd. Thus do these Idealifts, firft make the Word too General and indeterminate, comprehending under it All forts of Perceptions, and all kinds of Knowledge whatfoever; and then to ferve a Turn, Confine it to that Knowledge which we have only by Proper and Immediate Ideas. NOR NOR is this Affectation lefs injurious to the Understanding in general; for it comprehends things of All Kinds under one and the Same Word, by that means blending and confounding their true Diftinctions. Infomuch that after ringing the Changes upon Ideas thro' whole Volumes together, the Authors leave the Reader in a fort of a Maze, with a long Chain of them Ratling in his Head; and without any other real and fubftantial Knowledge than what he got from that part of them which treats of Ideas of Senfation. Thus far it must be confeffed they have treated of them usefuly and commendably; but all beyond this is fpecious Trifling, and nothing more than an empty Shew of great Exactness and Accuracy. The feveral Properties of Ideas of SINCE then it appears the Ideas of Senfa tion are the only Original fubject matter which the Mind hath to work upon, provided by God and Nature for the exercise of all its Powers and Faculties; and fince they are the foundation and rough materials of all our most Abstracted Knowledge; out of which each Man raises a fuperftructure according to the different Turn G 4 Turn of thofe Organs which are more immediately fubfervient to theOperations of the pure Intellect; and according to the various ways and methods he takes of exercifing thofe Operations upon them, it will be convenient to fay fomething concerning the feveral Properties of those Ideas. I. ACCORDINGLY the firft Property of them is, that they are Original. By which is meant, not only that they are the Firft Ideas the Mind receives; as if it afterwards received Ideas of a Different Nature, and Equaly Original in their Kind; or as if the Imagination was firft ftock'd with Ideas of Senfation, and the Mind was afterwards fome other way fupplied with a New Sett of Ideas Independent of them: But they are fo call'd because we receive them, from our firft coming into the World, without any Immediate concurrence of the pure Intellect, being altogether antecedent to any of its Operations; infomuch that the Soul, before there is fome Impreffion of outward Objects upon the Senfes, is a Still unactive Principle, unable to exert itself in any degree; it cannot form one Thought, nor have the leaft confciousness even of its own Being. These Ideas are, in refpect of all our Notions, and Conceptions, and Reafonings, in this one inftance like the firft particles of Matter in respect to all the Subftances that are compounded out of them; namely, that they run thro' an infinite infinite variety of Changes from the Operations of the Mind upon them; but do themselves remain the fame and unchangeable. As all our Compounded Ideas are made out of These alone, and as even our most abstract Complex Notions take their first Rife from them; fo is our Knowledge of all Things, whereof we have complex Notions or Conceptions, Ultimately refolvable into these Ideas only; and not indifferently and promifcuoufly into fimple Ideas of Senfation and Reflection as Equaly original. By this Property they are diftinguished, 1st. FROM fuch Ideas as are supposed to be Innate, fuch as we are by fome imagined to be born with, and are fo interwoven with our frame, that they neceffarily grow up within us; and would be in our Mind, if there were no impreffion from outward Objects upon the Senfes. That which gave Rife to this Opinion of Innate Ideas was, the lofs Men found themfelves at in folving the Manner of our conceiving Immaterial and heavenly Things; they would not give way to fuch a Thought, as that we should conceive them by the help and Intervention of any things in This World, there appearing no Congruity or Proportion between them; and therefore they had recourse to innate Ideas for that purpose, which fhould be the Objects of the Pure Intellect independent of all Senfation. But let any Man, if he is able, abstract from all Senfation or Impreffion of ma |