CHA P. 11.

Of Senfe, and the Ideas of Senfation.

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UR five Senfes, tho' common to us with Brutes, are however the only Source and Inlets of those Ideas, which are the intire Groundwork of all our Knowledge both Human and Divine. Without Ideas of fome fort or other, we could have no Knowledge at all; for to know a thing, is to have fome Reprefentation of it in the Mind; but we cannot think, or be conscious of thinking, 'till we have fome Idea or Semblance of an Object to think upon; and without our Senfes, we could not have one internal Idea or Semblance of

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thing without us. Infomuch that in our very Entrance into the large and capacious Field of Argument which is before us, we must lay down that Maxim of the Schools as univerfaly true without any Reftriction or Limitation, Nihil eft in Intellectu quod non prius fuit in Senfu; or, as a certain Philofopher expreffeth it with more Softnefs, Nefcio an quicquam Intellectus moliri poffit, nifi ab imaginatione laceffitus.

THE Imagination is the common Storehouse and Receptacle of all thofe Images, which are tranfmitted thro' the Senfes; and 'till this is furnished in fome degree, the Soul, while it is in the Body, is a ftill, unactive Prin

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ciple; and then only begins to operate and first exert itself, when it is fupplied by Senfation with Materials to work upon: So that the most abstracted fpiritual Knowledge we have, as will hereafter abundantly appear, takes its first Rife from those Sensations; and hath all along a neceffary dependence upon them.

I AM not unaware, how much this pofitive Affertion will at firft ftartle and furprize all thofe, who have hitherto fancied they could abstract intirely from all Ideas of Senfation; and that by the help of fuch as are Purely Intellectual they could think altogether independently of them. And the thought which naturaly arises in their Mind on this occafion is this; That if this kind of Abftraction is utterly impracticable, what then will become of all our Knowledge of the Things of another World? Of all Revealed Religion, and the Truths of Morality, and the Mysteries of Chriftianity? They are all, I truft in God, very fafe; and will become the more fo when this Affertion is fully laid open, rightly explain'd, and univerfaly acknowledg'd to be true.

THE Question is not, what the Confequences. may be of enlarging upon this Principle, and pursuing that Analogy, by which alone our natural Ideas and Conceptions become fubfervient to the conceiving and apprehending things fupernatural? But whether the Principle is true?

For there is a mutual Sympathy and faft Connection between the Truths of Nature, and thofe of Religion; they fall in together, and close whenever they meet, fo as to communicate Light and Strength to each other. This Opinion, as every thing else which is agreeable to Reason, will I hope be of no fmall Advantage to true Religion; for I doubt not but the Effect of putting it in a right Light will be, that Enthusiasm, in all the great Variety of Shape in which it fhews itself, will fall to the Ground at once; and all thofe Objections against Revelation and Myftery will be removed, which proceed upon their being Abftrufe, Unintelligible, and Contradictory; and those who expofe our Chriftian Myfteries, or explain them away under Pretence and Colour of adhering to ftrict Reafon and Evidence, will be under a neceffity of finding out new Topics. So that, tho' we thus ftoop as Low as the Earth, yet it is that from thence we may with more Vigour take our Flight even to Heaven itself, for the Contemplation of all the glorious Objects of another World.

BEFORE I fpeak of the particular Properties of these Ideas of Sensation, it will bẹ convenient to observe these three things in general concerning them.

I. THAT it is no way to the Purpose of the following Difcourfe to decide here, whether

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all fenfitive Perception be performed by any Actual Impreffion of the Thing itself upon our Senses? Or by any Operation of the fense upon the Object? Whatever the Quality in fenfible Objects is, which enables them to imprint fome Reprefentation or Character of themselves upon us; or whatever that Frame and Contexture of the Organs is, which difpofeth them either to receive that Impreffion, or to take the Likenefs of those external Objects by any intrinfic Virtue and Power of their own; it is certain that all fuch Perception neceffarily requires the Prefence of the Object; with an immediate actual Operation either of the Object upon our Organs, or of our Organs upon the Object. The Effect and Confequence is the fame, as when we apply the Wax to the Seal, or the Seal to the Wax; there follows fome fort of Representation of the Object and its Qualities. This is the Cafe of all thofe material external Objects, which by their Prefence have left any Footstep or Character of themselves upon our Senses; and this Representation or Likeness of the Object being tranfmitted from thence to the Imagination, and lodged there for the View and Obfervation of the pure Intellect, is aptly and properly called its Idea.

If any one, not yet fatisfied, shall ask farther what an Idea is? I fhall defire him to look upon a Tree, and then immediately to shut his Eyes, and try whether he retains any Simili

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tude or Refemblance of what he faw; and if he finds any fuch within him, let him call that an Idea, till a better Word can be found; and thus he will have a more exact Knowledge of what an Idea is, than he could attain to by any Description or Definition of it. Thus it is that all the great Variety of Objects in the visible Creation is let in upon the Mind thro' the Senfes; as all the Parts of a delightful and spacious Landschape are contracted, and conveyed into a dark Chamber by a little artificial Eye in the Wall; and fo become confpicuous and distinguishable in Miniature.

I KNOW there are fome who will allow nothing to be called an Idea but what we have from our Senfe of Seeing; tho' at the fame time they give us no other Word for the Senfations of the other four Senfes: But the Perceptions of the other four are truly and properly Ideas; for otherwise a blind Man, tho' he was born with all his other Senfes, could have no Impreffion of any Object conveyed to his Imagination which might be an Idea or Representation of it; and confequently he could have no Knowledge, no not so much as any irrational Animal. It is eafily owned that the Ideas of Sight are more numerous, and more vivid, and distinct than thofe of the other Senses; and more clear and lafting Representations of external Objects: And therefore because the Sight is the nobleft and meft extenfive of them,

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