in Matters of Theory and Speculation, wherein our Notions and Conceptions of things are more Complex and Accumulate, and confequently our View of them more Confused and indistinct: And wherein the true Size and Proportion of Ingredients, in each Notion to be compared, muft first be afcertained and determined; as well as in that of the Medius Terminus or Common Measure; before any Agreement or Disagreement can appear from an Application of it to the Extremes. And where the carefully removing from them all Ambiguity either in the Conceptions, or in the Terms by which they are expreffed; and paring off every thing Superfluous and foreign, is abfolutely neceffary. Here I fay Syllogifm is an excellent Inftrument of attaining true Knowledge, by pulling off the Mask from Error, and expofing it in its own naked Deformity; or as the aforementioned Author words it, By difcovering a Fallacy hid in a Rhetorical Flourish, or cunningly wrap'd in a fmooth Period; and by ftripping the Abfurdity of the Cover of Wit, and good Language; and again By detecting Fallacies concealed in florid, witty, or involved Difcourfes. To which if we add that it prevents all Circumlocution in Disputes, and wandering in a multitude of Words; that it keeps Men Clofe to the Subject; and helps to reduce all abftruse and intricate Matters of Controversy to one fingle Point of Decision; I think nothing more need be faid to prove it an excellent Inftrument of Reason and Knowledge:

ledge: And furely till fome form of Argumentation or Illation is found out which may more effectualy answer all these Ends, Syllogifm muft be allowed to be better than no Form at all.

2. THE fecond and indeed the most plaufible Objection is, that the Form of Argumentation by Syllogifm is intricate and perplex'd; that there is much Difficulty in knowing how many ways three Propofitions may be put together; and which of them conclude right, and which wrong. To which I answer, that in order to argue Syllogifticaly it is not neceffary for a Man to be acquainted with All thofe feveral ways. The better he is acquainted indeed with thofe Modes and Figures which conclude rightly, the more acute Reafoner he will make. But a plain Man of good natural Sence, may with much ease be brought to argue Syllogifticaly with great Readinels: Only by firft making him understand what a Propofition is, and how it is varied according to the different Quality and Quantity of it; and then by acquainting him (inftead of the many obfcure and intricate Rules in Logic for finding it out) that a Medius Terminus is nothing but the Proof or Reafon you give for any Affertion. As for inftance; if one were to find out a Medius Terminus to prove that God should be worshiped by Man; he need only to think of a Reafon why he ought to be worshiped by Man: namely, Becaufe He is infinitely Powerful, Wife, and Good.

When

When this Reason offers itself, the whole falls naturaly into a Syllogifm, the Major only whereof is Hypothetic and the Conclufion Categoric, thus.

IF God be infinitely powerful, wife, and good; then Man ought to worship God.

BUT God is infinitely powerful, wise, and good.

THEREFORE, &C.

A PERSON who never looks farther for a Medius Terminus, than the beft Reason he can give for the Truth or Falfhood of any Propofition to be proved; and throws it immediately into that Hypothetic Form, which offers of itself as readily as if it were natural; and useth himself to do this in a few Inftances, will come to argue Syllogifticaly with great Readiness.

I SHALL observe here, that as this Form of Syllogifm which has the major Hypothetick is the moft Eafy, and Natural, and Clear; fo it is the Beft: And it hath the Advantage of an Enthymem or that which hath only an Antecedent and Confequent, because the Confequence is in this laft Imply'd and Prefumed only; but is actualy Expreffed in the Major of the Hypothetic Syllogifm; which is ever the strongest and clearest way of arguing, if it be but fo form'd that the Confequence of the Major is too clear to be denied; and if it is not fo, it is no Fault of Syllogifm, but of him who makes it.

I

I SHALL give two Inftances of the Ufefulness of Syllogifm, in detecting two fundamental Fallacies cunningly wrap'd up in a long Series of Smooth Periods, and which have lain concealed in florid, witty, and involved Difcourfes; and in reducing two Matters in Controverfy, of no fmall Importance, to a fingle Point of Decifion. The firft lies concealed in this Propofition, We have Ideas of the Operations of our Minds by Reflection. The Falfity of which Propofition will appear by these two Syllogifms.

IF the Operations themselves, and the Ideas of those Operations, be not within us at the Same time; then there are no fuch Ideas of Reflection.

BUT the Operations themselves, and the Ideas of them, are not within us at the fame time.

THEREFORE, &c.

THE Minor is proved thus.

IF there is no Occafion or Neceffity in Nature for Both being together within us at Once, then the Minor is true.

BUT there is no Occafion or Neceffity in Nature for both being within us at once. THEREFORE, &C.

THIS Minor can never be evaded, till it be

fhewn

fhewn that there is fome Occafion or Neceffity in Nature for both the Operations Themselves, and their Ideas being together within us at the Same time: And if it were poffible to fhew that Nature acted fo much in Vain; yet it must be afterwards fhewn, why the Mind views the Ideas only by a reflex Act, and not the Operations Themselves; which are furely As much, if not More confpicuous and difcernible than any Idea of them can be.

BUT that the Force of this Argument may appear to the Admirers of the Juxta-Pofition Method, it muft ftand thus. Operations of the Mind---Ideas of thofe Operations---Within us at the fame time--No Neceffity--Ideas of Reflection And now I hope they fee clearly By the Eye and perceptive Faculty of the Mind, without any help of Spectacles, that it is as ridiculous to fuppofe both the Operations and their Ideas to be within us at the fame time; as to fuppofe an Horfe, and the Idea of an Horfe to be placed together in the Imagination.

THE fecond fundamental Fallacy lies hidden in this Maxim, All our Knowledge confifts in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of our Ideas. Againft which I argue thus.

If we have Knowledge of things, whereof we have no Ideas; then that Maxim is falle.

BUT