THE UNDERSTANDING,

187

of inward Ideas only in the Prefence of the outward Objects of them; fo that unless the Dog could unite thofe three Ideas in the Abfence of his Mafter, to make up One Idea of him, it is not properly that compounding which is the Privilege and Power of an human Intellect.

CHAP. IV.

Of Abftraction.

ANOTHER Act of the pure Intellect in

relation to the Ideas of Senfation commonly reduced to this head of Judgment is faid to be Abstraction, which is ufualy diftinguished into two Sorts, and both of them equaly groundless.

I. THE firft is a Logical Abstraction in order to form General Ideas; which is thought to be performed by withdrawing the Mind intirely from all the Individuals, and then forming one fingle Idea which fhall represent the Whole Kind or Species at once; as when we remove our Thoughts intirely from all the Individuals of Men, and frame to our felves one general Idea diftinct from them all to represent the whole Race. And thefe General abstract Ideas fhall, in the modern refined Method of forming them, prove the ftrangest and most in

confiftent

confiftent Monsters in the World. Thus the General abstract Idea of Man, fhall not be of a black or white, fhort or tall, thick or flender Man; but fhall be All these and None of them at the Same time: The general abftract Idea of a Triangle fhall be neither of an Equilateral, nor Equicrural, nor Scalenum; neither Oblique nor Rectangle, but all and none of thefe at once.

Now this is utterly impracticable, and therefore Abstraction in this Sence is a hard Word and without any determinate Meaning; for if the Intellect abftracts from all the Ideas of every Individual, it can have no Idea at all left to operate upon. When we say Mankind, it expreffeth no one Diftinct, Abstract, General Idea which ftands in the Mind for all the Individuals at once; but it fignifies the Idea of One Individual, which is no otherwise made general, than by our conceiving all the reft of the fame Kind By that one; fo that in truth it is the fingle Idea of any one Individual which is made to stand for and reprefent the whole Species. There is no fuch thing in Nature as any Univerfal realy Exifting, either to strike upon our Senfes, or to be an Object of our Reafon; and confequently there can be no fuch general abstract Idea in the Mind. If there were any fuch, it would be equaly Simple and Original with that of one Individual; and, which is yet more abfurd, whether fuch an

Idea were fuppos'd to be from Nature, or from Abftraction, or Creation of the Intellect, it would neceffarily imply this plain Abfurdity, That it would not only be both a Particular and Univerfal Idea, as you differently Confider'd it, which is very allowable and may be true; but it would be actualy and In itself both a Simple and Compounded Idea at the Same time, which is downright Contradiction; Simple, as it reprefented the whole Kind at once, in one fimple Idea abftracted from all the Individuals; and Compounded as it Included them

all.

AND now we may have leave to wonder at those Perfons, who fingle out this fort of Imaginary Abstraction for the only perfect Diftinction between Men and Brutes; and chuse to place the only Difference between them in that fort of Abstraction which one would think could never enter into the Head of Man or Beast. Nay we may with good reason fay, that of all the Operations of the pure Intellect they are leaft diftinguishable in this of making the Idea of one Individual stand for all of the fame Kind, which is the True Abstraction. When we have an Idea of one particular Man, this ferves us to diftinguish the whole Species from any other: And thus far even Brutes seem to approach to this Power, namely, that the Idea of a Particular Man whom a Dog for inftance hath seen, serves in his Imagination

whereby

whereby to diftinguish any Individual of the Same Species, (as often as it is excited again by the Prefence of any other Man) from the Individuals of any Other Species.

IF Men had faid that tho'B rutes diftinguish every Individual as it is an Outward Object, and as it actualy prefents itself to the Senfe; yet this is not diftinguishing Ideas in The Abfence of all the Individuals, or making one Idea or Conception ftand for the Ideas or Conceptions of them All. That they can't any way distinguish one whole Species from another; much lefs difcern any determinate ef sential Property, wherein All the Individuals agree; as Rationality in Man. And lastly, that they cannot distinguish even between the Individuals, but in fuch Qualities as depend upon actual outward Senfation; whereas Men can distinguish between both the Species and Individuals in things intirely independent of all outward Senfation. If these things, I fay, had been urged, they would indeed have made a perfect Distinction in this respect between Men and Brutes. But for Men to allow Brutes Reafon in common with Mankind, that is, allow them to be reasonable Creatures; and yet afterwards to place the Diftinction between them and us in a fort of Abstraction which is altogether Irrational; is no other than firft Raifing Brutes up to the Dignity of human Nature, and then Degrading Mankind below it.

I HOPE from what I have faid it is reafonably plain how falfe and groundless that Opinion is, which afferts, that Brutes do fome of them reafon in certain Inftances, as furely as they have Senfe. And, that if they have any Ideas at all, we cannot deny them to have fome Reafon. But if Some Brutes reason, why not All Brutes? Or which are those Brutes which do reafon, and which do not? Which are the rational Brutes, and which are irrational? Again, which are the certain Inftances in which they do reason, and which are to be referr❜d to pure Inftinct? Surely if fome of them have reafon, they all have more or lefs of it; it is fure they are all directed in their Operations by one common Principle, whether that be Reafon or Inftinct; which laft is no other than the prompting and Impulfe of Ideas from the Impreffion of outward Objects.

IF you grant they have Some degree of Reason, it will be hard to tell why they have not a Greater degree of it; for they have as many Senfes as Men, and generaly more acute; and confequently have all their Ideas more diftinct than we have. Ideas of Senfation are the only original Groundwork of all Our Knowledge; and if Brutes have all the Original Materials which we have, and can Reafon upon them, what should hinder them

from