pounded. Surely we should include into our Notion of Simple Ideas all that strikes the Sense at once; as when we fee the Sun or Moon, an human Body or an Horfe; thefe and all fuch like are properly Simple Ideas; for it is the Intellect, and not the Senfes, which fubdivides them into more Ideas than one, by directing the Senfe or Imagination to furvey the Parts, or Qualities, or Accidents fucceffively: The Sensation is One only at firft; it is but one Single Act of Perception; for you cannot divide the Idea of an human Body into the Ideas of More Bodies, nor that of an House into Ideas of more Houses. And therefore once for all, by a Simple Idea I mean, all that Refemblance or Similitude of the external Object, which the Organ of Senfation is capable of receiving in one diftinct Perception; as the Idea of an Human Body: Tho' it may be fubdivided into many other Ideas; as into the Ideas of all the different Parts of that Body; and tho' thefe again may be divided. into Ideas of ftill leffer Parts; fo that fimple Ideas may be thus multiplied, as far as it is within the Power of Senfe to distinguish.

1. By this Property, Ideas of Sensation are diftinguished, Firft from the various Alterations and Combinations made of them by the Mind. As these fimple Ideas came into the Imagination without the Concurrence of the Intellect, so neither can it deftroy any one of them; but all beyond these are the Creatures

of

of the Intellect, which hath a fovereign Sway and arbitrary Power over those Ideas: It alters, and Enlargeth, or Diminisheth them in any Proportion; it Separates and Tranfpofes; it turns and winds them at pleasure; and thus raiseth up to itself a new Set of Compounded Ideas with which the Imagination is furnished by it from Within, as those which were Simple and Original enter thither from Without. Thus the Ideas of many Men may be put together into one Idea of an Army; many Sheep to make the Idea of a Flock; many Houses into one Idea of a City; and thus alfo the Idea of One Man is by the Intellect made to ftand for all Mankind, which is then called an Univerfal Idea.

2. THE Ideas of Senfation are by this Property diftinguished from all thofe Notions or Conceptions which are Compofitions only of the Intellect out of our fimple and compound Ideas of Senfation, confider'd together with the various Operations of the Mind upon them. Such is the Notion we form of Charity, which is made up of the Ideas of a Man in Misery, of the Money or other Relief that is given him; and alfo by adjoining the several Operations of the Mind upon them, fuch as Pain of Mind for his Misery, a Sence of Duty to God, and Compaffion for a fellow Creature. And thus it is with all Virtues and Vices, of which properly Speaking we have no Ideas Simple or CompoundH 3

edi

ed; but each of them is apprehended by Ideas of Senfation, and the Motions or Operations of the Intellect upon them, put together into one complex Notion or Conception; and comprehended under one Name or Term, which is of a Signification fo complex or general, that it always imports a Combination of feveral different Conceptions and Ideas.

AFTER the fame manner the Intellect raises up to itself a Conception of Spirit; because it finds neither a fimple nor a compound Idea thereof within itself, it makes up a fort of complex notion or Conception of it, by firft adding together the Operations of our Mind, fuch as Thinking and Willing and the several Modes of them; and then Subftituting them so combined, to reprefent the Perfections of a Being or Subftance of which we have no Proper Idea; and of which we form the best Idea we Can from that of the moft fpirituous part of material Subftance. And this is the way the Mind fupplies the intire want of Simple Ideas for the Things of another World, whereof it hath not any, even in the moft obfcure and imperfect degree; fo that it may be truly faid; our Simple and Compound Ideas of Senfation, together with the various complexNotions which arife from the Operations of the Mind upon them, do comprehend the full extent of all our Knowledge: But to lay down Ideas of Reflection together with thofe of Senfation as

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Equaly

Equaly the Ground-work of our Knowledge, is confounding the Workman with his Materials; and the Skill and Manner of exercising his Art, with the Stuff he works upon.

СНАР. VI.

A Third Property that they are
Immediate.

ANOTHER thing peculiar to Ideas of

Sensation is that they are Immediate. The original and fimple Ideas of Senfation when they are First obtained, neceffarily prefuppofe the Prefence of the Object, and fome real actual Impreffion of it upon the Organs of Sense; there is an Immediate and direct Representation of the Object, and it is perceived without the mediation or Intervention of any other Object or Idea whatsoever. Thus the Ideas of a Man, and a Tree, could never have come into the Mind, if they had never been present to the Senfe, and the Eye had not actualy feen them. Nor was it poffible for us to have had an Idea of a Trumpet's Sound, unless the Collifion of the Air had been once fo near that fome of the Undulations of it could ftrike upon the Senfe of Hearing. So that by this Property they are diftinguished,

1. FROM the Ideas we have of absent Objects of the fame kind, but fuch as were never H 4 Actualy

Actualy perceived; thus the Idea of a Man we Have feen, ftands for the Idea of any other Man we Never faw. The Mind hath no other way of conceiving a Man or an Horse which was never present to the Senfes nor actualy perceived, but by fubftituting the Idea of a Man or an Horfe which was fo.

IF the Intellect could dilate itself no farther than the very particular or individual Objects which have been Prefent to the Senfes and actualy perceived, its Sphere of Activity would be very fcanty, and all our Knowledge confin'd within a very narrow Compass: And yet this must be so, if Men refolved neither to Know or Believe the Existence of any thing but what is or hath been prefent to fome of their Faculties, and thus actualy perceived by them; they must not believe that there is a Man, or a City, or a Country in the World they never faw. We readily yield our firm affent to the Being even of fenfible Things which we never perceived, and do reason and discourse of them under borrowed and Substituted Ideas; and we esteem our Knowledge of them to be Real, and True, and Solid, tho' we never had any actual Perception of them. And yet that Knowledge muft be owned to be in fome Meafure imperfect, because no two Individuals of a like kind are intirely and Exactly the fame in all particular Refpects; and therefore the Idea of one must represent the other but im

3

perfectly.