roade to eternal

felicitie.

y Oldelte Inhabitante.

In many public works it is the custom, before young men can be employed, that an apprenticeship must be served; in others an agreement is made for five or more years, that the employed shall receive, in exchange for services to be performed, wages at the rate of so much per week for the first year, so much per week for the second year, so much for the third, &c., to the end of the agreement, the amount being greater each year. And where an employer has some hundreds, or, it may be, thousands of workers, the rate each year is generally the same for all who have commenced at the same time. The object which I believe the employer of the present day has in adopting the Apprenticeship System, or the system of long engagements, at low rates of wages, is, that he may legally have the

Read before Section F, Economic Science and Statistics, of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, at Dublin, on Tuesday, 1st September, 1857.

power of preventing those who have been a year or two at the business from running away and selling their services at a higher rate to another employer, who has not had the trouble and expense of their inexperienced years; and secondly, the employer expects that by this means he gets cheaper labour, and the public expect that they get better work.

It is my object now, in bringing this subject before you, to show, or to try to show-first, that this Apprenticeship System-this system of paying all alike who have entered at the same time-is in most cases unnecessary; secondly, that it is very doubtful if the second of the employer's objects for adopting it be fulfilled-namely, the cheapness; thirdly, that it is bad for the employed; fourthly, hurtful to society at large; and, fifthly, that the objects aimed at would all be obtained by a system the very reverse of apprenticeships and long engagements-namely, by having no apprenticeships and no engagements what

ever: the employer paying his workers just what their services are worth at the time.

If he did so, he (the employer) could never lose by any of them leaving; but the person who employed this runaway worker would be the loser, if he gave more wages for the same quantity and quality of work. If the apprentice or engaged hand were receiving the full value of his services, the chances are he would not receive more than that from any one else, therefore he would have no inducement to run away; therefore, on that account, the Apprenticeship System is unnecessary. If the employed spoiled his work, he must, according to this system, pay the employer. If he or his parents are unable to pay for the spoiled work, as is often the case, and must besides have money to supply his daily wants, then the Apprenticeship System is brought into action. He makes an agreement with his employer to be paid at a lower rate of wages for a number of years, in order to repay his employer for those first years, when he both spoiled work and received money. This period, however, is prolonged by the employer, beyond all reason, to five, and in some cases to seven years. The agreement, if any, ought to be in force no longer than the period when the increased value of the services of the employed have repaid the employer for the work spoiled, for the extra wages received at its commencement, and, it may be, for his share of the wages of a foreman, whose sole duty it may be to superintend and direct a number of workers.

I believe, however, that no engagement whatever is necessary. A worker who has to pay once for what he spoils will never spoil a second piece of work; he will either leave a business that he finds he is not fitted for, and that he has to pay so dearly for learning, or he will take care and think of what he is about, and thereby become a first-rate worker. The effect upon the worker of long engagements at constant annual wages, the same for all of the same year, without regard to their individual ability, is, that in general those who have the ability do not perform more work than their neighbours who have not the ability. They could do more work-they could be more profitable to their employer, but they won't they derive no immediate benefit from working harder, therefore they don't.

They become lazy, indifferent, and, no doubt, often acquire injurious habits at this period of their lives, which may become permanent, and which are always difficult to reform. The system is, therefore, bad for the employed.

The effect of the system upon the employer is, that, in consequence of the worker not doing so much as he might, could, and would do, were he paid according to the quantity and quality of the work executed, more hands must be employed, and more money expended in providing them with tools and accommodation; and, therefore, I think it very improbable that work executed by apprentices, or by those under long engagements, at low wages, is cheaper than that performed by fewer willing hands, who are always receiving wages in proportion to their work.

An opinion prevails, or did prevail, that work executed by those not regularly trained to a business could not be so well done as when performed by the journeyman who has served his time-a legal hand, as they call themselves; but, so far as my experience goes, this idea is totally fallacious, and the experience of many of the large employers of labour leads to the same result. Mr Whitworth, of Manchester, whose beautifully-finished tools are to be seen in all the principal engineering establishments of the kingdom, informed me that that work was performed by men who at one time were common labourers, and whose intelligence recommended them to his notice. There are many of the members of the Mechanical Section who could, if they liked, tell you the quality of the labour they employ; but what I know most about is, that the engines on board of all the vessels built by my father since the year 1852, a year memorable for a strike of the legal hands then employed in the engineering establishments of Glasgow, have been made by men who were originally house-carpenters or joiners—that many of the best workers in his ship-yard were hand-loom weavers, and that half-starved nailmakers from St Ninians, near Stirling, made passable riveters in about a month.

In fact, it is evident that apprenticeships or long engagements are quite unnecessary; that a business is learned much more quickly without such; that it was never intended that there should be castes in the business of England, as in the trades of India.

I hope to be able to show now that the system of apprenticeships, of long engagements, is hurtful to society at large-that it is a system of protection, which, with the enlightened views of this age of freedom, ought not to be tolerated; that its end is a tyranny and despotism of the idle and indolent over the industrious, which at this moment is growing into one British Trades' Union. I have already proved, to my own satisfaction at least, and I hope to yours also, that apprenticeships, or long engagements, are an unnecessary precaution-unnecessary forethought for the employer; that in all cases he gets work at least as well, and as quickly done, without the system as with it; he may therefore give up the system.

Many have given it up; I have lately done so; and the Americans seem to have entirely repudiated it. That the apprentice himself is not benefited by the system has been, I think, equally proved. He learns his business much quicker without serving an apprenticeship. He does his work at least as well as an apprentice. I say he generally does it better, and many others say the same. He becomes a man sooner. He feels, at a time of life when it is most important that he should feel, that it is his own industry alone which advances him; he is not kept from working with all his heart, from working vigorously, by the feeling that he is not getting value for his services.

Now, as neither the employer, nor the apprentice, nor the public are benefited by the system, why is the system continued? First, I believe employers generally have not thought much about it— it is a custom which their fathers left them-a remnant of feudalism. Secondly, the public are indifferent, and have not yet seen their interest in the matter. Thirdly, young hands find that they cannot get employed unless they engage to serve a regular time at a business. It is not the employer, however, who prevents them from working, but the employer's workmen-those who have served their time at the business. These found, no

doubt, after their time was served, that they had bought their business; that they had bought, and very dearly too, that which did not require to be bought at all. They had paid by their apprenticeship, or long engagement at lower wages than their services were worth, for a monopoly of the business. They therefore try, and naturally so, to keep that monopoly; and in many establishments they do keep it, and prevent the public from getting its work done by any who are able and willing to do it. The public interest in the matter is therefore clear. They have paid for the idleness of the apprentice to begin with, and they are now paying for a monopoly of labour by the so-called legal hand, much higher than its natural value; for the legal hand takes care to get the number of the apprentices employed limited to a certain fraction of the legal hands. If the employer should take the liberty of adding a few more apprentices, there is a consultation, frequently ending in a strike. The legal workmen want what the employer does not wish to give; they refuse to work, there is again a strike; a regular union of workmen is formed, who will not work themselves, nor suffer others, who are both able and anxious, to work. I need not describe strikes further; they are admitted to be hurtful to society, and tyrannical and despotic towards their fellow-workmen. His Grace Archbishop Whately, the President of this Section, has put into my hands a little work of his, entitled 'Easy Lessons on Money Matters,' which sets forth, in a simple and lucid manner, the cause and consequence of strikes.

Now, I think I have proved what I intended at the commencement, and I have shown also that the system of apprenticeships leads in the end to strikes, trades' unions, disorder, separation of the master from the workmen, and to a state of things the very reverse of what the Bible teaches ought to exist between the parties.

If it does all this, then surely the simplest of all remedies is to give it up. Let the natural laws have their course, and let Labour be FREE.

The mean average market price of the several varieties of metallic copper being, in 1855, £140: 5s., and in 1856, £125. LEAD and SILVER.-More than four hundred lead mines sold lead ore during the year. The produce of the mines of the United Kingdom, in 1856 and the two preceding years, was as follows:1854, Metallic Lead, 64,005 Tons.

do. do.

73,091 73,129

1855, 1856, It will be seen that there has been a uniform rate in the production of lead from the British mines, but at the same time our importations of this metal have been larger than they were in 1855, when we imported 7246 tons of lead; the quantity received in 1856 being 10,254 tons. This is less, however, than the imports of 1853 and 1854, which were, respectively, 17,564 tons, and 11,858 tons. The mean average prices per ton of lead ore, as deduced from the public sales,

were:

£14 4 6

14 8 0

In 1855 In 1856 The money value of the lead ore sold in 1855 being £1,311,971; that of 1856 (101,997 tons) being £1,431,509. The mean average price of pig lead in 1855 was £23:3s. per ton, and in 1856 it was £24 per ton. The actual market value of the lead smelted being, in 1855, £1,692,055, and in 1856, £1,755,096, to which must be added the silver extracted; the quantities having been in the last three years as follows:

valuable, and hence they have been sought for and sold in larger quantities than formerly-9003 tons being sold in 1856, the money value of which was £27,445. The importations of zinc have declined. Of spelter, we received, in 1853, 23,419 tons; in 1854, 19,583 tons; in 1855, 17,845 tons; and in 1856, 18,213 tons. During last year we exported 3,153 tons of British zinc, while in 1855 we only sent out of the country 2516 tons.

I am enabled to refer with satisfaction

to the present returns of iron pyrites, arsenic, &c., which are far more exact which have hitherto been pub

than any

lished.

IRON.-The enormous increase which has taken place in our iron manufacture will be seen upon reference to the detailed statements. The returns of iron ore are far more complete than those which have been given in any former publication, and they may now be regarded as a very close approximation to the real produce of all the iron-mining districts of the United Kingdom.

Those returns show that 10,483,309 tons of iron ore have been raised, and that 3,636,377 tons of pig iron have been produced. Iron ores have sold, according to their respective qualities, at the mines, for prices varying from 5s. to 15s. per ton. The mean average price of iron ore, computed from the sales of all the districts, has been 11s. per ton. This will give £5,695,815 as the value of the iron ore produced in 1856 in Great Britain. The total produce of pig iron, at the mean average market price, or £4 per ton, will give a money value equal to £14,545,508.

COALS. The large development of our iron and other manufactures has naturally led to a considerable increase in the quantity of coals raised. Notwithstanding the great excess of the return obtained in 1854 over any previous computation, I find it exceeding in 1856 even that surprising quantity; the coal produce of the last year and the two previous years being as follows: