In Rhode Island a statute was passed prohibiting the manufacturing or keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors within the State. By the terms, the statute applied to liquors then on hand and rendered them practically worthless. So far as it prohibited sales and the keeping of liquors for sale, it was deemed prospective; and its lessening the value of liquors on hand previous to its passage, was deemed not to act retroactively in the sense of an ex part facto law. State v. Paul, 5 R. I. 185; State, 5 R. I. 497.

That statutes prohibiting entirely sales of intoxicating liquors are valid: See State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; State v. Brennan, 25 Conn. 278; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Geo. 586; Gutzweller v. People, 14 Ill. 142; Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196; Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591; State v. Learcy, 20 Mo. 489; Our Home No. 2. v. State, 4 Gr. (Ia.) 172; Zumhoff v. State, 4 Gr. (Ia.) 526; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165; State v. Carney, 20 Iowa, 82; State v. Baugham, 20 Iowa, 497; Lunt's Case, 6 Greenl. 412; State v. Miller, 48 Me. 576; State v. Gurney. 37 Me. 156; People v. Howley, 3 Mich. 330; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; People v. Quant, 2 Park. 410; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio 586; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; in re Dougherty, 27 Vt. 325; State v. Conlin, 27 Vt. 318; Gill v. Barker, 31 Vt. 610; Intoxicating Liquors, 25 Kan. 751; s. c. 37 Amer. Rep. 284; State v. Mugler, 29 Kan. 252; s. c. 44 Amer. Rep. 634; Robinson v. State, 38 Ark. 641; Waller v. State, 38 Ark. 656.

So a law prohibiting sales within a certain distance of a school, university, church or the like, is valid. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; State v. Muse, 4 D. & B. (N. C.) L. 319; Fetter v. Wilt, 46 Pa. St. 457; Ex parte McClain 61 Cal. 436; s. c., 44 Am. Rep. 554; State v. Joyner, 81 N. C. 534; Black v. State, 66 Ala. 493; Tillery v. State, 10 Lea 35.

So the State may prohibit its sale on certain days, or on certain hours. Hall v. State, 3 Ga. 18; Megowan v. Com. 2 Met. (K.) 3; Frasier v. State, 5 Mo. 526; Lamber v. State, 8 Mo. 492; Hederick v. State, 101 Ind. 564; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 768.

The so-called local option laws have frequently been upheld. People v. City of Bute, 4 Mont. 179; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 346; State v. Cook, 24 Minn. 247; s. c. 31 Amer. Rep. 344; Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69; s. c. 37 Amer. Rep. 6; State v. Parker, 27 Vt. 357; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491; s. c. 13 Amer. Rep. 716; State v. Noyes, 10 Fort. (N. H.) 279; State v. Court of Common Pleas, 36 N. J. L. 72; s. c. 13 Amer. Rep. 422; 12 Amer. L. Reg. 32; Com. v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27;¡Com. v. Dean, 110 Mass. 357; Com. v. Weller, 14 Bush 218; s. c. 29 Amer. Rep. 407; Anderson v. Com., 13 Bush. -; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; s. c. 20 Amer. Rep. 83; State v. Wilcox' 42 Conn. 364; s. c. 19 Amer. Rep. 563. Contra, Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 479; State v. Weir, 33 Ia. 134; s. c. 11 Amer. Rep. 115; ex parte Wall, 10 Alb. L. Jr. 284; s. c. 48 Cal. 279; 17 Amer. Rep. 425; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342.

There is no vested right in a license granted under a statute providing for its revocation. La Croix v. County Commissioners, 50 Conn. 321; s. c. 47 Amer. Rep. 648; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; State v. Holmes, 38 N. H. 225; People v. Wright, 3 Hun. 306; People v. Board, etc., 59 N. Y. 92; Com. v. Maylan, 119 Mass. 109; Com v. Hamer, 128 Mass. 76; Columbus City v. Cutcomp, 61 Iowa, 672: Richland Co. v. Richland Center, 29] Alb. L. Jr. 412.

Thus where a merchant had purchased guns and pistols with a view to sell them, and at the time he purchased them he had a license to vend such articles; and after that license expired the legislature repealed that part of the act requiring a license, thus rendering a sale of them prohibitory, he was held criminally

liable for having offered to sell the remainder left at the time his license expired. State v. Burgoyne, 7 Lea, 173; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 60. And there are many authorities, even some of those just cited, which hold that power to revoke the license, is a tacit condition of every license and it is not necessary to be reserved in the law as license. McKinney v. Town of Salem, 77 Ind. 217.

So the State may prohibit a certain class of persons selling intoxicating liquors, by requiring every vendor to take out a license, and, as a qualification to receiving a license, requiring the applicant to be a person of good moral character. In re Ruth, 10 Amer. L. Reg. 767; s. c. 32 Iowa 250; Calder v. Sheppard, 61 Ind. 219.

But a State statute which imposes a tax for selling spiritous, or vinous, malt or other intoxicating liquors, and providing that it shall not apply to wine or beer manufactured in the State, is unconstitutional, so far as it makes a discrimination against wine and beer imported from other States; but on this ground the vendor cannot avoid the payment of the tax, if, in addition to such wine and beer, he sells other intoxicating quors within the terms of the statute. Tiernon v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; State v. March, 37 Ark. 356; IMcCreary v. State, 73 Ala. 480; contra State v. Stuck, 12 N. W. Rep. 483; s. c. 58 Iowa 496.

The imposition of a tax upon the business of selling intoxicating liquors supplied from manufacturers out of the State is not a license, and is not a violation of the Federal Constitution as an unjust discrimination against the citizens of another State. It is also only commerce between the States. People v. Walling, 18 N. W. Rep. 807; s. c. 18 Rep. 149. See State v. Amery, 12 R. I. 64. W. W. THORNTON.

1. ATTORNEY, WHEN HELD AS TRUSTEE-Administrator Must Assert Estate's Right in Reasonable Time.-1. Where an attorney of an estate buys in land, sold to satisfy a debt due the estate; the administrator has the option to take the land or hold the attorney as trustee, although he was not directed by the administrator to buy the land and took the deed in his own name. 3rd Grant, Pa., 65; 11 Johns. N. Y., 467. 2. The administrator must exercise his right in a reasonable time. He cannot dally with the attorney for years, until the land has appreciated in value; and then assert a right for the estate. 67 Mo., 181; 56 Miss., 541; 11 Ohio, 57. Ward v. Brown, S. C. Mo., January 26, 1886.

2. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION-Construction of ByLaws-Corporations-Must Act Through Officers. -Where a corporation, organized for the purpose of mutual benefit, provided in its by-laws that npon the death of a member, in order to make up a sum to be paid over to the decedent's nominee,

each member shall pay one dollar, and that, at the death of a member who has regularly paid such assessments, his nominee shall be entitled to claim and receive from the association the amount collected on such an assessment levied therefor, the nominee of the decedent is entitled to receive only such sum as was actually collected from the members upon the assessment made for her benefit, and not as many dollars as there were members of the association at the time of the decendent's death. A resolution of the members of a corporation concerning the disbursement of money, if not adopted or ratified by the directors, (where no money could be appropriated or drawn from the treasury without their order), is ineffective, as a corporation can only act or speak through the meium prescribed by law, and that is its board of trustees. In re Solidarite, etc. Co., S. C. Cal. January 27, 1886, Pac. Rep.

3. BONA FIDE PURCHASER, NOT AFFECTED BY PRIOR FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-May Perfect Title-1. A bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration from a fraudulent grantee is not affected by the fraud in the former conveyance. 5 Mo., 296; 12 Mo., 169; Bump Fraud Con. 3rd ed., p. 493; Story Eq. Jur. § 434. 2. A purchaser with notice of the fraud may protect himself by purchasing the title of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice. So too, a purchaser without notice of the fraud may sell property to one who has notice and pass a good title. 69 Ind. 148; 97 Penn. St. 287; 78 Mo. 449. Craig v. Zimmermann, S. C. Mo. January 26, 1886.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Right of Appeal-Rules of Court-The right of appeal is a constitutional right, and inferior appellate courts have no power to defeat or destroy such right for failure to comply with conditions imposed by their own rules, but not sanctioned by any provision of law. Levy v. Judges of Appeal, etc., S. C. Louisiana, 1885. The Reporter.

En

5. CONTRACT. [Contractor-Compensation.] titled to Compensation for Work Done and materials in a Building Destroyed by Accidental Fire. An incorporated firm of builders made a contract with a corporation, owning a church edifice, to furnish the materials, make, and put in the building by a stated date, certain fixtures. Slight alterations were made in the work, by agreement, after the contract was entered into. After the date agreed on, but before the entire completion of the work and its acceptance by the building committee, the building was accidentally destroyed by fire without the fault of either party. Held, that the contractor is entitled to recover for work done and materials in the building at the time of the fire. In the opinion of the court by Black, J., it is said: "Besides the fact that the work was in progress after the date fixed by the contract for its completion, it also appears that the parties agreed to certain alterations in ihe work to be done. It does not appear whether the time for completing the work was extended by agreement or acquiesence. Neither the extension of the time nor the agreed changes affected the contract in its other provisions. In all other respects it remained in full force. The contractor cannot simply because of the delay and the alterations abandon his contract and sue for the value of the work. Adams v. Nichols, 19 Pick. 275. The contractor relies for recovery upon an alleged acceptance and cites, Lord v. Wheeler, 1 Gray 282. The facts of that

case are not analogous to this. There when the work was done the employer entered into and occupied the house and used and enjoyed the material and labor of the contractor. This use and enjoyment was held to be a severance of the contract and an acceptance pro tanto. Here there is no pretense that the edifice was used for any purpose other than construction and this use was contemplated by the contract. The contract also determines how and by whom the acceptance shall be made. The duty to pass upon the work did not arise until completion. There is then, no ground upon which to base the claim that the work or any part of it had been accepted. Where a contractor agrees to build a house on the land of another, and before its completion and without his fault the house is destroyed by fire he is not thereby relieved from his obligation. The obligation to build is his own voluntary contract, andlits nonperformance is not excused by inevitable accident. Adams v. Nichols, supra; Thompson v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272; School Dist. v. Dutchy, 25 Conn. 530; School Trustees v. Bennett, 3 Dutcher 515; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1. In each of these cases the contract was to build a house entire, and it is apparent that they are unlike the contract in question here. There are two lines of authorities having a direct bearing upon the question in hand.

The first lays down this rule: that the contractor who has furnished material and done work cannot recover if the building is destroyed before the completion of the work under the contract. 2 Add. Con. (Morgan's Ed.) p. 554; Appleby v. Meyer, L. R. 2 C. P. 650; Brunby v. Smith, 3 Ala. N. S. 123. The second line of authorities announces exactly the contrary doctrine, among them may be cited: Dallis v. Chapman, 36 Tex. 1; Clary v. Sohier, 120 Mass. 210; Cook et al. v. McCable, 53 Wis. 250; Rawson v. Clark, 70 Ill. 656.

* In the case at bar the fixtures were, it

is true, to be put in place, and completed to the satisfaction of the building committee, and to be paid for only when completed; but the contract is based on the assumption that the employer would have the edifice erected and ready to receive the work. All this was a condition precedent to the performance of the contract by the contractor. The implied contract on the part of the employer was to have and keep the building ready to receive the fixtures and keep them therein for such length of time as wonld reasonably be required to put them in place. The agreement to do this is as much a part of the contract as if expressed therein in terms. This the employes failed to do. Besides this, the house was in the possession, control, care and custody of the employer, and the contractor had nothing to do with its protection further than to be without fault as to his work. The contract therefore was not an absolute one to do the work at all hazards, but it was dependant upon the assumed and implied conditions before stated-conditions which the employer was to perform and which it did not perform. Therefore, according to the weight of American authorties, such a contract is severable to the extent that the contractor may recover for work done up to the time of the fire. In this case the recovery should include the fixtures on the floor as well as those in place. Hayes, Spencer & Co. v. Second Baptist Church, S. C. Mo., Mch. 1st, 1886. MS.

6. HABEAS CORPUS-Extradition-For what an Extradited Person May be Tried-Criminal LawForgery-Joinder of Offenses-When two or more

distinct offenses are joined in one indictment, under § 1024 of the Revised Statutes, or two or more indictments therefor are consolidated, the jury may find the defendant guilty of one charge and not of another, and may find a verdict as to one or more of the charges, and be discharged from the consideration of the remainder, on which the defendant may be thereafter tried as if a jury had not been impaneled in the case: and the defendant may oe sentenced to receive the maximum punishment for each offense or charge of which the jury may find him guilty. A warrant of extradition allowed by the Dominion government under the tenth article of the treaty of 1842 with Great Britain, recited that the party was accused of the crime of "forgery" and had been committed for extradition thereon, without saying what forgery: Held, that resort might be had to the proceedings before the committing magistrate, and his report on which the warrant issued, to ascertain what and how many forgeries the extradition was intended to apply to, or include. The treaty aforesaid is not only a contract between the governments of Great Britain and the United States, but it is also the law of this land; and a person extradited under it cannot be detained or tried here for a crime, unless enumerated therein and included in the warrant of extradition; and he may, if occasion require, invoke the treaty in any judicial proceeding as a protection against such detention or trial. The postmaster at Lewiston, Idaho, issued a postal money-order on the application of a fictitious person, without consideration therefor, payable to a certain bank, to which he at the same time wrote in the name of such person, directing that the amount of the order be collected, and remitted to him at Pierce City, in a registered package, which he intercepted as it passed through his office and converted the contents to his own use: Held, that the act of the postmaster constituted forgery, both at common law and under the statute of the United States: R. S., § 5463. Ex parte, Hibbs, U. S. Circuit Court for Oregon, Feb. 4, 1886. West Coast Rep., Vol. 9, No. 4.

7. LIBEL—Action by Partnership-Damages-Mental Suffering-Words Actionable Per Se-Truth of Charge, How Pleaded-In an action for libel, brought by a partnership, damages can only be recovered for injury sustained in the joint business of the firm, and evidence to show the mental pain and distress of each of the plaintiffs is not admissible. A circular setting out a transaction by a firm, and alleging that "they are not worthy of support," and charging them with "base treachery" and "foul and unfair dealings," is not actionable per se. If such circular, though not actionaable per se, shows on its face that it was instigated by actual malice, the defendant must specially plead the truth of the charges, if he desires to take advantage of it either for justification or in mitigation of damages. Donoghue v. Caffey, S. C. Conn., January 1886. Atlantic Reporter.

8. MASTER AND SERVANT-Employees of Different Masters"Fellow-Servants.”- The defendant

owned a saw-mill, and gave an order to D. & W., master machinists, to make some alterations in the gearing of the water-wheel of his mill. D. & W. sent the plaintiff and another workman to do the work. It was understood between these workmen and the defendant that the mill would run at such times as they were not actually at work upon the wheel. While they were at work upon the wheel

the engineer of the defendant negligently started the wheel, injuring the plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff was a servant of the defendant, engaged in a common employment with the engineer. Evan v. Lippincott, S. Ct. N. Y., June, 1865.-Ex.

9. PARTNERSHIP-Loan · Obligation Signed by Members Individually.-Where money is obtained for and applied to the benefit of the firm, and subsequently is secured by notes and a mortgage executed by members of the firm, though the firm name is not used, the transaction is, in substance, a partnership transaction, the partners superadding to their joint obligation the several liability of each. Carson v. Byers, S. C. Iowa, December, 1885, The Reporter.

10. RAILROAD CORPORATION-Action for Damages for Death of a Wounded Prisoner.-Where a prisoner who is disabled by gunshot wounds made by an officer in effecting his capture, is put on and taken off of a railroad train by the officer, and his death subsequently results from the wounds, and it is shown that his removal by rail hastened his death, the company is not liable. Johnson v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., S. C. Mo., Dec. 21, 1885. 11. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Promise to Answer for Debt of Another-The mother of A. was taken sick. A physician was called, who began to treat her. Upon his second visit she became dissatisfied, and desired another physician. A. instructed the physician to pay no attention to the complaints of his mother, but to continue the treatment, and he would pay him for his services; whereupon the physician continued to treat her. Held, that the promise was not to answer for the debt of another, but was an original undertaking, and not within the statute of frauds. De Witt v. Root, S. C. Neb. January 6, 1886. N. W. Rep.

12. WILL. [Capital and Income.]—Apportionment of Contingent Reversionary Interest between LifeTenant and Remainderman.-Testator by his will gave his residuary personal estate, which included a contingent reversionary interest, to one for life, with remainders over. At the testator's death, and for some years afterwards, this reversionary interest was of no value, owing to the possible interests which might take effect in priority to it. It had now become practically a vested interest, subject only to the life interest of a person seventy-five years old, and was of considerable value. The question was raised as to how, supposing the reversion had been now sold, the proceeds of such sale ought to be apportioned between the tenant for life and remaindermen. Held, that this interest must now be treated as vested, and the apportionment must be made on the principle laid down in Re Earl of Chesterfield's Trusts (49 L. T. Rep. N. S. 261; 24 Ch. Div. 640) and Beavan y. Beavan (49 L. T. Rep. N. S. 263; 24 Ch. Div. 649), i. e., by ascertaining what sum would, with accumulations of compound interest at four per cent. from the testator's death, less income tax, have produced the sum now realized, and that sum must be treated as capital and the remainder as income. Re Horson, Eng. Ch. Div., Oct. 27, 1885; 53 Law Times Rep. (N. S.) 627.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.*

[Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.]

QUERIES.

31. A. traded a team of horses to B., who is totally insolvent, for a piece of real estate, B. giving a warranty deed to the premises and also representing to A. that the premises were free from incumbrances. After receiving the deed, A. learns that B. had no title to the property, and within three days after the trade is made, replevies the horses from B., before a justice of the peace. Can this action be maintained, and is showing an incumbrance on real estate, such an inquiry into the title to real estate as to deprive the justice of jurisdiction or defeat the action?

A SUBSCRIBER.

32. On the trial of Hilands for murder, the jury were permitted to separate after being sworn, but before any evidence was given. The next morning, the court expressed doubts as to the legality of the separation, and discharging the jury, ordered the impaneling of another. The defendant was tried and convicted, after a plea of former jeopardy had been entered. On error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the plea was sustained, and the discharge of the defendant ordered. Since the decision of the Supreme Court, an information, charging the defendant with involuntary manslaughter, has been made. It is claimed that this crime.only being a misdemeanor, was not included in the indictment, and that defendant's discharge will not be a bar to the further prosecution. Can this after position be maintained? J. M. H.

[The decision in this case will be found in "Weekly Notes of Cases," of Jan. 7th, (Phila.)].

34. A. offers for sale to B. a horse for $100, on six month's credit. B. accepts the offer, whereupon A. says: "Then you must give me your note for the amount due in six months." This B. declines to dowherenpon A. says: "Well, take the horse and you need not give the note,"-whereupon B. says: "Well, I decline to take the horse." Is there any contract by which the parties can be held liable to each other. Galveston, Tex. JAS. B. STUBBS.

either real or personal." Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591. A State law cannot make it illegal to sell to citizens of other States, and thus prevent them from buying, when it allows its own citizens to buy. The law indirectly takes away the rights of citizens of other States. A party, who owns a claim against another, can go into any court, having jurisdiction, for the assertion of his rights. His agreement in advance not to resort to certain courts, which have jurisdiction of the case, is void as contrary to law. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445. S. S. M.

Query 11.-[22 Cent. L. J. 45.] IS A PLATFORM SCALE A FIXTURE?-A. is the owner of forty acres of land used for farming and such stock raising as is generally incident to such a farm in Missouri. On said farm he places a platform scale, attached to the soil by making an excavation and setting posts in the ground, and thus setting the scales-not on a brick or stone foundation. A. then sells the farm to B. by warranty deed. A. afterwards removes the scales, claiming them as personal property? Did the scales constitute a part of the realty and pass to B., the grantee, or were they personal property? Cite authorities.

CONSULTUS.

Answer.-In Dudley v. Foote, S. C. N. H. 1884; 15 Week. Law Bul. 86, it was held that hay scales built upon the land by the owner are real estate and pass with the soil under them, not to the executor, but to the heirs, as a well dug and stoned by testator would have passed to them, and a bill of sale from the heirs of five sixths not under seal, did not convey any interest in the scales, or give a right to any portion of the income derived from them. WM. M. ROCKEL.

Springfield, Ohio.

Query 28.-[21 Cent. L. J. 393]. Apropos the case of People v. Marx, 21 Cent. L. J. 337, I wish to submit the following: During the last two months several fires have occurred in Gallatin, Tenn., which are believed to be the work of incendiaries. In order to protect property more fully, the municipal authorities have enacted the following ordinance: "An Act, entitled an Act to afford additional protection to all property situated within the corporate limits of the town of Gallatin, Tenn. § 1. Be it ordained and enacted by the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the town of Gallation, that hereafter all the owners of business houses shall be required to suspend business with their customers, and close their houses at ten o'clock P. M., and to keep the same closed and the business aforesaid suspended for the remainder of the night. § 2. Be it further enacted that it shall be unlawful for any person or persons to be upon the streets of Gallatin or in any public place within said town after ten o'clock, P, M., until daylight following, except it be that such person has business or engagements that call him or her upon the streets or in such public places after the hour aforesaid, and any such person found upon or at any such places without a reasonable and genuine excuse, shall be in violation of this section of this act; it being the purpose of this act to prevent persons from strolling about the town who have nothing calling them out after the hour aforesaid. § 3. Be it further enacted that any person violating the provisions of this act except in case of necessity are hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $3.00 nor more than $50.00 for each offense, to be paid or secured, as other offenses are now provided for by law. § 4. Be it further enacted that for the better enforcement of the provisions of this act the mayor is hereby

authorized to appoint under the laws now in force, four policemen, whose duty it shall be to keep a vigilant watch, and see that this act is faithfully enforced and observed by all persons, and forthwith to arrest all persons violating the same, and it shall be their duty to enforce all the other laws of the corporation, and to this end they are clothed with like power of the city marshal. These policemen shall be paid the sum of $2.00 each per night for all the services rendered. § 5. Be it further enacted that this act take effect from and after its passage, the public welfare requiring it." The charter contains no special authority on this subject, but Code of Tennessee, § 1607, § 1, provides that all municipal corporations shall have power "To enact such by-laws and ordinances as may be necessary and proper to preserve the health, quiet, and good order of the town." W. B. S. Answer.-Personal liberty, which is one of our most valued rights, includes the right to move one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct. 1 Bl. Com. 134. The police power, whether exercised by legislative act or by city ordinance, has never been accurately defined, but one of the limitations on it is well expressed in the following words: "It is not within the power of the general assembly, under the pretense of exercising the police power of the State, to enact laws not necessary to the preservation of the health and safety of the community, that will be oppressive and burdensome upon the citizen." Toledo etc. R. R. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37. The courts will protect against such acts. In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 110; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cem., 70 Ill. 194; Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707; Grills v. Mayor, 8 Bax. 247; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606. This ordinance is oppressive and not necessary, and therefore void.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

S. S. M.

THE AMERICAN DECISIONS, containing the cases of general value and authority decided in the courts of the several States from the earliest issue of the State Reports to the year 1869. Compiled and annotated by A. C. Freeman, counsellor at law, and author of "Treatise on the Law of Judgments," "Co-Tenancy and Partition," "Execution in Civil Cases," etc. Vols. 68, 69, 70 and 71. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1885, 1886.

These volumes, uniform with their numerous predecessors, are in all respects equal to them, or, more probably, surpass them, in interest and usefulness. The series is now gradually coming down to its prescribed limit (1869), and of course the cases included in the later, are of more general value and higher authority than those in the earlier volumes. These include "the cases of general value and authority" decided in the several States during the years 1856, 1857 and 1858, and it is safe to assume from the well-established reputation of the compiler that they include all the cases of "value and authority," decided by the several Supreme Courts during the period which they

cover.

The series is well worthy of a place in the library of any practitioner.

MISSOURI REPORTS. Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. F. M. Brown, State Reporter. Vol. 83. Columbia, Mo.: E. W. Stephens, Publisher. 1886. MISSOURI APPEAL REPORTS. Cases determined in the St. Louis and Kansas Courts of Appeals of the State of Missouri from March 17. 1885, to May 19

1885, reported by A. Moore Berry, of the St. Louis Bar, and James F. Mister, of the Kansas City Bar, official reporters. Vol. XVII. Columbia, Mo.: E. W. Stephens, Publisher. 1886.

These two volumes may well be considered together. The reporters have evidently done their whole duty in the arrangement of the cases, in the headlines and in the index. There is a suggestion, however, which we venture to make to the reporters of the second of these volumes for their consideration, with reference to their next issue. It would be well that the head line of the pages should distinguish between the two courts; so that upon. opening the book the reader would see at the first glance by which court the case was decided. It is not very important, of course, but might be a convenience. The volumes are well gotten up and are very creditable to the publisher. These volumes are sold at $1.36 each, which is decidedly cheap.

J. P. for the county aforesaid upon the view of the Dead Boddie of who is about 5 ft. 6 1-2 high, weigh about 130 pounds, dark complected, find that he came to his death by Special Deputy Constable, the said attemted to kill the said who after a tussle, managed to shoot him with a shot gun, which shot taken affect in the stomach & killed him the said who was proved to be a desperate character from the evidence & according to Law we the undersigned Justice & Jurors find that did the killing in extreme justifiable homicide and that he done it to save his own life-$2.15 was found on his person which was used to pay for a coffin and a bottle of whiskey."

There is a painful ambiguity in the last sentence of this verdict. Was the $2.15 used to pay for the coffin, and for a bottle of whisky? Or was the bottle of whisky, as well as the money, found upon the person of the deceased! As there is no probability that the verdict will be amended, there is scope for conjecture. As the deceased was found to be a "desperate character," and came to his end after a "tussle," the presumption would be that any bottle found on his person would be a whisky bottle, empty, not a bottle of whisky. We are therefore led to the conclusion that the bottle of whisky was bought with the moneyto console the survivors.

THE WAY TO SHORTEN ARGUMENT-"In general, if we are not mistaken, alert attention is the best way for a court to shorten argument, and the tendency of interruptions to engender desultory and rambling dialogues in disregard of the rules as to the opening and closing is a fertile source of prolonged and fruitless discussion. But counsel having sufficient self possession will rarely find occasion to regret an interruption, which enables him to address himself more immediately to the hinge of the controversy as it rests in the Judge's mind, or to supply needed elements in the discussion or correct misapprehension. There are, doubtless, however, counsel whose talking apparatus is in such good running order and whose supply of volatile ideas ready to expand indefinitely, when the presence of enforced silence is taken off, is so inexhaustible that interruption is the only relief, both for the bench, the adversary and the waiting calendar.Exchange.