called a "collation"-cold salad and champagne-for the usual bar dinner. We hope that mistake will not be repeated next year. A dinner is satisfactory; a socalled "collation" is a dreary abomination. It ought also to be stated that the subject of delay and uncertainty in judicial administration will probably come up for discussion at the next meeting, upon the new report of the reorganized special committee on that subject.

Another matter of special interest and of great importance, upon which the members should prepare themselves, is the report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform on the Surveillance of Professional Criminals. This report was read by Professor Simeon E. Baldwin, of Connecticut, who is understood to have been the author of it. It takes a strong and severe stand in favor of the propriety of keeping professional criminals under a State of police surveillance, as they do in France and other countries of Continental Europe. Its reading created quite an explosion of indignation from one or two members, but the cooler heads of the association seemed to take a favorable view of its recommendations. We believe that these recommendations, though severe, are on thewhole judicious. The machinery of criminal justice in vogue in most of the States is inadequate to the punishment of crime and the protection of society. Persons convicted of such crimes as burglary and larceny in dwelling houses generally return to the same occupations after serving a term in the penitentiary. The probation is of no benefit to them. It is right that the police should have them registered and should know where they

are.

Another thing which ought to engage the attention of the association in the same connection is the propriety of establishing a penal colony, say in Alaska, or in some of the islands of the Aleutian Chain. Our penitentiaries are unsuitable for professional criminals. They should be sent to a penal colony, and the colder the climate the better. A low state of the thermometer will have a tendency to improve their morals and make them better citizens when they are permitted to return after sentence or on ticket-of-leave. Our penitentiares are nurseries of crime. The professional thieves, burglars and safe-blowers are thrown together with young men who have committed such crimes as assault with intent to kill or menslaughter and who notwithstanding the same are capable of becoming good citizens. This contamination is very injurious to them. The female sewage of our large cities might also be turned into these penal colonies to wive with the ticket-of-leave men there, and in that way useful colonies might be founded.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

OH, THE WITCHES!-[Chicago, Jan. 14, 1886. Ed. Jetsam and Flotsam:] I send you the following clipping, from a recent number of The Princetonian, Princeton College, N. J., which you may deem of sufficient interest to the bar to publish in your valuable paper: J. B. S.

"An unrepealed law of New Jersey, passed while the State was a British colony, reads as follows: "That all women of whatever age, rank, profession or degree, whether virgins, maids or widows, who shall, after this act, impose upon, seduce and betray into matrimony any of his Majesty's subjects by virtue of scents, cosmetics, washes, paints, artificial teeth, false hair or high-heeled shoes, shall incur the penalty of the law now in force against witchcraft and like misdemeanors.'"

JUDGMENTS WITH AN IF.-A well considered decision against awarding an injunction in advance of imminent danger is that of Pearson, J,, in Fletcher v. Bealey, 33 Weekly Rep., 745. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from depositing vat waste from their alkali works on land lying on the bank of the Irwell, near Manchester, about a mile and a half above the plaintiff's works, on the ground that a deleterious liquid must eventually flow therefrom and get into the river to the inevitable destruction of the plaintiff's business. The plaintiff did not allege that he had suffered any damage; in fact, it was admitted that the liquid had not yet begun to flow. Held, that the plaintiff's action could not be maintained, inasmuch as to sustain a quia timet action for an injunction it must be shown that there was imminent danger, and that the danger, if it arose, would be so substantial that it would be impossible for the plaintiff to protect himself against it; that in the present case it was possible to avert the danger by a proper system of drainage; and further, before the liquid began to flow, some method of rendering it innocuous might be discovered. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Myl. & K., 169; Attorney-General v. Corporation of Kingston, 13 W. R. 888; Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co., L. R., 9 Ch. Div. 712. As the event might prove that the action was only premature, it was held that the judgment should be without prejudice to any future proceedings on the part of the plaintiff in case the operations of the defendants should occasion a nuisance, or in case the plaintiff should apprehend an immediate nuisance or danger if the operations of the defendants were continued. In contrast to this case is the recent decision by a divided court in People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., Cal., 1884, 4 Pac. Rep. 1150, to the effect that it is not the duty of a court to make provision in its final judgment for a re-opening or a renewal of a controversy which it closes by its judg ment. Therefore where it was adjudged that a plaintiff was entitled to a perpetual injunction restraining certain acts of defendant which amounted to a nuisance, it was held erroneous for the court to provide in its judgment for the annulling and setting aside of the decree when it should appear that defendant had provided means for abating such nuisance. In Rhodes v. Jenkin, 52 L. T. R., N. S., 806, a question of equity practice of some significance was determined in respect to the effect of reserving a cause for further consideration on the one hand, or, on the other, reserving leave to apply on the foot of the decree. The action was for the administration of an estate, there being trustees having the usual powers of sale and management. The decree disposed of all the questions pending and contained no clause reserving the case for further consideration; but it did give the usual general leave to either party to apply, and also special leave to apply, as to the raising of certain legacies. After the decree, the trustees went on and sold further property, and it was now claimed that because they proceeded without applying on the foot of the decree they were not entitled to costs, and their right to proceed in that manner at all was questioned. The court held against 'this contention. Pearson, J., said: If I were to say that when a suit has been instituted and everything has been done by the court which is necessary, the mere reservation of liberty to apply is to cripple all the powers of the trustees, and make an application to the court necessary for every sale or other step in the management of the estate, I should, to my mind, be perpetuating the tyranny of an administration decree for no purpose. It might be different if the sale were impeached.-Daily Register (N. Y.)

The Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, FEBRUARY 12, 1886.

CURRENT EVENTS.

THE BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR ORGAN. —Our learned and esteemed contemporary, the Albany Law Journal, continues its pessimistic attacks upon the bar associations. Not content with recommending a receiver for the bar association of its own State, it goes out of its way to say some ill-natured things concerning the American Bar Association. The Albany forgets that the bar associations cannot conveniently have more than one organ, and that the office of organ cannot conveniently go around from one law journal to another, like the office of president. We suggest, however, as the official organ of all the bar associations, whether it would not be well to make the Albany their semi-official organ, not because it is really necessary that they should have a semi-official organ, nor because these ill-natured out-croppings of the Albany do them any serious hurt, but because it might improve the feelings of a really good

man.

THE TICKET-OF-LEAVE SYSTEM.-A bill has been introduced in the legislature of Kentucky to establish a ticket-of-leave system, in so far as to allow certain convicts in the penitentiary, other than those held for certain aggravated felonies, to go outside the walls of the prison on ticket-of-leave or parole, subject to be re-arrested and incarcerated whenever they shall violate the law. The idea is a humane one, and the principle involved in it is, that certain convicts who have not committed the more heinous crimes and have behaved well while in the penitentiary, are to be allowed by the 'commissioners of the sinking fund, who are to have power to make rules for the government of the penitentiary, to go out of the penitentiary and remain outside, subject, of course, to be re-arrested for violating the law. The commissioners of the The commissioners of the sinking fund are empowered to make rules and regulations touching the terms on which these paroles are to be granted and revoked. They are, it seems, to hold the ticket-of-leave Vol. 22.-No. 7.

man by a sort of a string, as bail hold their principal, with this saving proviso that the ticket-of-leave man is to have full liberty to quit the State. This proviso is couched in such language as almost to involve an invitation to him to become a non-resident.

THE RESULTS OF THE APPOINTIVE SYSTEM. -Those who continually bewail the elective system of making judges and who praise the appointive system would do well to look a little at the workings of the latter method. If we may credit the English law journals a good many judicial appointments have been made of recent years for political reasons. The last one is the appointment which has been made of a judge to succeed Mr. Justice Lopes, of the High Court of Justice, who has been promoted to the office of Lord Justice of Appeal. Concerning this appointment the Law Times says: "The vacant judgeship has at length been filled up by an appointment which commends itself more to the party politician than to the lawyer. The new judge, as Mr. Grantham, Q. C., never enjoyed a large practice; his experience of causes such as he will have to deal with at once on the Northern Circuit is nothing, and he has not been sought after in cases involving legal difficulties. He has, however, had experience as a chairman of quarter sessions. We have had more than one judge of quarter session calibre, and he does not always fail conspicuously in the Superior Court. But no one who knows Mr. Grantham doubts that the will make a painstaking and courteous judge."

LAW BOOK MAKING RUN INTO THE GROUND. -There is reason to believe that the legal profession in America are not as much troubled with the multiplicity of indifferent law books as are the legal profession in England. All sorts of monographs are coming out in that country in cloth binding by young lawyers, bearing the imprint of reputable publishers. We have just received a curious specimen page of one of these, entitled "Notes on the Law of Master and Servant, with all the authorities, by James Paterson, M. A., Barrister-at-Law." We subjoin a

dence for that purpose. cial notice of some circumstances outside of an act which go to show its meaning, and in doing so they frequently take a wide range of illustration and investigation from public records, public documents, general and local history, and other matters of such general and public notoriety as may be supposed to have been in the minds of all the legislators when the act was passed, but they never admit the opinions and evidence of individual witnesses for that purpose."

TELEGRAPH COMPANY. [NON-DELIVERY OF MESSAGE-WOUNDED FEELINGS AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES.] NON-DELIVERY OF MESSAGE CONTAINING NOTICE OF FUNERAL OF DECEASED RELATIVE.-In Blakeney v. Western Union Telegraph Co., the question recently came before the Hon. Azro Dyer, judge of a court of Nisi Prius at Evansville, Ind., whether an action for damages could be sustained against a telegraph company for failing to deliver a message by reason of which the person to whom it had been directed, had failed of the opportunity of attending the funeral of hist brother. The learned judge held that, while a plaintiff might be entitled to recover the penalty given by the statute for such nonfeasance, he could not recover substantial damages, because wounded feelings are not of themselves a ground for the recovery of damages. He therefore sustained a demurrer to the complaint, delivering a short written opinion, in the course of which he said: "By the present action John Blakeney charges that the telegraph company was guilty of negligence in failing to deliver the message, and he asks damages against the company in the sum of one thousand dollars for his mental distress and wounded feelings occasioned by this negligence. The question presented is whether an action can be maintained for this mental suffering. It is true that telegraph companies are liable for special damages occasioned by their negligence.

3 The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 37; Blake v. National Banks, 23 Wall. 317; Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 42; Blake v. United States, 103 U. S. 235; Wilson v. Spalding, 19 Fed. Rep. 304; State v. New Orleans Pacific R. R., 30 La. Ann. 980; People v. Stevens, 71 N.Y. 527; Fisher v. United States, 15 Ct. Cls. 323; Fendall v. United States, 16 Ct. Cls. 121.

sarily, but naturally and approximately. And the question remains whether mental suffering comes within the statutory rule. In many actions at law distress of mind becomes an important factor in estimating damages. Such damages enter into the recovery, when the plaintiff has sustained, by the negligence or wilful act of another, some corporal or personal injury; but mental suffering alone, unconnected with any other injury to the person, will not support an action. No case can be found where a person has been allowed to recover damages for a shock, injury or outrage to the feelings, unaccompanied by an injury to the person. A different doctrine would lead to absurd and curious litigation. Take, for example, a railroad collision; it is proper that every passenger on the train who is personally injured should recover for the negligence, but shall every one who was frightened by the collision, maintain an action against the company? In a proper case the sender of a message may recover the statutory penalty of one hundred dollars for negligence on the part of the telegraph company, but the statute does not authorize the receiver of the message to recover this penalty."

CARRIERS OF GOODS. [COMMON CARRIERNEGLIGENCE.] - RAILWAY COMPANY TRANSPORTING A CIRCUS NOT A COMMON CARRIER AND MAY STIPULATE AGAINST LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF ITS SERVANTS.-The case of Coup v. Wabash, etc. R. Co.," is a little old, having been decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan on January 28th, 1885; but it is, perhaps, sufficiently novel to deserve even a late notice. The court held that a railway company that contracts with a circus proprietor as a hirer, and not as a common carrier, to furnish men and motive power to transport his circus in special cars owned by him, said cars to be operated under the management, direction, orders, and control of the said proprietor, or his agent, and by means of said employees as his agents, but to run according to the rules, regulations, and time tables of

43 Sutherland on Damages, 715; Russel v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 18 Rep. 206. 5 22 N. W. Repr. 215.

the company, from a point designated to cer tain other points, at greatly reduced rates, with the privilege of stopping at places and times stated to give exhibitions, is not liable as a common carrier, and may stipulate for exemption from responsibility for damages caused by the negligence of its servants while in this special employment. In giving the opinion of the court, Campbell, J., said: It cannot be claimed on any legal principle that plaintiff could, as a matter of right, call upon defendant to move his trains under such circumstances and on such conditions; and if he could not, then he could only do so on such terms as defendant saw fit to accept. It was perfectly legal and proper, for the greatly reduced price, and with the risks and trouble arising out of moving peculiar cars and peculiar contents on special excursions and stoppages, to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for consequences which might follow from carelessness of their servants while in this special employment. How far, in the absence of contract, they would be liable in such a mixed employment, where plaintiff's men, as well as their own, had duties to perform connected with the movement and arrangement of the business, we need not consider.

It is a misnomer to speak of such an arrangement as an agreement for carriage at all. It is substantially similar to the business of towing vessels, which had never been treated as carriage. It is, although on a a larger scale, analogous to the business of furnishing horses and drivers to private carriages. Whatever may be the liability to third persons who are injured by carriages or trains, the carriage owner cannot hold the persons he employs to draw his vehicles as carriers. We had before us a case somewhat resembling this in more or less of its features in Mann v. White River Log & Booming Co., where it was sought to make a carrier's liability attach to log-driving, which we held was not permissible. All of these special undertakings have peculiar features of their own, but they cannot be brought within the range of common carriage. It is, therefore, needless to discuss the other questions in the case, which involve several rulings open to criticism. We think the defendant was not liable in the action, and it should have been taken

646 Mich. 38; s. c., 8 N. W. Rep. 550.

If a

from the jury and a verdict ordered of no cause of action. This decision can only be supported on principle on the ground that the contract was not a contract under which the railroad company undertook to do anything beyond furnishing to the plaintiff certain rolling stock andmen to operate the same to be managed at his own risk. man undertakes to do anything, whether by himself or by another, for a consideration, however small, it is absurd to say that a stipulation in the undertaking exempting him from liability for not doing it, or from doing it negligently, is good; it is repugnant to the main purpose of the contract, and is like the clause in a deed which grants an estate in fee and then says that the grantee shall not have the power of alienation; and in this regard it can make no difference whether the service which he undertakes to perform is that of a common carrier or not. It is not doubted, however, that it is competent for a railway company, in a contract for such a special and peculiar undertaking as the transportation of a circus, to agree with the proprietor that it will do no more than hire to the proprietor certain rolling stock and, certain men for the time being, both to be under the control of the proprietor, except so far as it may be necessary for the defendant to control them in keeping open its railway for the safe running of other trains. In such a case the railway employees so hired to the circus proprietor would cease for the time being to be servants of the railway company, and would become, pro hac vice, the servants of the circus proprietor. In that light and construing the contract in that way, the decision of the Michigan court can be upheld, and upon no other ground.

MUNICIPAL AND QUASI- MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.

Some of the most interesting and intricate questions in the domain of modern law have arisen out of the contracts of municipal and quasi-municipal bodies. An abstract of the decisions on the subject, cannot, therefore, fail to be useful to the practitioner.

Contracts of Strictly Municipal Corporations. -A municipal corporation, unless in some way